

CHAPTER II: FUNCTIONAL CYCLE (FUCY.)

Let us not begin by simply assuming that we live and think within an old model of time. Although we use linear time since it is inherent in our language and experience, other kinds of time are inherent in them as well, perhaps kinds of time that have never been explicated before. Let us see what model of time develops from explicating the explication process. No explication is ever equivalent to what (.....) it explicates. "Explication" and "process" have time implicit in them, of course, but not only linear time. Let the present, past, and future arise **later** from the process, as we did in Section I, when we used the words "body" and "environment" to say that they are one interaction process. Then we can distinguish them later with new terms that develop **from the processes**.

In the old model of linear time-bits we would have to say, for example, that a given bit of foot-pressure implies three different ground-pressure bits: one, by resisting, first enables the foot to press; a second is equal and opposite to the foot's pressure; a third ground-pressure is the result of the foot's pressing. The fact that one bit needs all three is an ancient problem with the linear model.

The "body" implies all three, if someone makes bits. So all three were implied when we said (in chapter I) that "the body implies the environment," although only now do we see this.

A whole string of en#2 is implied by the (any this) body-en#2. And it may imply many strings. If an animal hears a noise, many situations and behaviors will be **implicit** in its sense of the noise, places to run to, types of predators, careful steps, soundless moves, turning to fight, many whole sequences of behavior. Meanwhile the animal stands still, just listening. What it will do is not determined. Surely it won't do all the implicit sequences -- perhaps not even one of just these but some subtler response.

I say that hunger **implies** feeding, and of course it also implies the en#2 that is identical with the body. Hunger implies feeding and so it also implies food. It might imply the chase to get the food which may be far away. Hunger also implies digesting, defecating, scratching the ground to bury the feces, getting hungry again. These are a string of en#2s as well as ways in which the body will be.

If digestion is my model instance, then the process is cyclical. Hunger also implies getting hungry again after defecating and sitting a while. I call this a "**functional cycle**." In such a cycle any "this" event

implies all the rest, all the way around. But let us not decide that the sequence is simply predetermined, as is usually assumed.

Also in walking no single foot-pressure-ground-pressure-event simply **is**. If there were suddenly such a single is, the animal would fall. Its weight **is** already on the way to... (Momentum cannot be expressed as mere change of location.) The "bit" moves the animal over. Or, it might be a bit near the beginning, the increasing foot-pressure-ground-pressure with the weight coming onto the foot. Any bit to which one might point implies the whole movement of walking. Any occurring **is** also an implying of further occurring. And, each bit implies something different next.

If a spider is taken off its half-finished web and placed elsewhere, it goes on as soon as it can, spinning where it left off. It spins outwardly the rest of the net which thus has a hole in it. Like digestion, its web-spinning process cannot just begin again in the middle. The events cannot follow in just any order. More intelligent animals can re-include feedback from what they did in ways which would let them begin at the beginning of an interrupted action, but even so this involves quite a different sequence than an uninterrupted action. Living cannot well be thought of as unit events related to other events only by position, that is to say single events that one could rearrange in any order. I don't mean that anyone claims that living events can occur in any order. But why this is not possible is thought of only in terms of externally imposed relationships of things in an observer's space. Let us instead allow the spider to generate time and continuity. The spider's own process has its own order. The rest of the web will remain implied until the environment #2 cooperates in the occurring of the rest of the net. Each occurring is also an implying, and this stays the same unless it is changed by an environmental occurring that has **a certain very special relation to the implying.**

Life process is "temporally organized," but here this does not mean only that someone notices hunger coming before eating. It means rather that hunger **is the implying of** eating. And eating? There is that special relation again: If hunger is the implying of eating, then eating is the "....." of hunger. The term we want is implicit in the "....." and when we get the term it will do to our "....." what eating does to hunger. We can try out saying that eating satisfies hunger, that it carries out what hunger implies, that eating carries the hunger into some sort of occurring. Hunger **is** the implying of eating (the "need" for food we say, making a noun out of this implying). Then eating is the satisfaction (another noun). The nouns make separate bits out of the process. But actually it's no fun eating if you're not hungry while eating. The eating happens only with hunger. Eating happens **into**

hunger. The bits have both in them. The process is both implying and occurring, **A bit of life process is always also the implying of further bits.** Right here "implies" means just this well known and little understood fact.

Time is generated by the sequence. But the further parts of the cycle (all of them, or the next one) do not look like this one. Hunger doesn't look like eating, which in turn doesn't look like defecating. Implying in this sense is again non-ikonic, non-representational, (as we found in I).

The whole cycle of ensuing events is, in a way, here now, at one point. We can say that the whole sequence is ongoing. We can say that hunger **is** being about to search for food, find it and eat. This "is", and our word "implies" (in just this use, here) speak from this relation: All living is an occurring and also an implying (of).

Implying has (makes, brings, is) time, but not only the linear merely positional time. Though far from clear (we are only beginning), we want the sequence to define time for us. We did not begin with a clear notion of time. Let us say that **the relation between occurring and implying** generates time, rather than saying that life processes go on in time. (The latter statement would involve an already assumed time.)

Now a caution: One might be tempted to say that each bit of occurring is what the last bit implied. But this would be only the old linear model. Later, in IVB and VII we will have developed the terms to derive our capacity to think of time as a linear series of positions (past, present, and future). We have those now, of course, but let us not assume that these linear positions must be "basic," as if everything else must fit into them. In VII we will develop terms for how one can remember something from before, or imagine what has not yet occurred. We will be able to derive linear time as a simpler case from a more intricate model of time from which much else can be derived as well. Our primitive concept of "occurring into implying" will elaborate itself more and more.

From the spectator standpoint we may know what will happen, because we have often observed the same events ensuing. But let us not assume that the process is a sequence of pre-determined events. Implying is not the same as what will occur. Hunger is not eating. It doesn't contain a hidden representation of eating. Let us not make the occurring-implying relation into an equation. We don't need to assume that the process consists of already-defined events that the spectator predicts at time one, observes at time two, and remembers at time

three. We need not assume that the implying consists of defined units. In nature a myriad different ways of eating have developed, and more may arise. The implicit is never just equal what will occur.

Implying is a part of occurring, but occurring is also equal to en. It is body=en. The body implies **and** occurs in the en. But implying has a more intricate sort of "is" than en. Occurring has this more intricate order too, but only in regard to the next occurring. All occurring also implies, so implying is part of every occurring. But implying is much more than just the next event which the spectator has observed before.

Although open for further events, implying and occurring are always just so, just how they are, not at all indeterminate (see *The Responsive Order* and *Thinking Beyond Patterns*), but implying is more orderly than one set of b-en#2 events.

Implying is never just equal to occurring. Therefore implying is not an occurring that has "not yet" occurred. It is not an occurring in a different position on a time line.

So we see that implying is not what **will** occur. Nor is it ever right to say that what has occurred **is** what was implied. We need more terms to become able to speak from their relation.

So far the word "into" has been used to speak of that relation. We said that the en **occurs into the implying**. Since en is part of occurring, we can also say that occurring **occurs into implying**. This relation will soon elaborate itself. So far it is clear that it cannot be an identity.¹

In the old model everything is assumed to stay "the same" so that change is explained by tracing identical units that are only rearranged. In the old model the system of localizations and possibilities always remains the same. Instead, let us begin with change. Later we will derive "the same" from change.

Occurring is change; something happens. **Occurring into implying can change the implying.** The occurring sequence is also a sequence of changes in the implying. So the sequence is not determined from the implying in one event.

The process is a changed implying all along the line.

We can go a step further: Since implying implies a next occurring, and since occurring changes implying, therefore **implying implies a change in implying.** It implies its own change. The sequence can be defined as the implied changes in implying But

those are not determined possibilities.

Since there is always an implying, we can say that occurring always occurs-into an implying, but it does not always change the implying as it implied itself changed.

But it is misleading to call it "change" as if it simply implied just anything else. Implying implies something so intricate that only a very special occurring "changes" it as it implies itself changed. Anything else may disrupt the body or leave the implying unchanged -- still implying as before. For example, while the animal is hungry something other than food happens. Then the implying of feeding continues unchanged. Or, a predator may chase it so that running may come to be implied. Or, the animal may be killed. Since there is always implying, all occurring happens "into implying," but not always as the implying implies. We can already say that certain distinctions are coming here. Implying implies an occurring that will change it so that it no longer implies as it did, but not because it was disrupted, rather because what occurs relates to the implying in a certain (not fully predetermined) way. More terms with which to think about this relation will develop.