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Gendlin: That was much better than I expected.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Well, first, I want to say that this is not my usual voice. It hasn't quite come back yet. I'm recovering from an operation, and I'm really fine, but it'll take a while for everything to get normalized. Next, I want to say that right now, after Bob Scharff and the others, I'm well off. So it's at some risk that I talk at all.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: If I disappoint you, go right back to whatever Bob and the others said.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: So I don't usually use the words "trust" or "truth," because for me, the big words have so many different meanings that what I do when somebody uses.....I love the big words, too, but when someone uses them, then I always want to know, "Just here in this spot, in this sentence, at this juncture, what does this word mean, or do for you? If this word could mean just exactly what you mean by it... here... what would it mean?" And I ask very gently, "What would it mean?" I don't say "Define your term."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Because if I ask it very gently, then typically, out come three or four very poetic, metaphorical, rich, fresh sentences, and those are very valuable. So that is a method that we've now developed, called *Thinking at the Edge*. Everything I say is much better on our webpage, so put in "Focusing" and click "Philosophy" and you'll see it all there.

So if I'm going to talk about truth, then I have to talk about, first of all, some phrase that I need. For example, "the implicit explicit truth", or "the implicit truth that includes also the explication, and then still has the implicit with it." Something like that. "The implicit explicit truth." Well, that's only one kind of truth, but truth is *at least* that. It can be *many* more things.

And this is a formula that I find very handy: I say, "Well, what I'm talking about is one kind of that." And so then I don't take away anybody's other things. I don't want to take anything away from anybody. And besides, I also have other kinds of truth, too, of course. Many. Operational results of experiments, or there's a kind of truth that, when I say....when I'm in conflict, I say to

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myself, "Well, what I want is the truth," and that makes me all whole. I don't have any idea what it is, but *I'm* whole, because *my wanting* is whole.

So there are many kinds of truth that *I* care about. The one I want to talk to and know the most about is the "implicit explicit"-- two terms you need for this one. And trust, similarly. I don't like "trust," because people keep saying, "Trust your feelings." *I* don't think you should.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: *I* can't. And they say "Trust other people." Well, I trust other people to be the way that they've been. So however somebody's been, I pretty well trust them to go on being that way.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: But that's not what *they* mean by "trust." So I don't use that word, but if I were to use it, I would say, then, "Trust not the *feelings*, but the *process*." And by the process -- for short, "trust the process" -- what I mean is that we want to *receive* every different feeling. We want to *welcome* every different feeling, no matter how horrible, gruesome, whatever it may be, say, "Oh, yeah, there you are." In Afghanistan, where they're teaching focusing, they do it via the poet Rumi, who says that you own the guest house, and every feeling that comes is a guest. And welcome them at the door, no matter what they look like. It's a hospitality concept, you see.

What that means is that you are *not* your feelings. You're welcoming them, and in welcoming them, you sense yourself as none of those things. You *have* them. They're guests. You take them in and you give them a room in your guest house.

That's an important kind of "I" that I may not have time to come back to. It's the kind of "I" that's....it's self-owned, and it's not a content. It *has* all the contents.

So I would say, "Trust the process by which you can go in and say, "Now what is this feeling bringing me... more... here?" And then you will see that with every feeling goes a larger cloud, sort of. An "Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah," and if you pay direct attention to that at-first-unclear larger sense, then little steps come. "Oh," you say, "that's right. I see how I got that. It was......" And, "Oh, yeah, another thing about it......" "Oh, yeah, it's because of this....." "Oh, yeah, it reminds me of that." And, "Oh, yeah, I need to do this and this."

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So I would go on and say, "There is a process possible with little steps, and that process, you can trust." We can come back later and see where it ends, but you can trust it because at every step, you're glad you got that far. "Oh, yeah, I see." And so it helps you at each step, even though there are further steps. In that sense, the explicit implicit truth is never finished. And why would you want it to be finished?

[Laughter]

Gendlin: This is a question that I ask, "Why would you want to impoverish "being" to that extent that you want it to finish?" It doesn't finish. It creates and creates and creates. It creates us, and *through* us it creates, and it doesn't finish. Each new person is a whole new ballgame of creation. So why do you want it to be less than that? But even if you do, and you know *why* you want it to be less than that, it *won't* be. It's gonna go right on.

Now, I want to say that *no* concept, no logical form, no "shape," I said in my title, no picture, no explicit event is ever going to be "the Truth." But if you take the explicit event or the concept or the idea, the diagram, or whatever it is, if you take it *together with* where it comes from in you, if you take it *together with* what some people want to call "the context," -- which is pretty good, everything has an experienced context, that "cloud behind the feeling" that I was talking about -- if you take any explicit, any logical form, any diagram, any picture, any concept, *together with* where it's speaking *from*, then you have something, some truth, some angle, some entry into what's going on.

If you wanted to say... or if I had said, "The truth is always implicit," I don't think that's right, either. It's always implicit, *and* has already created something from it. But if you go back into the implicit that comes with it, then the implicit becomes more. Oh, this thought that you've just had isn't only itself, it opens up the "where it comes from," so that it has made more than if you hadn't had the thought.

So we want to respect *both* the concept and the "where it comes from," because the "where it comes from" develops through the concept, through the creation, and the sharper the concept is, the *more* it develops.

So, as I know you said, the implicit is no invitation to be rounder or stay fuzzier, or look down on precise work. Just the opposite. The more precise your concepts are, the more they open the implicit further so that then you have even more to say.

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But I am saying negatively, *no* concept, no logical picture, no form, is ever *directly* true of whatever is. There's always an implicit intricacy, I call it. You can call it whatever you want. There's always "that." Anything we study is really "that". Whatever big word you want, reality is always..... "whatever-we-study" is modest. "Reality" is very big. I don't care what you say, "the truth," "reality," "whatever we study," the smallest specific detail, "what Plato meant by this sentence," large or small, it's always an implicit intricacy. But what is implicit intricacy? It's us, in a way. *And* that thing.

So we are always already in interaction with whatever we study before we start studying it, of course. So that....a way of saying this fast is to say, "Interaction is first, *then* you sort it out. The implicit intricacy that you live is first, *then* you sort it out. But, of course, when we go to school, they make us learn all these finished conclusions, and so then we have to *recover* from that. Most people have to recover from what was called "thinking" in school.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: So, by this time, people here will probably have already recovered from it. But it is important to see that, unfortunately, we start kids with the concepts first. They're supposed to learn these, and then they're supposed to monger around with them and rearrange them, but only a little or they won't get them right. And that way, thinking *dies*.

Fortunately, they don't start school 'til they're six or five or now four or something terrible. But anyhow, thinking starts....*real* thinking starts from the implicit intricacy that you already are. And it's an interaction with things. I'll come back to saying, "What about the assumption that reality, or whatever we study, is already some fixed way; we're just confused about it." I'll be back to that.

Trust the process of steps, of opening, of explicating. Trust the implicit explicit truth. So it requires noticing that there *is* this "implicit," noticing that there *is* more with it, whatever it is you've said *or thought*. Just go back behind it and say, "Where'd that come from?" and "Uh." And don't be scared just because all you have is "Uh." Now, that's something worth talking about.

[Laughter]

When you *first* do this -- and I don't think that's true of any of you here. You probably do it whenever you think, anyhow -- people who think are accustomed to the fact that the unfinished,

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uncomfortable, but pregnant sort of "uhh" is worth more than the 25 things that we could say off the top of our head if we had to say something. Right? So maybe that's good enough.

But if you don't know about Focusing, that's what we call "Focusing," to spend time -- and it might be ten seconds or 20 seconds -- to spend time actually attending to this somewhat uncomfortable, but pregnant "uhhh," to know that something can come there. And then something will. And then it's, "Oh, yeah."

Once it comes, you're glad you didn't go with all the things off the top of your head that you already know. But until it comes, you feel sort of....I mean, even after years of doing it, you know *so* many things, and you're *so* smart, and you have such beautiful things to say, do you really have to stand here in front of this gray wall and just be....(gesture)? And the answer is "Yes, you do have to." That's the process to trust.

Okay. Now, noticing this – I mean "noticing this" I mean in three ways. First, I invite you just to follow me intellectually, because I have general philosophical things to say, and you can follow those. So even if you don't do anything with this Focusing stuff, you can follow me when I talk about that. "Oh, yeah, there is always a context, there is always an implicit, and there is an implicit-explicit relation, and there are complicated connections between implicit and explicit," and you can follow me.

But secondly, I would say privately, inside yourself, do see if it doesn't also apply there, really, to you, where *you* think. Especially where you think about something that you *want* to think about, something that you have a feel for, and you're not finished with. Because you can do that right away.

And thirdly, I would even invite you to explore either our training, or merely my assertion that if you spend a lot of time doing that, the space gets bigger and bigger there. You can do things after a while that you couldn't do at the beginning. There is a deepening that goes on there, and we have even a training for it. And you might even like to know about our training, even if you don't need it, because eventually....never mind.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: I was gonna joke and say "You'll send somebody *else* to it."

[Laughter]

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Gendlin: Now, this business about "no conclusion, no concept, no form, no diagram, no shape is ever directly true," which I'm asserting, has been a terrible block in philosophy, and still is in many circles today. Somehow, philosophers were taught to believe that philosophy is the *conclusions*. And it has become understood that no conclusion necessarily holds, so people are running around saying "Nothing holds. There's nothing at the bottom. It's all up to you." Even my classes, I used to argue with. "Any questions?" "Oh, it's up to you, you know." I say, "Well, if I call you at midnight for advice on a problem, you're gonna tell me it's up to me? I know it's up to me. Didn't you go to the University of Chicago? Don't you know something about *how* to think? I know the conclusion is up to me." But philosophy, I'm here to say, is *not* the conclusions. And *never was*.

All the way back to where philosophy – at least what *we* call philosophy – began back there with Heraclitus in....what is it now, 3,500 years ago or something? How far ago? 800 or so B.C. or something? It's only...it's less than 3,000 years ago. It's been known that no concept, no set of words, no single thought necessarily holds. Consequently, even to say *that* doesn't necessarily hold.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: You see? And that's been understood by philosophers, by *all* philosophers. So when you read a philosophy....Now, there are two things to say. When you read a philosophy, what I advise is, "Go and stand where that philosopher is standing. And put yourself into doing what that philosopher is doing." Then you will discover where that philosopher gets the terms from, because every philosopher introduces new terms.

They use words like "truth" and "trust" and "being" and "beauty" and "self," and all those big words/ But they always mean something by it, which you don't know right away when you start reading it. You have to read quite a bit of it before you say, "Oh, *I* see." Because the words....Where does the philosophy get those differently-meaning words? Well, they get them by dipping into the implicit *somewhere* and coming out of there again.

And so, you want to do two things, which, for me, come to the same thing, but you might want to do it differently. So what I'm sure of is: to understand the philosophy, stand where that philosopher is standing. And that's true of all of them, not just the most recent one.

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You go back to Plato and see what he's doing, and you discover, "Oh, he uses different meanings in each dialogue." "Oh, he doesn't believe in the theory of forms that they teach us in school. He has this whole dialogue ridiculing the theory of forms." It's called the Parmenides, and they don't read it. Read the first half of the Parmenides. It's easy to read and it's fun. And Plato's making fun of Platonism there. We say, "Well, if that's not what he's doing, what *is* he doing? Where *does* he get his terms?" Well, then you see: right *on the page*, he gets them. All of a sudden, you see: in everything he's *doing*, he's making new terms.

Aristotle got a little impatient with him because there's different terms in every few paragraphs. Aristotle decided to save some of the good terms. But you see that when Aristotle did that, he knew why Plato was doing that other thing. So Aristotle puts the terms, but then he says "The things are not....*don't* have the terms in them." Where we have three different things, we say, "A human being is an animal and a "this" and a "that." Those things are not in the *thing*. So again, you say, "Well....Uh" – see what I mean?

He knows about the implicit intricacy. He's making sure that the terms remain not stupid, not cut-off conclusions, not assertions directly of reality, or of any single thing, even. The thing is one. Our definition.....So it goes on right through philosophy. And if you do that, you learn these tremendously valuable things from these old philosophers. It's not *at all* true that they are just whatever Heidegger or McKeon or somebody else tells you about them. Because that's just one *more* scheme.   .

Okay, I want to combine two things that I already said. When you allow the sharp concepts that these people create, when you allow the sharp concepts to work in the implicit, it *opens* the implicit more. But when you stand in between the assertions and the implicit, you can go from there in ways that *that* philosopher *didn't* go.

And that's *really* what's exciting. It's not all that exciting to see what Plato did. It's exciting to see that *I* can do that, too. I can take any concepts and play with them until it opens, and then....And Plato, you know, refused to write without at least a fictional character. For Plato's method, you have to have a *person*, because the contradiction doesn't do *anything*; it just cancels out. "You said *this*, and now, see, it comes to *that*." And you're just lost, that's all. The only way you can go *on* with the dialectic is if you have a *person* who says, "What the hell did I *mean*? I didn't mean this contradiction."

[Laughter]

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And he goes back in there, and he uses *that* to improve what he's trying to say, because the sharpness of the concept opens *his* implicit.

Now, I have to go very fast and apologize, because now I'm gonna do something bad. I'm gonna just do a lot of *assertions*, a lot of *conclusions*. All right? But I will say that most of my philosophy is on the web page. It's all there. You can pull it down, you can give it to anybody. You have my permission to use it in any form whatsoever, or argue with, do anything with it.

Okay, so my second little unit here: Today, we have constructivism and objectivism, right? And they're both right about each other.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: They know that they're talking nonsense, but they also know that the opponents are even worse, and so it's okay. But constructivism and objectivism *share* the assumption that I'm attacking. Namely, that the organized, clear, conceptual stuff is the only order that there is. I'm saying, "No, the implicit intricacy that we *are,* in interaction with everything, this is a *greater* order, a more precise order, and a different order. So that if all the concepts and all the objective entities that are measured collapse or change all the time, that's all right, because that's not the only order.

So, to me, objectivism and constructivism are the same thing. They both assume that you've gotta believe --and you can't -- these entities, these forms, these concepts, these already-finished things, cut off from the making of them. Somebody like Dennet wants to make a computer and then jump into it. Well....

Audience member: Well, I wish him well. We would be rid of him.

[Crosstalk, Laughter]

Gendlin: Well, I want to say, about trust, that science – well, let me say first that the habits of bad philosophy -- well, I don't know if there is such a thing as bad philosophy. Then it's not really philosophy.-- But the habits that people have, they're in the habit of taking the *conclusion*, as if there *has* to be a conclusion by itself -- and, "Oh, my God, there isn't" -- that you can trust.

And so, also the so-called objectivists, the people who want to say "Trust science," want you to trust *this year's* science. Last year already, they said something else, and next year, they're gonna say a lot more in *different* terms, so obviously, trust the science of a

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hundred years from now or, as my slogan goes, trust *the process*. The *process* of science you can trust, actually.

But if you look closely, you see that *science* doesn't trust it's *concepts*. They're all busy changing them *right now*. Science trusts the results of experiments. Well, what *is* an experiment? An experiment is an interaction. It's like you build something out of your concepts, but then, as that wonderful cartoon a couple of years ago has a woman standing, and the whole place is full of huge machinery and computers, and she's got the plug in her hand, and she says, "Well, I guess since we have to plug it in, we're still in control."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: So an experiment is taking the best that we know right now, the explicit concepts, build the machines from it, the entities that we know -- it's taking *that* and putting it into *interaction*, in "reality," you want to say, or in "the world," or in "nature" maybe, whatever word you like for that. "In the truth," we could say.

Because one meaning of "truth" – always at least one meaning of those big words – one meaning of "truth" is that we live in the truth....*already*. Then what we *say* might be false, but we already *live* in the truth. So we don't want to treat nature as if it were only something out there that we puzzle about. By that time, we're adult or, as one of my friends says about Piaget, "He thinks the child is a little scientist all by itself. "

[Laughter]

Gendlin: No, we live, period. There's already the truth, and there's already interaction. But when the scientists take their conclusions and their machines and turn them on -- and Bob (where did you go?) has these delightful stories about this, which maybe he will tell one later -- what *then* happens can surprise you. And it can surprise you not only in the terms that you wanted to be surprised, it can also surprise you in a *totally* different way. It can blow up or it can make noise, it can do all kinds of different things. So that even though they don't *call* it that, for science, too, interaction is primary.

Then I have a very careful, very hard-to-read paper called *The Responsive Order*, in which I argue that this should be taken into how we *think about* empiricism, instead of some people saying you trust the results, and some people saying, "No, you made up the hypotheses so, therefore, you can't trust anything."

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That's not true. None of my constructivist friends would like to get on an airplane that wasn't tested, you know?

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Even though that can crash, too, of course. We know that. So then we test it, then we build further and we think further and we try this and we try that, and we make new words and new things, and we do more and more. And pretty soon, the old stuff doesn't work anymore and then you've got a new set of terms, and if you go back and look for what was true 30 years ago, you can't even find it in the library. It's over in the "History of Science" section, because now, the terms are all completely different.

So, trust the process, I'm saying, and don't mind the fact that it's never finished, because why do you want it finished? But I do have to say one more thing, and my time is going away, so I've gotta say it real fast.

There is an error that pervades Western philosophy. It's the error of thinking that the *map*, the finished concepts, the clarity, is basic to the operations. I'm arguing that the *operations* are basic, and the clarity changes every few years. But *they* want to say it, because the clarity "*explains*." So you have to look and see what "explains" is. And I haven't got time to go into it, but you all have the experience of what "explains" is, and it's a very precious experience. "Oh," you say, "*that's* how it works." *Yes*, the concepts are very precious. *Yes*, the machines are very precious, because they explain and they let us do things. All right?

We couldn't be six billion people on this earth right now if it weren't for science and all the machines and all the explaining. So the explaining is *extremely legitimate*. It's just that it changes every few years, and the interaction is what controls change. So you have to know that the scientific concepts and the entities and what we build and what we make is *very* precious, and very legitimate. It's just that you can't forget that you're here, too, and that all the science is going on *in this wider context*.

And every scientist really knows that, because they try to revise every theory when it doesn't work. And what do they do when they revise a theory? Well, they "focus." They go in and say, "Now, what else do I know here?" and "How can I find the way that still correlates everything else with...?" – and so I don't have a lot to say about that.

But the mistake I want to point to -- the big mistake -- is just to think the map is basic to the operations. But that's very technical.

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The mistake I'm talking about is that logic is precious, right? It's sacred. It creates. But it depends on the units. To have logic, you have to already have these discrete entities that have nothing inside but themselves, sort of like. They're all made of lead or butter, right through, and they have only external relations.

Logic, the way it is understood – and I question that – but logic, the way it is understood, is only external relations, also known as "formal relations." Much of Western philosophy wants to know why logic – and mathematics, which is also like logic – why it *applies* to nature.

Well, it applies because we make *entities*. And we make entities and build the world with it. So don't put that down. But we *make* them. So, pay attention to the making of the entities, the making of the logical units, the way we unitize so that we can then use logic.

And so I'm saying both that it's legitimate and sacred, and also, that it happens within the wider interaction that we *are*, already, before we even start to think. After all, we don't only *study* things, we also walk around on things, right? And we *live* with things and we *eat* things and we *inhale* things. We don't just *only* observe them or interpret them. The interaction was always first.

Now, I want to tell you that I have a great deal of detail. First of all, -- and here, I can just throw things out and stop. The basic terms need to be different. I have what is perhaps a crude, but after all, the first – I always say this about Heidegger, but *now*, I'm going to say it about myself.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: I always say about Heidegger, "Well, pioneers can't *give* you finished products. So take where he opens things and don't worry about the fact that he contradicts himself someplace or falls back in again. Well, that's what you expect from pioneers. So treat my process model the same way, please. It's the first attempt, and it works to some extent, to set up primitive terms that are *both* implicit-explicit. The basic terms of which I start are "implying" and "occurring." That we can start without assuming static "is-es"; that we can start with a living process instead of "is-es" that we interpret in various ways.

"It" -- reality, nature, you, me, the dog, anything we study, one sentence of Plato's, *anything* – "it" is *both* a particular shape *and* an implicit, an implying. If you start with something that's *both*, then the terms become – are - different than the usual terms. And yet, I have a way of reducing it back to the usual terms. If you

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need to link with all the data that we have, that's all captured in the usual terms.

With that model, I can do a lot of things. One of the things that I can do – and I'm going to talk a little fast now – is to *derive* the way we make logical units, and that's Chapter 7. But I recommend you looking at it, because it's my favorite chapter.

I can *derive* the empty space and these entities, these closed, fixed entities. These entities, you know, they only move because they're patterned, and you have to think of "What *is* actually a logical form or a pattern?" A pattern is something that can move just as the pattern, and ignore everything else. When it ignores everything else, it makes something interesting.

When a pattern moves from this to that – you see, the monkeys can't figure out how to even make a length out of two sticks that fit into each other. They begin to, they're close to it, but they can't. Whereas a person says, "Oh, this is too far for this stick and this stick and they don't fit. I need something this long." And can *think* this thing that's this long, and looks up in the tree and says, "Oh, there's one," and pulls it down and strips it off and has a length.

What is that? Well, that's a pattern, by which I mean it ignores the leaves and it ignores all the tree and it ignores everything, and it just moves the pattern from here, where it's missing, to there, where I see it. Are you following me?

Now, *that's* how things "only move." Everybody that *I* have read assumes that "only moving" is basic, but "only moving" is *not* basic. "Only moving" is a human, symbolic creation, a very complicated mathematical creation in which you're dealing with quantities, with length, with patterns. And I can derive this. Or I *have*. Or if you don't like how I did it, you can do it better.

It's important to know, though, that the empty space and the linear time are not basic. Well, Heidegger already said that, and so did many other people, but I *will* say this. You do – *we* do, as a society – maybe *you* don't, but *we*, as a society need to understand logic and the creation of lengths and of empty space and so forth. We need to understand it, because we have no way right now to *use* science. There are people who – they prefer 25 herbs mixed, as long as they don't know what they are, because they won't have anything to do with science. And then there are the other people who trust science and think that they themselves are the neurological cell firings. You know what I mean?

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Well, I'm here to say, "No, no. You are not the atoms and you're not the organic chemistry that people said I was when I was a student. And now, you're not the neurology either, dear." Those are unit screens, unit creations, but we're very grateful for them, and they can cure things that we couldn't cure before, so I'm not putting it down. No, no, no.

Twenty years from now, they'll have an even different screen. But we need a society-wide understanding, because the critique *alone* is helpless. We've had the critique now for a hundred years or more and logic has gone on and changed the entire world, right under our feet. Changed how we *write* our critique, even, on the computers now. Right? How do my friends critique science electronically?

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Anyway, we need to understand both the legitimacy *and* the limitations of logic and science so that we can *use* them as a society, instead of each person sort of fumbling around, "Would I rather have a tea of 24 mixed herbs or go to the doctor?"

Well, I have to say that I have a lot of methodological stuff, some of which you might like, about how the implicit and the explicit carry each other forward, what they do to each other, what happens to dialectic, what happens to logic, what happens to various other ways of conceptualizing, if you put them into this zigzag where you increase the implicit by the sharp concepts, and then you come up with new sharp concepts. You might want to see some of that.

I want to say, again, that having just looked at stuff about "being" and "truth," that "being" and "truth" *can't* very well be much less than you and me are; don't you think?

[Laughter]

Gendlin: The universe can't possibly just be an external, something observed from a distance, because we're *here*, and where would this be? I mean, isn't this the universe, too?

[Laughter]

Gendlin: So, anything, really, that you take --not just the big universe -- anything, any little thing, opens up into all sorts of possibilities that go further.

This creativity is never finished, and it shouldn't be. I think a really simple way is to say, "Some people want to blame concepts or language for getting stuck. And you all know what that's like,

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because we have a beautiful thought and we tell it to a certain person, and we analyze it, and it's dead, and we go home and wonder what we thought was so exciting. That happens. But it also happens the other way. There's that rare person where, if you tell it to them, it opens up and then there's more, and then there's still more, and then you think of more, and then you wonder, did you have all that at the beginning?

[Laughter]

Gendlin: That's right. Both of these can happen, and they're both language. So the power of language to open things up, to make fresh sentences from what seemed to you vague, is what I want to emphasize. So don't blame language. There's a lot of this stuff now where they think language just consists of the public meanings, and so if you say anything, then you have "fallen into language."

This is very stylish to say, but I think it's very dumb, because didn't this person ever say something *fresh* from what they felt or thought or experienced or saw or lived, or what? Because if you do that, it comes out metaphorical. It comes out words – "the same 600,000 English words -- but saying new things, new combinations, in new ways, and *you* can do that.

The way to prevent it from killing is to check inside every moment. "Does this carry forward what I had there?" And if it says, "No, *[Speaker makes a noise]*," say "Okay, never mind. Throw that out. That – I didn't mean that." And it recovers, and then after a while, you say another thing. You say *[Speaker Makes Noise]*. Okay, okay, that not either.

And you think with the "not-yet-spoken," and of course, all the things that....all the words that come, until you get one that *takes* it, carries it *further*, and *that's* the one you keep. Then you go on from there. If you do that, then it never kills it. Are you following me? Even with a person that doesn't understand it, you go back and you say, "There" – like with a child, you say, "There, there, there. That man doesn't understand. That's okay. Let's go this way." And keep your...*protect* your beginning place there.

We have a very well worked out set of steps called *Thinking at the Edge*, which I would like you to look at. We teach those steps. Once you know the steps, of course, the hell with the steps. Same with Focusing or anything else. Steps are for teaching, to help a person find it. Once they find it – see, that's why I don't like "Gendlin's-whatever-you-said."

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[Crosstalk]

Gendlin: It can't be "Gendlin's dot, dot, dot," because it's *yours,* and there is nobody else has it. Oh, yeah, that's another thing. Many of us are terribly private and shy about what we think, and that's fine, but you do have to know that if you don't think from there, it's lost, because nobody else has your "dot, dot, dot." Now, that may burden you with responsibility, or excite you. I don't know, but it's true. Each person is a different take. Leibnitz already said it very well. Each person is a different take on whatever you studied, that sentence or the universe or whatever it is.

Okay, now I have two minutes to say....back to – I want to just *own* that I come from -- and I made a list, and of course, it's incomplete, but again, it's *at least* -- where's my list? It's here somewhere. Oh, I know where it is. It's right here. I come *at least* from Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, pragmatism, like Dewey, Dilthey, Whitehead, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merlo-Ponty, and Wittgenstein. Without any of those, I couldn't be here this way. There's probably more than – there's at *least* those. And I have learned *different* things from them, not the same thing. But they all dip into the implicit in a way that you might want to see. And more important, where they *stand* will open up for you more than *they* say, and more than *I* say.

So I think it wants to be my last message here --and I'm on time -- to say "Don't treat a philosopher as a bunch of conclusions, cut off from the process." That isn't philosophy. Philosophy is a way of coming from....it's a way of opening where we *come from*. It's a way of dealing with the fact that you can't ever really say anything if you're gonna take what you say as the final conclusion. That's been known *throughout* philosophy. So you'll want to know, "How does *this* philosophy deal with that? What was *this* philosopher's strategy? Where did this philosopher dip in and come out to get those new terms?" Or "Did Heidegger just sit down and type out *Being and Time*," and just start with that.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Because if you do that, then these philosophers become alive, and philosophy becomes alive, and you become alive. Again, people who came to this, well, you're *already* thinking, but so many people *rediscover* thinking. They haven't had "thinking" since they were four or three or something. In our TAE they rediscover thinking, and they're so excited, because they can think, and they wanted always to be able to, and they couldn't.

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So let any philosopher – if you've already mastered any one text, then take *that* one, of course, because the sharper you've mastered it, the more it will do – and let it show you where it comes *from*, because that's also what it *opens*. And there, you can think further. Heidegger said -- Heidegger *pleaded* with people to do this, just what I'm saying -- "Please think further. Please think further." When Frings started The Heidegger Circle, Heidegger was still alive. He wrote Frings a letter and said, "Please don't call it the Heidegger Circle. Please call it the Circle for the Question of Being or the Question of What Is, or something like that." Of course, it was called The Heidegger Circle, of course. And it repeats what Heidegger said year in, year out, except for references to current events or other philosophers, you could shuffle the papers and they're all about Heidegger's finger, if you see what I mean.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Well, it's very important to study his finger, because his finger points – and by his finger, I mean the precise concepts that he laid down. It's very valuable to study the *precision* of those concepts, but it's also deadly to cut them off from where that whole thing is pointing. That's why he kept saying that. He said "A philosopher can't jump over his own shadow." He meant himself. He said, "It's too much to ask of me to now overcome what I've brought. I can't do that. You have to do that."

So I want to say that orthodoxy, in *that* sense, is very important and precious, because it keeps the precision, but it also kills what it preserves. So we need *both*. Okay? We need to *go on* from where these philosophers have opened things, and we also need to, of course, preserve them or keep them, so that other people can go on from there.

And there, I stop. Right on time.

Bob Scharff: Precisely on time, Gene.   Which opens up the implicit again, doesn't it.

Gendlin: Well, but of course, it's good old linear time; it's a human creation. *Is* it a human creation?

Audience Member: It is and it isn't.

Gendlin: Anyway, give me trouble, please.

Male Participant #1: Thank you for the talk, first off. And there are two points I have. First, this conference is about "Trust."

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Gendlin: Wait a minute. We're taping, right? Where's the man who's taping? There you are.

Audio Man: It'll pick up everybody's voice.

Gendlin: It does even now?

Audio Man: Yes.

Gendlin: That's wonderful. OK, go ahead.

Male Participant #1: And so I'm wondering....I think what's shared in this room is the trust in *philosophy,* in the *process* of philosophy. That's my one point.

Gendlin: Yes!

Male Participant #1: And I think your talk illuminated that for me. I have this trust in philosophy, that's why I'm *here*.

Gendlin: Yes!

Male Participant #1: I can't, even if I try....this process....of *course*, questions arise about philosophizing and reading all these, you know, dusty texts and trying to get something out of them. But then I realize that's part of philosophy, and I have to take that. Even *that's*....so....   .

Gendlin: Yes.

Male Participant #1: ....I was just wondering if that's a good way of thinking about "trust" also. A way of thinking about "trust."

Gendlin: Yes. Absolutely. Yes, well, I could add to that, but yes. I would say, y*es*, I sign what he's saying. *Yes,* I'm arguing that you can trust philosophy, if you take it as *the process*.   And yes, what you said is important there. It takes a graduate student in philosophy about a year or two to figure out even what philosophy *is*. And that's how it is. It's difficult to get on this meta-level, where you're really thinking about concepts. You don't have any *concepts*. You're thinking *about* them. Philosophy is very peculiar. It isn't *about* anything, it seems. So, I don't know if you meant that, but there was a hint....

Male Participant #1: It's about *itself,* in an important way.

Gendlin: Yes. Yes, you're trusting the process of *you* figuring out what the hell philosophy even *is*. And I'd say "yes" to that process.

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Because by the time you say fancy things, you've done a lot of trusting already.

Male Participant 2:   Gene, you've talked a lot about....I was struck in this marvelous speech that you really put together so much of your thought....One theme that kept coming up is "where?" Where you stand, where you're coming from, even, you added at the very end, where you're aiming *at*. Could you say more about that adverb? That "where?" Because, of course, we know it's not a definite location. It isn't a *particular* point. On the other hand, it is a very spatial term and it's very striking to me that you've used it so often. So it does imply something about -- let's call it the "space of thought." Something like that. "Spatiality of thought." And I'd like to hear....well, why do you think you spontaneously chose that word, and on other occasions, you often speak this way? But, I'd just like to hear a little more about. Because philosophers *normally* talk as if what they're doing has *no* space. You know, no particular location at all....

Gendlin: Oh, yeah.

MP #2:   ....as if they could free themselves entirely from this, and say something that's *always* true, or true without qualification. True without location. True without the "where."

Gendlin: Yes. Oh, that's lovely. And it's a nice question from *you* also. Because it's about space, and space that we livingly create. This one, too. But I have two or three different -- not *one-shape* – answer to that.

First I would say, yes, there is a location, first of all, of my discomfort, my excitement, my whatever-I-want, but my *felt-sense* of whatever I'm saying. So, he's asking me about "space" so I go "Oh, yeah, space. Well, I'll divide it into three points, and I'll take *that* one. So I'll say, "Oh, yeah, it starts here, somewhere in the middle (perhaps Gene is making a gesture toward the middle of his body?), in the ordinary space of the fellow sitting in the chair. Here. It's absolutely located. Then, as I pay attention to it, it turns out to have its *own* space. And a very *different* space. Now it can be hiding under a rock over here and be a little scared thing, or it can be a thing much *larger* than this, the fellow in the chair. Which also shows that the "space of thinking" is not identical to....it's not actually my physical viscera, although we don't know what it would be like *without* that yet. But it's not...it's *its own* space. And *that space* is very interesting. And as you do more Focusing or whatever, exploring that, you find that space is a very *distinct* place.

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Now everybody knows that place *when it pipes up*, but that's sometimes rare for people. You know, like you have a job offer or an apartment of something, and it's perfect, but something says, ah, er-r-r-r, "You're well-advised not to take that job." Right? Even though you don't *know* why. Now with Focusing, you can go in there and *find out* why, which is a big advantage. Or at least *some* of why. But there is a *distinct* "where" that's *different* than my concept/thought capacity.

And to do this well – and again, more than half of the people in this room have already *done* that – you need to make *peace* between these two. It's like, for me, for a very long time already I know that they can't knock each other out. My intellect is allowed to think *anything* under the sun, no matter what it is, however critical, or nasty or romantic or whatever it wants to think, it can think that. But it can't knock *this* one out. And this one can't knock *that* one out either. Because I'm blind without that one......and I'm blind without this one. So they....I need them both. *This* one is always the implicit, coming up with a little step. Those little steps are *so different* from what it makes up here (Gene points to his head.) Up *here* I have three things, and I say, "Oh, they go together. Yeah, yeah, yeah." And down here it's saying, "Nyi, nyi...." So I say, "What's the matter?" And it says, "Well, these two go together, but this one is way far away. And there's a lot between that you don't know yet."

So I respect that. I *have* to. There's a different quality to what comes in *that* space. It's much finer, and it includes what I don't know yet. And if I think *with* it, then I can think better. Both of them. So O.K., you know, I see that little scheme of those three, but that'll have to wait. And that one up there is accustomed to waiting, because that one is so fast, and this one is a little slower, but also very fast, but even slower.

And that's "space." Now wait, there was a *third* point which I've lost. And I may not get it back, but what was it?....(long pause). Oh, yeah! That even this space down here and these little steps and this implicit, the implicit that I *point* to is a kind of "It" also, a kind of "datum," a kind of....I don't want to say "entity" because I've used that word for the defined ones. But a kind of *"something,"* so that "where" we *live* is still *another* space, not the space that has the North-West-South coordinates, and not "that" space either (Editorial note: referring to the space of the felt-sense). And there we live in the truth, I might want to say, or something, that would be cute to say. But then we also live where the dog and the horse and the grass and the.....and that's another "where." And I don't know now what you're going to say to that. Do you want to say something back?

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MP #2:   Well, I thought.....you know, there is this interesting expression, and you've given new life to it by these remarks. "Armchair philosophy."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Yes.

MP #2:   And Leibnitz was famous, one of our joint heroes, for writing all those great thoughts from that chair...

Gendlin: (inaudible overlapping comments)

MP #2:   That's true. But in any case (inaudible). But he must have known how to move from this *first* place that you mentioned....

Gendlin: Yes, yes....

MP #2:   ....of the bodily sense, the implicit...*into* the more stratospheric (inaudible) of his own metaphysics or whatever you want to call that, and back and forth, in a remarkably free way, I mean in a way that must have been extraordinary.

Gendlin: Well, where's the "stratospheric"? Make a short sentence. If that could mean what you wanted it to mean, what did you mean by "the stratospheric"?

MP #2:   I guess I mean "that which is not entirely rooted, or *directly* rooted, in the armchair."

Gendlin: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah, I see what you mean. Well, that's what *I* would like to have meant by "wherever the dog and the grass live." But you're saying more than that, because "Where did he get his monads from?", for example. Where does he come off talking about all these things? *That* place. Sure. We live *there*, I think, all of us, don't we? Would you say?

MP #2:   I think we do, but we don't *know* it until someone like Leibnitz begins to *articulate it* in so many words, so to speak.

Gendlin: Well, I would say every four-year-old *knows* "there."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: We might *lose* it after a while. Oh, you know this. That's fine.

Gendlin: (Speaking to another participant.) What were *you* going to say?

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Male Participant 3:   I'm interested in what you have to say about feeling, the process of feeling, and trust, and the process that you talk about. That poem by Rumi is very beautiful. I know it, and it's something that I've actually tried to do in *my* life. But sometimes it gets to an impassive difficulty; it seems very overwhelming. At moments like that, like a crisis moment, how would you say....a way of *returning* to that trust in the process.

Gendlin: Yes. And of course, that's a beautiful question, because we have *so very* much work on this, even though it's just a beginning. I think the human race is just finding this place. Back with the Greeks, nobody *ever* changed. You know? They went from the beginning of the drama through the end and never changed, you know. And then with modern literature, people changed, but only a little and very slowly. And that's still *true* of us, I think. We change very little and very slowly. (Laughs.)

But there's a lot to say there. And some of our focusing training deals with that. So one thing I want to say right away is, there is a third "place." The place everybody *knows* is to push in there in that feeling, and say hello to it, and what it is, and all that. And as you point out, and we all know is true, there are times when we can't do that. It's overwhelming, or it swamps us, or we .... and we try to run away, and sometimes we can't even do *that*.

There is a third "place," which, for quick, I call "being next to it." But actually it's inaccurate, because "next to it" can burn you up. It's too close. "Being *in relation* to it," "*backing* away but not *running* away." There is an actual a third place, which people discover very quickly. While I'm saying it, they sort of look at me like "What the hell is he talking....Oh, *there* it is." Where you don't "push in," I say, but you don't run away either. Don't run away, just back up. And then if you can't stand it, back up some more, and then back up some more. But keep it in front of you, and get to a place where you can breathe, and it's still *there*. *That's* the best place to work on it *from*. It's another "place."

And again, there's all the "place" imagery. And that's almost one of the first things that we teach. It's called "making a space," and there's a lot to go with that. But there are other things *like* that, that you can discover very quickly. And they make a lot of difference. Because mostly if you push into the thing, it stalls and gets stuck. And if you run away, it doesn't change and it comes back the same. So...doing that.

Or, for example, so one person comes to mind right away, saying, "It's too urgent to go away, and it's too intolerable to stay with."

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And then she found, within a few minutes, "Oh, it's like the rope in the gym, when you come down the rope, you can't let go, and if you hold too tight it burns your hands. You have to have just sort of a certain degree of looseness and then you can come down." But that's only one thing. (Pause) Yes. (Addressing another questioner.)

Female Participant 1: You spoke, in Chapter 7 of <u>The Process Model,</u> that you could derive logical units. Do those include numbers?

Gendlin: Sure. But how do you mean that? Numbers are the purest kind of logical unit.

FP #1: Do you specifically treat that? The derivation of numerical units, different kinds of numbers?

Gendlin: No, I would say not. But I'd love it. Maybe you will do it.....Go ahead.

FP #1: And I also wondered about this "pattern in motion thing," which reminded me a lot of Stephen Wolfram's complex computation patterns, the gliding patterns. Do you think there's a relation to that, the computation patterns?

Gendlin: Yes, and of course, like everyone, including him, I'm puzzled about computation, because it is a kind of interaction, and yet it is so limited, in some way. But yes. And furthermore, he gets *beyond* mathematics.

FP #1: Exactly so. Beyond these units.

[Inaudible Crosstalk]

FP #1: ...these very little, very small assumptions, kind of like your little steps, that, *processed* enough times, do, in some cases, get beyond the....

Gendlin: Say it again. I didn't catch the beginning of that.

FP #1: That his rules, the rules that he invents for cellular automatons, next-to-each-other rules, very tiny little steps, regarding the behavior of things in neighborhoods, right? But if they go through enough *cycles of processing,* right? And they get beyond just the periodic or ending up in a stuck place or a random place, that they actually *have* these gliding patterns.

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Gendlin: I would say that it's different, because he gives the computer a *fixed* thing. And in following that fixed instruction, it generates these incredible patterns.

FP #1:   Of four different kinds of classes, only one of which kind of *leads on*.....in an unfinished way.

Gendlin: All I can say is I can't *quite* make as much of it as you're doing. And I'm *glad* that you're doing that.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: But I want to point to some other part of Wolfram, where he is clear that "logic," the way we usually understand it in mathematics, is only a narrow way of *assuming* that everything has to come out *redundant* forever. And I'm very interested in that, because I find that, even in Leibnitz – and I'm looking to at least the *two* of you to do something, help me with it – that there is the assumption that logical necessity *has* to be *mathematical*. So that A equals A. Well, if you take two numbers that amount to the same thing, like 37 and "the square root of something plus something that comes out to 37," then it's possible to say that it's really one term: A equals A. If you solve it out, you get 1 equals 1, or something like that.

          But only on the assumption that our concepts are *like* that, is logic really "A equals A." So most logic, when it's *used*, when it's *not* just mathematics, is *not* identities. And Leibnitz still seems to say that logic is *identities*. Identities exist *only*, I always say, in mathematics. But now Wolfram nicely expands that and says, "No, identity is only the redundant little place, here, of what we've been *calling* "mathematics." And then he has, of course, his own stuff, which is wild, but it also *opens that up* the way I mean it.

FP #1:   It's as if the concepts, as well, have implicit and explicit aspects.

Gendlin: Yes. Yes. Yes.

FP #1:   And so in that sense, you can trust them in a different way.

Gendlin: So he's at least an *instance* of that, if it's not imperialistic for me to make *him* an "instance." (Gene pauses, before calling on another questioner.) Yes.

Male Participant 4:   A couple of points. One is that, when you were speaking, I thought of, as I remember, Socrates saying that the term "philosophy" was "love of wisdom" but not "wisdom."

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Gendlin: Yes.

MP # 4:   It's the *pursuit of*...

Gendlin: Yes. *Amen.*

MP # 4:   And it's the journey and the searching for it...

Gendlin: Absolutely.

MP # 4:   So I think even from the beginning of term *itself*, is this concept that it's the *love* of it, but not the "It" itself.

Gendlin: Absolutely.

MP # 4: And the other thing is --and this might be sort of trivial, but it's always stayed with me – when I was twelve years old, I read a book called Our Friendly Atom, put out by Walt Disney.

[Gendlin laughs]

MP # 4:   Our Friendly Atom. But the most beautiful thing in the book was, it started with the Greeks, the Greek concept of the atom, and Democritus and all the different people. And it showed how *the concept kept opening up....*

Gendlin: Yes.

MP # 4:   ....as people began discovering something new. So I had a whole new sense that this was a *process* that keeps *going on*, and how *delightful* that was.

Gendlin: Absolutely.

MP # 4:   So that gave me the excitement of....

Gendlin: That's *exactly* what I mean. That's *exactly* what I was trying to say.

MP # 4:   And one last thing. I noticed that you don't refer too much to Hegel, but it seems to me that Hegel was very concerned with the process and dialectic, and with logic. But he seemed to take the human being out of it, just as if the idea just somehow existed.

Gendlin: That's right.

MP # 4:   But nevertheless, the logic....so I was just wondering what you had to say about how Hegel's...

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Gendlin: Well, I have to say first that you all know if you *do* philosophy, it takes pretty much of a lifetime to master even one of these. And when you master about five or six, you're doing *very* well. So I would just confess that there are people who -- well, that's a silly way to do it....maybe not do it that way -- that Hegel is....that *I* haven't mastered Hegel. O.K.? So I'm leaving room.

But the *reason* I can't is because of what you said. Because *I leave* when he does what seems to me like this formal dance that leaves me out. Then I'm no longer interested. And I think there's too much Hegel in Heidegger, also. I don't think "being" *is* history. I can respect *history*, but not like what my father used to say, "History is *his*-story." And I don't really respect *any story* about history.

Hegel works backward, but to work forward is a complete loss. The next step is *totally unpredictable* from a dialectical point of view. And I *did* mention Hegel. I mentioned him by saying that *Plato* refused to write without a person.

[Laughter]:

Gendlin: I don't mean that *you* should.....

MP # 4:   I understand.

Gendlin: ....I just mean that *I* thought Hegel at that point...... (Gendlin pauses, then calls on another questioner.) Yes.

Male Participant 5: Let me try to restate how I understood you, in the light of what *I* do....

Gendlin: But I want to leave room for people who are passionate about Hegel. They *know* something about *where he stands* that I *don't* know.

MP # 5:   O.K. Well, let me try to restate what I heard you saying, in the light of what *I* do that involves the history of science. And then see if I've got you right. That is: you have a question. You can't answer the question by consulting what you already have, by reading all the books. You have to stage an interaction to do it. An experiment.

Gendlin: Yes.

MP # 5:   An experiment is an interaction, you said. The interaction, this experiment, gives you *back* something: a "finding". Now, this

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finding, let us say, conflicts with what we already have. It doesn't fit the categories and it causes a controversy. "What? The K decays into *three* pions. That's not supposed to do that. *It can't* do that. It's *defined* as decaying into two pions." Or you don't get enough argon atoms. So now, here's where the Constructivists say, "Well, when we *solve* that controversy, the scientists are stepping in and just making a decision from the outside. Like the teacher coming in and...

Gendlin: I haven't understood that. At *what* point do they say that it's just a decision?

MP # 5:   The Constructivists.....there's a controversy, and the controversy gets resolved one way or the other. The Constructivists will say, "It's the result of a social decision."

Gendlin: Alright.

MP # 5:   The Objectivists will say, "Well, there's a way, a particular *"true"* way of resolving it, the one or the other, that we can *find*. But *really* what happens is *more interaction*. That is, you do *more* experiments based on what this is. So the finding, then, is not just.....when you say, "Trust the process," it doesn't stop with the finding. But in a way, the finding is always the beginning of the process. Is that.....

Gendlin: Yes. I think I could say, "yes," but then I'd want to come in with more. Yes. Yes. But then I would say, "Wait, you went too fast for me, from the point where it's supposed to have two and it has three, or some other finding that doesn't make any sense." Because at that point – and what I always *do* at that point – this, of course is Robert Crease who wrote books about this. And I always use *your* story at this point, to say that....well, there's this large experiment, and there are many people. And some of them are present in the room; you have maybe thirty people. And these are designers of equipment, and those are doing something else. And there's really probably only *one* person who's the *theorist* in the group. And he has *lived* the theory that the finding contradicts. And he or she is really the *only* one who can do the thing that you just quickly said, "resolve the....." You can't resolve it by going home and saying, "Alright, let's pretend we get three." Because most of the time, you get two. Why do you get three *sometimes*? Or whatever the situation is.

That *theorist* goes home and does what I'm calling Focusing. Because you can't just say, "Alright, let's revise the theory to fit *this* finding." Because the theory has to fit *all* the other findings in physics that are *related* to it. And there isn't even anybody,

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hardly, who *knows* all those findings, except *this* guy, who's lived this theory for years. So *he* has to go home, and in your story, he comes back the next day with a revised theory that *does not* take care of it all. It just comes *closer*. And I *love* that. Here he sweated out all night and he *doesn't* have a resolution. He just comes *closer*, right? And then he starts to ask all these people, "Will you please re-examine what you did?" You know. "Did you check for *this*?" "Did you do *that*?" And all these possibilities. And then he comes back later and they report to him. Then he goes home again. To revise a theory in a developed science is not like doing it in Psychology, where we pay no attention to any findings.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Because we don't yet *have* a real science there. And we're not going to have 'til we change the concepts to something like an implying-occurring, or a *living* kind of concepts. It's not going to work. But *then* it *will* work. And then we *will* have findings. So when that process *goes on*, that process *in itself* is not what the Constructivists understand. *They* think, "Well, if you don't like your finding, just change your hypotheses and then you'll get your finding."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: But that's not how we build computers and airplanes and other things. And *then*, of course, I agree with the rest of what you said. Then *that* eventually leads to more *interaction* and more *experimentation*. More things that you have to plug in and turn on....or *try*. And it's at *that* point that you can then *trust* it. So, yes, I like the story, but I have to insert *your* story. (Laughing)

[Laughter]

Gendlin: (Addressing another questioner) Yes.

Female Participant 2: Is not going to have a science until...what?

Gendlin: Start again; I didn't hear you.

FP #2:   I was taking notes, and I didn't get it. "In, we aren't going to have a science until we...." (making three noises to indicate "dot-dot-dot")

Gendlin: Well, I'm glad you didn't write *that* down.

[Laughter]

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Gendlin: Until we get a kind of concept that fits *living* things.

Female Participant 2 I'm following up on that question; I'm from a background myself.

Gendlin: O.K.

FP #3: Well, I'm studying it right now. What do you say, as philosophers, to the people in that say, "Don't worry about it," or "That's not important," if you're finding a discrepancy. That those small discrepancies are *not* important. And it's.....for *me*, I'm having that frustration of, you want to go *away* and do that "Uh-h" thing, and they say, "Those "Uh's" don't *matter* because we know there's this sort of pattern. And if your stuff doesn't follow this sort of pattern, then you need to *make* it follow this sort of pattern. What do you *say*? Is there some way of reconciling the two ways of looking at the world? The one sort of a very empirical, "Let's do the experiment. And if the data doesn't fit, well, we'll fudge the stats," or whatever. There's no *time* to go away and go "Uh-h."

Gendlin: Well, wait. You're contrasting two things, and I have to understand them. Are we talking about psychologists who work with *people*? Because I know some of *those*.

FP #3: Yes.

Gendlin: They, when you come to *them*, you have to fit their theory.

[Laughter]

FP #3: Yes.

Gendlin: That's what *they do*. They feel like....you know, they're like a baker. "I'm a baker, I sell bread. You want shoes? *Go there*."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: In *my* opinion, they can help very few people. But if they have sharp, interesting *concepts*, *I* can use them in a better way than *they* do. *I* have learned, from *those* people, things which *help* me when I work with myself or anybody else. But there, I go into the implicit *living* thing, and I say, "Jung claims that...dah, dah, dah, dah. What does it do for you?" And sometimes it doesn't do *anything* for me, and sometimes something *comes out*. Well, *that* is *important*! *That's* true. At *least that*.

So those theories can be *used*. And I have *room* for people who do nothing but theory. But when they pretend to help people by

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relating to their *theory* and *ignoring* the person who's *sitting* there, *that* I'm against. At least don't *pay* them, in that case.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Is that what you meant?

FP #3: I'm not talking about *clinical* psychologists. I'm talking about the study of behavior, the experimental study of behavior, Social Psychology, Personality Psychology....

Gendlin: Yeah. Well, there's again what we *have* in Psychology. I used to *teach* this part, too, and I would say to the students, "Look, we're depending on you to go on from what we've got. What we've got is *little islands* that are not connected well. So, they're *both* right, the people you quoted. It's like, if you're not working with *this* -- some guy's got an old 1930 motivation theory and three experiments with monkeys – it doesn't matter if something here contradicts that. Because the space between these islands is so *big*, that we don't know how to put these things together.

On the other hand, each little island has *something*. You know? So all this conditioning stuff with the pigeons in the box, now let's us study *newborn infants*. Did you know that a newborn, on the first day, can tell you which of three or four different-shaped nipples it likes? That's very exciting, because you show a newborn these rubber nipples with different shapes, some of them like a pyramid and some are square and some are round. And one of them he has in his mouth. And he can tell you which one. Because as you show each nipple, you let him suck – I'm not telling it well. He sucks on this nipple. And if he wants the nipple to stay, then he sucks harder. And if he doesn't, then he doesn't. So the one that he *distinctly* likes is the one that he *sucks* hardest on. And this is a "pure measure," like in pigeons in boxes, that we used to think was a meaningless type of research. Now, we're using it to discover *great big things:* that seeing and touching are correlated in the body *before* the nervous system *develops*.

A newborn is not supposed to do this until nine months later, when seeing and touching become neurologically connected. But he can do it *right away*. And that's how we find out. So I used to try to communicate that *the islands are precious*, still, *even though* they're also right when they say, "That experimental stuff you can ignore," if you're talking about kings and heroes and four directions and archetypes or whatever else you're talking about. Do I have any Jungians here, still, from yesterday?

[Laughter and crosstalk]

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Male Voice: *I think they all left.*

[Laughter]

Male Participant 6: So, I was going to ask a similar question.

Gendlin: There was somebody who didn't..... Oh, that *was* you.

Male Participant 6: Yes. The one place where I was having trouble following you, I just hoped you could say a little bit more. I found that very interesting, also, when you were talking about the patterns that ignored the rest of reality, and then sort of gave rise to a different kind of movement. And I was getting images in my mind of...like Bachelard reverberation, or oscillation, sort of. But I think.....I was trying to think of a movement that was not a matter of external relations. I was hoping you could say more about that.

Gendlin: Oh, yeah! Well....for example, dancing? You can take a movie of it and analyze it as external movement, of course. But it *comes* from inside. Right?

MP #6: Yes. I *do* think that....

Gendlin: But I also think every animal moves not *just* from location in empty space *here* to location in empty space *there*. An animal is always going somewhere. I don't think that the animals "move." They "behave." They act, they go somewhere; they're doing something. The human observer is only interested in *this* location point in Newton's system, and *that* location point. And then it turns out you can have observers in motion, and so the *points* are not steady. But that's a huge, abstract, human, mathematical pattern *creation*, where you don't care about the rocks that it's stepping across, and you don't care what goes after, and you separate away the values. And then you have only these dead *facts*. Then we're talking about *values*. But values are these left-over, chopped, poor things, when they create *facts*.

Male Participant 7: (Inaudible)....looking at the film of themselves performing....

Gendlin: Say it again?

MP #7: (Inaudible) looking at a film of themselves performing.

Gendlin: Yes.

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MP #7: Then you've got your point. That has to become something very intricate, and it has to go from just the *behavior* to how that *is* for them.

Gendlin: Well, yes, exactly. The one that's watching himself, herself, *perform* does *not* see only movement.

MP #7: Bingo.

Gendlin: [Laughing] *That's* for sure.

MP #7: That's why they don't want to *do* it (inaudible).

Gendlin: But, *we* don't have to see only movement, either.

MP #7: Right. That's right. .

Gendlin: We can know that this thing about "just movement" is a precious human *creation* of a screen, sort of, within which we can cure illnesses, and build machinery, and have electricity, and every other thing. This is very precious. *But*, that's not where we really *are*. You know? And philosophers have said that, all the way back. The critique is, "Oh, but now we can *understand* where we are, we can *understand* how we've created "just movement." Right? That isn't *first*. It's *not* that first we move, and then we add values. The same with *consciousness*. There's this hopeless attempt, these days, by my friends, to add "consciousness" to this system of cut-off things. The system *depends* upon having cut consciousness and values *away*.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Now you take this mutilated, bleeding thing...

[More laughter]

Gendlin: ....that you threw away and you try to *add* it. Don't *do* that!

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Be *conscious* of the fact that *this* thing is a *system* that's very precious and very legitimate, that has cut away consciousness and values and *everything* really, except movement/empty space patterns......Yes. (Indicating next questioner.)

Male Participant 8: From what I understand, you think that understanding, or knowledge, comes *after* operations, interactions and

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instrumentation?   Is that to say that *all* understanding and *all* knowledge is post-instrumental, or is it to say that *some…*?

Gendlin: I want to say "*some,*" right away, quick.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Already when you started I realized that you were *right*, of course. There is a *huge* amount of knowledge even in a single living cell, if you *want* to call it "knowledge," and I *would* want to. And there's *certainly* a lot of knowledge in a newborn child. And so I *want* to be wrong about that. What did I mean? Now I have to do what I just described. What the hell did I mean? (Laughing) I meant that "The Knowledge" of today's scientific situation is actually a *product* of the *operations*. But they will *claim* that the *operations* are explained and derived from the *knowledge.* Very often, they *do* something and they *get* something, and then they spend years trying to figure out why they *got* that. And then as soon as they figure out why, notice *why* they got that, they put that *in front* and derive the finding that they've had for years *from* this understanding that they *just developed*. Right?   And *that's* legitimate, too. It's just that you have to *understand* what you're *doing* there. Because *that* knowledge comes *after* the operation.

And now I've said it well. No, there are many kinds of knowledge. And what did you think of particularly, as an example, for the knowledge that is *first*?

MP #8:   "Unity" and "plurality" are categories that come prior to experience....

Gendlin: Well, OK. Let's see.... It might be, in some sense, prior.

MP #8:   Or at the same time.

Gendlin: Why is it prior?

MP #8:   Yes. Not prior. That's possible, but I'll say, "at the same time" as experience.

Gendlin: But isn't it *from* experience?

MP #8:   I'd say it's a category that *organizes* experience.

Gendlin: And do you think experience is not organized *before* that category? Or that category is working there without our knowing about it?

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MP #8:   If I said that the experience was organized, and it had nothing to do with my understanding?

Gendlin: Oh, no. Then you're right again. Wait, wait. I'm fighting you on "unity and plurality." But not on your basic point. I agree with you.

MP #8:   I see.

Gendlin: But, if you say that some abstract concept organizes experience -- the sort of thing Kant would say -- then I would fight about that. I would say, "No, I think experience is an organic texture. And we can derive concepts *from* it that *do* a lot. And "one and many" is certainly an ancient one of those. But, if you think concepts organize experience to *begin* with, then I think that's either *not*, or "what do you mean by "concepts"?"

MP #8:   No, I said "categories."

Gendlin: *Categories.* Yes. Well, OK. I want to argue that there are no categories until we explicate them. That it's like a mesh, like a mesh of capillaries. There aren't really veins and arteries until we *re*-organize it. Would you then say, "That's OK. But "unity and plurality" are very powerful *re*-organizers"? *That* I would....

MP #8:   I don't think it's appropriate to say that they *re*-organize, because we can only speak about what they have already organized.

Gendlin: Well, that's what -- this is valuable for me to communicate -- because that's exactly what I'm fighting as well as agreeing with, so, if I can make it clear......I would *deny* that we can only speak about what concepts have already organized. That, to me, is the trap that I'm working *out* of. Because if *concepts* have already organized it, then *you* say, "*These* concepts have organized it." And *he* says, "*Those* concepts have organized it." And then we are again in the place where either *these* concepts or *those* concepts have to be true. So *I* want to say, "No, *none* of those concepts are true. And *all* of them *can* explicate what is already *organized*. And I would surely not deny that "one and many" or "unity/plurality" is a powerful way of *finding* what, to me, is already implicitly organized by *living*.

MP #8:   I'd like to differentiate between concepts such as "the atom" and concepts such as "same and different" and "unity and plurality" and "true and false."

Gendlin: Well, to me, the difference wouldn't be that important. Now wait! I know you have a point that needs to be met. But what I want to

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say is, it's precisely creating the "sames" that I've been talking about. That once you assume that "reality" or *anything* come is "sames" and "differences" – and this goes all the way back to Greek and Plato and whatnot – the "same" and the "different" seems to be such a basic category that there couldn't be hardly any sense made of anything without it or before it. And *I'm* here to tell you, "No, we *create* the "same" from a living process which does *not* consist of little "sames." (Pause) And yet, it isn't *dis*-order, either.

And if you had to have an example, from thinking, for it, I'd say it's more like metaphor process than it is like "same" entities. But even *that's* again a concept, of a sort. But there is an organic "living" which is sitting there, in the chair, and that you can *trust*. And then, if you want to say that *concepts* have already organized it, then I would argue that there's a historical sense in which it's *also* true. Because concepts have been *stuck into* us from the culture, from the education, from other ways. So I wouldn't deny that there *are* concepts, even, *implicit in* living, but they don't organize the living. The living *is* an organizing; it's a creating *itself*. And if it *isn't*, then we're back to Constructivism and Objectivism. So I can *threaten* you from that *other* side.

[Laughter]

Gendlin: But that's the weak argument, I always think. When people say, "And if I'm *not* right, then we're in trouble." I say, "Well, maybe we're in trouble."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: So I know what that argument ....yeah (laughing).

Male Participant 9:   Gene, are you saying ...

Gendlin: One second. I *do* want to own up to the fact that there must be *some* difference between "atoms" and "categories." That that's left, and I didn't deal with it. (Pause) Yes. (acknowledging MP #9).

MP #9:   Gene, is what you're saying -- getting into the implicit and all of that, and in your response to this young man -- are you saying that we human animals exist in a kind of continuity with non-human animals...

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Gendlin: Sure. Oh, yeah. That's a very large point....that's a very large point. In so many philosophies, there are only human beings and stones.

[Laughter}

Gendlin: Leaving out the animals -- animals and plants – is a *completely crucial thing* that has happened. And you have to go back to Descartes and see that this was even *deliberate*. He even *knew* what he was *doing*. So he was essentially saying, "This is hypothetical." Descartes wasn't crazy or anything. He said, "What I *really* believe in is nature and Stoicism. But I make these hypothetical systems, I make analytic geometry." And then he made his method, like analytic geometry, and *he* knew perfectly well what he was doing. And if we could get *him* back, we would be fine. We would understand that this was a hypothetical system, and what power it has. So, yeah, we need the animals. *Very badly.*

MP #9: And building on that for just a moment – I don't want to take up your valuable time – but building a bit on what you've just said to this young man and what Ed was quizzing you about, this idea of "place" that he's been obsessed with – and, I think, productively – for decades. And it's such a pregnantly *ambiguous* term. And your response has really got me going. You say, "Well, there's *this* place." I think of thumos of the Greeks...

Gendlin: Oh, *absolutely*.

MP #9: Jean Gebser's idea that, what does he say? That "the root of consciousness is in our intestines," the coils of the intestines...

Gendlin: Buddhist "mind" also is here. Did you know that? All this "mindfulness" and "mind," "mind," "mind." Well, it's British. The word is "heart." But they don't *tell* you that. Because, they do *say*, in the text it *says* that *that thing* is in the heart. But they can't ever write a sentence that "The mind is in the chest." So when he tells you that it's in the chest, the editor requires that *that* time you've got to say "heart." So you never find out that what they mean by "mind" is "in the chest." And it's the heart. It's the thumos. The same as the Homeric thumos talks to you.

MP #9: Emerson was so beautifully into this already. And then Ed used the term "the *stratospheric* place," and Leibnitz was brought in, and – I want to check this against *your* response. Why would he have said such a thing, that the "monads are windowless." Students sometimes ask me that. Well, my God! It suddenly *occurred* to me, you know, and out of my own later experience as a teacher. I think I was assuming for decades that because what I

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was telling to students, and my brilliant phenomenology and informal logic and conceptual analysis, *that* was somehow getting *through* to them.

[Gendlin laughs}

MP #9:   And even when I read their papers, I projected into what *they* said what I *wanted* them to say! Until finally something happened in my guts and I *saw*: I *can't* take a thought out of my mind and put it in your mind.

Gendlin: A window.

MP #9:   I can take a *quarter* out of my pocket.....

Gendlin: That's beautiful.

MP #9:   ....and put it in *their* pocket. So here, to *my* satisfaction, at least, at the time, was the connection between the guts and the thumos and all this, and what Ed calls "the stratospheric" in Leibnitz. *He's* somehow such a genius that, even in his *armchair*, he could connect the two places. It's what you're doing in your way – and it's really quite an exciting adventure out of Leibnitz....

Gendlin: Wait. I followed you up to "connect the two places." Which two places?

MP #9:   Well, you connect the place of the guts and the gut intuitions and (inaudible).

Gendlin: Yes.

MP #9:   Suddenly, I just couldn't avoid it any longer. I was *not* getting *through* with my brilliant thinking. These kids weren't getting it.

Gendlin: Yes. Yes, yes.

Male Participant 10:   Heidegger says the monads don't have any windows because they don't *need* any. They're *already* out in the world.

MP #9:   Wouldn't you say that's a kind.....that you could trace it as a *kind* of development out of Leibnitz, couldn't you?

Gendlin: Yes. It means *at least* that, or *one* kind of meaning for "no windows."

[Crosstalk]

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Gendlin: ...and yet, it's fun. I'd like......Yes (indicating another questioner) I want to say something back there.

Female Participant 4: I'd like to offer you a story, in celebration of your wonderful thinking and contribution. I think it also is confirmation of what you're saying from a totally different culture. And I hope that you appreciate that and think that's fun.

I spent some time this summer with some Native American philosophers. They've done their Ph.D. work in "English In Western Institutions," so they know this literature. But one of the Ph.D.'s spoke with great disdain about English and the western traditions. "Oh, you just talk nouns, nouns, nouns!"

[Laughter]

FP #4:   "Concepts, answers, atoms, individuals." He said, "I speak all day in Navajo and never *use* any nouns."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: Yes. Amen.

FP #4:   One of the examples they gave was a basketball bouncing across a court. And they said, "When "white people" see that and we ask, "In one word, what do you see?" They say, "ball." And if you ask one of us what they see, they say, "bouncing."

Gendlin: (laughing) Of course.

[Laughter]

FP #4:   It's *not* just that it's a verb like process and focusing and.....

Gendlin: Exactly.

FP #4:   It's not just that it's a verb, and "ball" is a noun.   But the *implications* of that are so profound. Because "ball"....it never occurs to us that there's anything in the ball that we would want to be like.   Ball is different from *me*.   *I'm* not the ball.   But "bouncing." The way we know the ball is bouncing is because *we bounce*.

Gendlin: *We* bounce. Sure.

FP #4:   We *have* the bouncing *in* us...

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Gendlin:	Sure.
FP #4:	And so the notion of *difference* is absolutely irrelevant, because the ball isn't in their vocabulary. But "bouncing"! So the sharing, the sameness. As I understand it – one of the people...there was a physicist who has worked with David Bohm, and David Bohm told him and has written with him and spoken, around (inaudible) Indian, that Hopi is a much better language for doing quantum physics than English.
[Laughter]	
FP #4:	Because Hopi doesn't get....isn't *hung up* on "How can A be B? How can that happen?" Because for *them*, because the B is just always mixing up and changing, moving, and being (inaudible). So I just want to, I guess, celebrate and confirm....
Gendlin:	Sure, sure. That's lovely.
Male Participant 11:	One thing, if I could sneak in this last question. I know I'd regret not taking this opportunity. But I think this is related to what has just been discussed. You use this term "interaction" and I've been fascinated with this notion for some time.
	But I'm thinking if this term can be expanded. So the experiment is an interaction.
Gendlin:	Yes.
MP #11:	But also what we get to *know* in the *end* is "interaction."
Gendlin:	Absolutely.
MP #11:	And *about* interaction.
Gendlin:	Absolutely.
MP #11:	And I would say also this hypothesis: One reason that mathematics is so good in describing *nature* is that mathematics is *of* interactions, if you will, and *about* interactions, in the *same* way that nature is *about* interactions and in the *same* way that society is about interactions.
Gendlin:	Yes.
MP #11:	And I think the word "interaction," you could say it's a noun, in a way.

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Gendlin: I could use a better word.

MP #11:   OK

Gendlin: No, I've had a lot of trouble with that word, for other reasons. So if you have a better word...

MP #11:   I think ....

Gendlin: "Interacting," you would say, would be better?

MP #11:   No, I think....I'm saying, actually, that using it as a noun captures this kind of ambiguity that, in a way, it's a *thing*, but in another way "interaction" can't be a *thing*.

Gendlin: *At least* it can't be a thing.

MP #11:   *At least*, yes. And also, one step further, is that *language* is interaction, in a way. So ...

Gendlin: Yes, it is.

MP #11:   ....so like a term you pick up out of a text, a *philosophical* text. It's not even going to be a *concept* even then. You have to read, and as you read, you've *filled out* the concept. So it's like....

Gendlin: Absolutely. W*ithin* the interaction, then you can make a noun.

MP #11:   Yes. But the way I'm thinking of it, that *that* would require a certain perspective, so you "fix a perspective," I'd put it. So you kind of stand *in relation*....

Gendlin: Now wait with "interaction."

MP #11:   Perspective...

Gendlin: Hang on to that for a minute. Let me get to go to where we are, then we'll hassle "perspective." Let me just say this all *fits* now. Because it's within the "bouncing" and the "throwing" and the "catching" and the eh, eh, eh......that there *is* even such a thing as an "is ball." Right?

[Crosstalk]

Gendlin: The is-ness is the *ball* that comes from the factory, occupies such-and-such a space in Einstein's spaceship deal and *that's* the *real thing*. Obviously that's derivative *from* the (gesture?) And if we invent a certain kind of ball that has a *funny* shape, then the damn

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thing doesn't even *land* here, it jumps off and goes somewhere else like a football or something. It's obviously the *verbing* that generates the noun.

Female Participant 4: But we get a noun, and we think we've got a conclusion and we stop, right?

Gendlin: No, now he has to derive mathematics. We have to say, "OK, if we're *conscious* of the fact that *we* make movement – pure, abstract motion – by *ignoring* the ground and the background and what we're doing and everything else – if *we* are conscious of this completely exciting move that we make, to "just move," right? That I get up and I walk over there, and then I want that considered as *nothing but* the relation of these two space points. You know? And if you say anything else, you're "wrong." Because I'm *creating* mathematics. It's like Kant says, "*I* generate time." It's a wonderful sentence. "*I* generate time by drawing a line." He's conscious of what he's doing. He knows he's sitting in *Koenigsberg* and breathing. And *he* wants that *ignored* so that he can generate linear time. In that sense, if we're conscious of *that*, *then* mathematics is an interaction, *certainly*. It happens *in* the space of "bouncing" and so forth.

MP #11: One way of talking about it is in terms of systems, I think. Systems, the term "systems"....

Gendlin: Do you mean systems theory, like Bertalanfy, or do you mean it your own way?

MP #11: Sort of my own way. Well, what I mean is "systems of interaction." So you might have....

Gendlin: Well, that's back to – (aside to another participant) I'm going to give him the same trouble I gave you – if he wants the system ahead of the interaction.

MP #11: No, I don't...

Gendlin: By the way, Wittgenstein is wonderful in that. "First it happens and then you make rules from it." There are no rules that govern what happens.

MP #11: I would say that there's an interaction between individual interactions, if you will, and the larger system. And that's part of the system. So I want to make....

Gendlin: Oh, *yeah*.

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MP #11:   I would go very far and make everything an interaction – the object, the subject, the relation to the subject....

Gendlin: Yeah, I think that's right. But again, that so-called "larger system" is *there*. It creates itself, or it creates us, or....It's not a creature of "the same and the different," is it?

MP #11:   It's not fixed *in itself*. It's always fixed *in relation*. So you might *have* a system embedded in another larger system....

Gendlin: But that's also out there.

MP #11:   But you don't say that there's a finite number of systems, or there's an overarching system that contains them.

Gendlin: Well, I just worry about the *word* "system." I wanted to use it the way it would mean, if it meant what *you* want. Because *in public*, a "system" is already committed to certain concepts, certain rules, certain....But you don't *mean* that. You mean what *I* mean, I think. It's an *order* that's more organic or finer than....

MP #11:   It has to fight with this tendency to reduce, to say that the system is just the sum of the constituent elements....

Gendlin: OK.

MP #11:   I don't want to *say* that.

Gendlin: Now, about "perspective," I worry. Because "perspective" always assumes some adult philosopher who meets Being on the street for the first time, sort of, and then they "interpret" each other.

MP #11:   I mean it to say that....what *work* that does for me is that I want to figure out how a *plane* could be made, for example, and we can *trust* a plane or a car. And we *do*. We kind of settle at a certain spot. The mistake is in thinking that *that spot* is fixed.

Gendlin: Well, by the time we settle at that *spot*....What do you mean by "settle at a spot"? (Pause) No, that's *nice*. Just *say* more.

MP #11:   I don't want to say, "It's just a decision," necessarily.

Gendlin: No, no. I understand. That's OK.

MP #11:   But what I'm trying to get at is, for example, we have English, which is dominated by nouns, in a way, right? But it *works*. We can do a lot of things with it. And what I want to say is – this is

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kind of more – but if we just have "interactions," we might just fall into that "You can't settle on a meaning."

Gendlin: Oh, you're right.

MP #11:   Well, no, but that place where you *fix* things is also part of an interaction....

Gendlin: Absolutely.

MP #11:   ....and is in flux, *also*.

Gendlin: Absolutely....absolutely....absolutely. And then *I* want to say, "in *two* ways." Because this is already true of the grass, or something. And it wouldn't be grass if it weren't an enormously *well-organized* what-he-calls "system." Which is that it "knows" the sun, and it "knows" the water, and it "knows" the ground, and it knows what to take and what not to take. And it's an *enormously* complex system. And it's *organized*. So we agree. I mean, I don't want anybody to say, "Well, interaction is just say-whatever-you want." Those people are not interesting to me. They think we can say (inaudible.)

Just the opposite. The sharper you grasp it – and that goes for categories – the sharper your categories, the more you're going to find *further* in what we're calling "interaction."

And then, on top of that, *human* beings have *history*. So we already have, built into us, British empiricist philosophy before we ever *talk*. But *that's* secondary, I think. There's a sort of debris from.....that's *not* our living. That's.....

MP #11:   Another layer of complexity to our living.

Gendlin: Yeah, it's...

MP #11:   But my point is that we can *fix* ....when we talk about grass we can sort of *fix* it. With you I can talk about how the pattern isolates, it ignores the other....so the leaves and all the....so we isolate a certain mold....

Gendlin: Well, *we* do it and the *grass* does it. But *I* want there to be a distinction because I *live* where the grass does it. But I think where the grass does it *and also* where *we* "make" cells and I value knowing about cells and all the stuff that I know. But *that* kind of fixating seems to me to be within a *wider* context of how my body.....I like to say, "My body does all this digesting and blood

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circulation and I'm glad it *does* that, because if *I* ran it, then it would look like my finances, probably."

[Laughter]

Gendlin: But that's not true of *science*. Science can actually *improve* on how nature does it. And let more of us live better and longer. And I'm here to say that just *happened* to me. So, yes. But I do want a distinction between how *we* are precise and how the *living* is precise. Now, I see, I'm going to have to defend that distinction. That's the truth. (To Bob Scharff) Go ahead.

Bob Crease: Well, unfortunately, *some* kinds of interactions really *do* have to come to an end.

[Chorus of disappointed groans]

Bob Crease: And this may be one of them. But I would like to say that the audio portion of this has been recorded and it will be on the web via our Stony Brook Trust Institute website, which is www.stonybrook.edu/trust. And the person who is responsible for this is James Corrigan, who has recorded *all* of these lectures. And they will *all* be on the web and available to you. We owe him a real debt of gratitude.

[Applause]

Bob Crease: But also, we're really grateful to have Gene here and to have inspired this two-hour-long interaction. And we should thank *him* one more time.

[Applause]

Gendlin: Thank you.

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