

CHAPTER VII-B: PROTOLANGUAGE

a) Internal Space

VII-space is inherently internal/external. VII sequences set up this distinction.

The gestures version the behavior context, but they are simple movements. The behavior context is "the same," each of the bodylooks is a version of how the body looks in that behavior context. Each gesture reconstitutes the behavior context. But what is perceived is the gesture. The gestures are "external," the behavior context is the string of evevs, it is felt. The gestures are not behaviors among the behavior context's possibilities. The gesture doesn't change how the behaviors are possible. The gestures do not go on in the "filled space" of the behavior possibilities. Rather, the simple movements make a new, seemingly "empty" space.

The change in the evevs (which are versions of the same behavior context) is only felt, nothing changes in the behavior context. This change is "internal." The space of the simple movements is "external," and different from the kept-same behavior space.

There is now a sharp difference between the external movement in "empty" space, and the movement as a version of the complex filled behavior context, which is sequenced only "inwardly."

One sees only the simple movements, not what they version and carry forward in the body. What each body sees on the other (is carried forward by, on the other) is one thing (bodylook, movement), and what is felt, had, and sequenced in the body is another (the evevs = behavior contexts or action contexts). Thereby there is an internal and an external.

We have always had an internal and an external, but only now do we have concepts with which to think about that distinction. As usual, I am not so much concerned with the natural history of the origin of the distinction, as with making concepts to think clearly about it. No doubt some day there will be better concepts. But it is startling to realize that there have been no concepts at all about that until now. This has made for much philosophical nonsense,³⁰ very poor theory in the study of people, and difficulties with an unthinkable observer in physics.

The simple movements of gesturing let one sequence, version, have, feel, the behavior context without changing it. Gestures don't

change a behavior context, at least not in the way a behavior would change it (one sequence being a change in how all the others are physically possible). Some move in the dance may change how one of these behaviors might be done, but this is now accidental. The dance carries forward by bodylooks and not by changing the behavior context.

Versioning is change, of course, but different in kind, than behavior.

We must keep in mind that to feel or sense or perceive generates time, it is always a sequence. When we say we feel "something," we say this on the model of a thing, "something." But to feel is a change-sequence. Behavior's evecs are felt as they are carried forward. In versioning again there is a string of changing evecs but now they are all of them of "the same" behavior context. That context is changed in each version of the string, only not as behavior would change it.

There is thus a hidden aspect to the simple movements; we feel not only the bodylook-carrying forward we see, but also the behavior-context versioning, the change of which we feel and don't actually see.

The external of simple movements and patterns, and the internal of action-context-versioning, are generated together, of course. One sequence of this doubled kind makes that distinction.

External and internal are now both clear during gesturing--one does and sees the simple movements in an external space of mere movements. The internal is the felt, it is how the movements are of, and pause the action-context of mutually implicit sequences (as well as being the feeling of these movements themselves).

But when gesturing stops and there is again action, what then is internal and what is external?

At a certain (still to be defined) point (I call it the FLIP), the actions come to be in the external space. But until then, the external/internal occurs only in gesturing (and functions implicitly in action).

The new inner and outer spaces are both necessarily symbolic. The outer is pattern-space. Objects come into pattern-space. The inner is the string of versions of the action context while one perceives only the simple movements.

The ("internal") feeling is of the bodylooks and of the versioned action context. The bodylooks are symbols. (One has a sense of the symbol itself and also of its meaning, so this duality is correct.) The

same perception (perception bit, or opfucy bit)--the "external"--is the simple movement and is of the action context (it carries forward the one even which implies the behaviors or actions and also implies the gesture sequence that versions this action context).

This clarifies the difference between two uses of "of." The feeling (bodily carrying forward) is said to be "of." As we just showed, feeling is both of the symbol and of what the symbol stands for (what it versions, and reconstitutes). The symbol, the perceived gesture, is, and is of what it versions and reconstitutes.

b) The FLIP

But at what exact point does this new internal/external space become the space in which action and gesturing go on?³¹ Until the end of VII-A everything still happened in behavior-space. The behavior contexts were elaborated, each with its gestures, but the gestures were only pauses during action. Gestures and action went on in action-contexts. These related to each other as the behavior contexts did (a given sequence changes how the others could happen), in behavior space.

Gesturing is double, and hence the movements are external in empty space, and this reconstituted action-context here, now, is had and felt, even while one looks at the gestures. While gesturing occurs, there is this duality. But when it ceases and action resumes, one is in behavior space again, and has been there all along.

It is not the gestures that make relationships between different situations, it is still the actions.

It is not in empty space that different physical settings are located, but still in behavior space.

After the FLIP, the contexts are no longer the physical settings, but the inter-human gestural contexts. Their connections are not those of behavior space, not how a physical action changes the context for other actions. Rather, their connections are how a given gesturing between people changes their situation, the one they have with each other. Many physical settings might be involved--for instance they might argue over who owns a given tree. They might contend about this in the garden, in front of the tree, or at home, sitting in the wooden longhouse, leaning against the wall. The tree is in their situation whether they are physically present where it is, or not.

After the FLIP everything is located in the gestural external

empty space, and the gestural interaction supersedes and defines what each situation is.

Before we can see exactly at what stage this FLIP occurs, let us become exact first about what is involved. There are a number of other developments that we must also grasp, exactly. These are each pieces required for a theory of language, necessary although not sufficient. After we have them each clear, we may try to see in what relation to each other they can develop.

Does it require the FLIP (indeed, is it the same question) to gesture about the tree in the longhouse at home?

The gestures can of course be made anywhere, they don't require the actual tree. The gestures are not among the behavior-space mesh. A gesture does not change how behaviors are physically possible thereafter.³² But although we see the gestures could be made at home, why would someone make them, so to speak, in the "wrong context?" How would the people ever discover that they can form there, why would they want to? How would they be relevanted? So it seems that this must wait until contexts are interactively determined, and not physically, i.e., until the FLIP.

We would like to see more exactly how interaction contexts develop, and in what way they are implicit in each other. Another way to say the same thing: we want to see how an interaction (a gesture sequence) changes how other interactions can or cannot now occur.

It is important to notice that our theory stands before this hurdle, so to speak. We might imagine, for instance, that someone would just discover that the gestures belonging to another context can be made in a different one, but our theory resists that. Why would they form? What would relevant them?³³ Paleontology bears us out, there was really a long time when tools were made freshly at each new hunt site, and left there. Once the hunt-context was no more, the tools lost their significance. There was no way to save anything, it was always fresh formation, as in our theory. The patterns in making the tools were only pauses in the behavior of hunting. These might have been very elaborate, but they were in behavior space, not yet in one interaction space. The patterns lost their capacity to carry forward when they were not in the action-context they paused, even if those patterns were already there, on the objects. Nor were such patterns formed out of their physical contexts. And then--all this did happen, and the people acted in their gesturally defined interaction-context, and no longer in behavior space. That is the FLIP.

Action comes to be in terms of the people with each other, even

when they deal with objects, even when others are absent. The tree is that person's tree even when that person is absent. If chopping down that person's tree is action, it is, now, not because of the change in possible behaviors with a felled tree as against a standing one. Rather, it is action because the relation with the other person is changed by cutting down that person's tree. And it is one action if that person asked for, it, and another quite different action if that person wanted to prevent it.

To understand the FLIP we need a new distinction. The behavior distinction between gesturing and action has now been superseded, because the gestural sequences have become determinative of what action is, rather than the physical actions with objects. We need a new term for the latter: let us call it "doing." Doing is visible activity with objects; from observing a doing we cannot know whether it is action or not (whether it changes the interaction context or not) nor can we know just what the action is (just how it changes the context).

Let us call the contexts interaction contexts (iacxt).

We defined "action" as a carrying-forward change in the action context. "Versioning" was only a string of versions that kept the action context "the same." Let me keep this distinction but let it be functional. It no longer coincides with whether a sequence is physically a doing with objects (or with others as physical objects) or whether it is gestural. In either case it might be action, or it might be only versioning. What was a two-way distinction has become a four-way distinction.

What looks like physical behavior can be either action or only "doing." What looks like gestures can be either action or only versioning.

Let me keep the term "action," as before, to refer to a carrying-forward of the context, now the interaction context. On the other hand, "versioning" (as before) refers to a string of keeping the context (now interaction context) the same.

New criteria from VII, symbolic criteria, now determine whether a sequence is action, or only a versioning or only a doing. For example, if I don't sign the check, the whole thing wasn't action. If I say "I quit" when the boss isn't listening, it wasn't an action. Also, if I say "I quit" to my boss in a certain context and tone of voice, again it wasn't an action, but only an expression of dismay, a versioning of the interaction context but not a carrying-forward of it.

The buyer on the Chicago Grain Exchange raises a finger and

has thereby bought a hundred carloads of grain. Many different seemingly more active behaviors would have been mere doings, not actions. The buyer cannot obtain the carloads by going to the railroad siding, where they actually stand. Jumping onto the cars, feeling the grain in one car, shouting at the workers there, loudly claiming ownership, all those would only be doings.

I call them "VII-criteria," the ways we determine what is action and what is not. They derive from the gestural interaction contexts themselves.

There is thus a new distinction between sequences that function as actions, and those that do not. This cannot be seen, it must be had as part of the interaction context.

The train buyer's gesture is an action when performed on the floor of the Grain Exchange while bidding is going on. But if you are not familiar with that context, you might not even see it. The people shouting and milling around the floor would be much more noticeable, but both the doings and the gestures in this milling around are not actions. I am saving the action/versioning distinction, but it is now determined by VII-criteria. Both are interactions and go on in interaction contexts.

An example of versioning might be a long discussion that leads to no change. Another example is the expressive gestures of our people on the Grain Exchange floor. (Of course versioning too changes the interaction context but not in the same way as action.)

People live and act in situations (which now means: in interaction contexts). Situations are not the physically external facts, but the context of interactions with others, which also determines how these facts are defined. (A locked door is one thing if I am hiding from someone, if trying to get out, quite something else.)

In terms of the internal/external distinction, action is now always partly internal, that is to say it involves interaction-context-change which one doesn't see because it lies in the gesturing between people, which is now also action. But this aspect of the context-change is internal not just to one person but others, of course. It would be wrong to say that people now live in internal space as if situations were private, as if one had them alone and spatially inside. People live with others who are external to them and can be located outside of them in external space. But interaction contexts are not arrangements in this external space either.

This has made them difficult to study with the kind of concepts

current until now, the kind that are modeled on things in external space.

Both external and internal are results of (are formed together with) versioning or symbolic interaction between people. The external space becomes overarching when the interaction-context becomes overarching, and doing goes on in it.

c) The Order

Let us now look at some of the steps of development that would lead to the FLIP. We will try to be exact about the formations and understand exactly what is involved in each. This should let us say just in what order they develop, what is already involved along with each, and what forms later.

1) In the first dance the whole bodylook of each carries the other forward. There is no sequence without the other.

2) The individual alone gestures at objects and also perceives the object's look. (We called this "seen-formation.") Let me also call this "lone carrying-forward."

Let us say several individuals are in the forest, a few hundred yards apart. A bird flies over, and they each alone gesture at it, and see its look.

3) If they are now together again, when one of them gestures at an object, the others watching that individual are also carried forward by that individual's gestures. (They know what that individual is gesturing.) Let me call this "also carrying-forward."

In the above three steps the people are in the actual physical context, the object is present. To carry forward the garden at home at night requires a carrying forward by patterns rather than whole bodylook. The whole body at home does not look like the whole body does in the garden.

Seen-formation is already no longer a whole bodylook carrying-forward. The object does not return the human bodylook. Its own pattern, its own look forms (with human bodylook carrying-forward implicitly functioning). The gesturing at the object is not a bodylook-bodylook sequence.

When others are also carried forward, they are looking at the individual. But their being carried forward is not in a bodylook-bodylook sequence with that individual. That individual need not look

at them, and is not feeding back to their bodylooks. The gesture sequence forms between individual and object. The individual is carried forward thereby, and the others also. They are carried forward by the gestures themselves, not the whole bodylook, and they are carried forward by just watching, not by having their own body effect make a rendition on the other body in turn.

Something quite fundamental happens at the second step (in seen-formation). (In Section VII-B.e) the exact way seems form will become clear.) Patterns carry forward, that are only part of the body, and they carry forward not between two bodies but between body and pattern. Since bodylook as a whole is already a pattern, let me call these new ones "patterns themselves."

It is therefore true, as G.H. Mead said, that our lone-carrying-forward develops in a prior context of interactional carrying-forward (of response to each other), but there is a third type of carrying-forward with each other, which is different and develops only after lone carrying-forward.³⁴

I do not call these patterns as such because "such" means third universals. Also, it is not clear at what stage of the development of seems, the FLIP occurs.

Let us say they all look away from each other and at the object. They are then each "alone" and their interaction with each other is implicit. Thus the scheme comes out the same way whether they are at first physically present or not, and "alone" refers to the sequence: person-object, rather than person-person bodylook. And the person-object sequence must happen before the new level is reached, and happens only in an implicitly interaction-including context.

Each such pattern sequence carries forward the other people also and for the same reason it formed in the first place, for each of them. (We called it also carrying-forward.) Now they are each carried forward by their own gestures themselves, and by the same gestures of others.

The carrying-forward is complete on the side of each person, they each alone know their own gestures, without anyone's feedback, and also know the gestures themselves, which the others may make.

The other's being also carried forward is implicit in any such sequence. (When actual others are also carried forward, that is of course a different sequence than lone-carrying-forward with only an implicit sequence of others being carried forward.)

Subsequent interactions between the people directly have the

lone-carrying-forward sequences implicit. New interactions develop between the people in the context that includes the lone-carrying-forward sequences. And, when they are again alone (or directed at the objects with others looking on) new lone-carrying-forward sequences develop, as more interaction sequences are now implicit. The development goes back and forth. Each type is implicit in the other.

Interaction after the third step is quite different than at the first. Each now knows (is carried forward by) what the other does, and they are also each carried forward by what they themselves do. They each have the other's being carried forward as part of the context. They each know that the others know that they know.

It is not only that lone-carrying-forward sequences are implicit. The interaction is a new and different one. Its events have developed with lone-carrying-forward and are much more elaborate and different.

Interactions as we know them are all of the kind after lone-carrying-forward. What our interactions are, involves our carrying-forward ourselves as well as the others, and involves their carrying-forward themselves as well as us, all of that actually in every bit of the ongoing interaction sequence.

Now that patterns themselves carry forward (the pattern of the object, and of the gesture at the object), such patterns carry forward even if separate from the rest of their physical context. A pattern carries forward even if the rest of the body is not as it would usually be. The pattern of an object carries forward even if the object is not otherwise present. One can "recognize" a picture. The look-of-a-rabbit carries forward even without the rest of what a rabbit is. The gestures a person makes at a rabbit carry forward even if no rabbit were present (though we still haven't figured out how one would ever form such gestures if there were no rabbit). But also, ordinary actions like chasing a rabbit would occur in pattern space. One could do only just some part of the chasing moves and these would be recognized (would carry forward) even if there was no rabbit expected or present (though we don't know why one would do that).

Thus longhouse-carrying-forward (at home) about the garden depends on the carrying-forward by patterns-themselves.

We must go several steps further before we can think about language. We cannot yet fully understand what has developed so far.

However, we can be clear already here, about the inherent interrelation between the formation and power of patterns-themselves

(symbols) and the other developments above. They develop together. But we are not saying that they develop together because we found them so in natural history, or because that would be convenient. We understand each of these developments from inside, and thereby we see how they are inherently related. Lone carrying-forward is by patterns themselves (since there is no other human body to respond to). Also-carrying-forward, and hence at-home carrying-forward, require lone carrying-forward, so that interaction now includes lone-carrying-forward. They are carried forward by their own gestures, as well as those of the other.

d) Absent Context in this Present Context

Let us now see further how interaction contexts develop that are mutually implicit in each other.

How would it come about that the people would gesture an absent context (for instance the garden) while in a different physical context (for instance, the longhouse at home at night)? Why would anyone do the "wrong" gesture in the "wrong" context?

Patterns themselves carry forward no matter where they are made. These gestures (to put it schematically) reconstitute the context they version. The gesture is a string of versions of that context, hence people would have-feel-sequence it. They can live in the "absent" situation.

But, it sounds now as if, when they gesture the tree at home, they experience themselves in the garden: would they no longer know if they are in the garden or at home?

They obviously must be different sequences, to version the garden in the garden, and to do it at home. The same gesture would be a different sequence, and so it would not be the same gesture in the garden sequence and in the longhouse. Of course, at home the whole body doesn't look as if working in the garden, but one could use the same patterns themselves in the garden too. Even then these cannot be the same, at least not as the whole sequence. We have to see exactly how they are different.

The people can interact in the garden about a rabbit that is present in the garden, as well as about one that isn't present while they are in the garden, as well as about a rabbit that isn't present because they are at home in the longhouse--but is present in the garden, as well as about a rabbit that is absent in the absent garden while they are at home.

All these have to be different sequences. The patterns that version a present rabbit (seems) function in the formation of the other sequences. Exactly how?

We must not jump ahead as if there were language, the same phrases used--so far as we have gone each sequence forms freshly (by recurrent causation in the same routines but freshly).

Versioning the garden at home is a different interaction context, than versioning the garden in the garden. The patterns that form will not be the same, although the patterns from one will function implicitly in the new formation in the other.

We have to keep it clear that we are thinking about the original formation of various patterns themselves. Later, with language, there will be the same patterns, used in various contexts. Right now we are at a certain stage of the development of such patterns. There is not yet a stock of them, usable extant, nor do we yet understand "use." They are forming, freshly. The sequence will not be the same in different contexts, we have not yet developed such "same" sequences that can occur in various contexts. The interaction context is the garden-in-longhouse context.³⁵

Carrying-forward by patterns themselves doesn't mean the patterns are the same in different contexts. Different patterns form in (or as) different interaction contexts.

When I call the garden and the longhouse two contexts, I am thinking physically before the FLIP. Their trees could come up in their interaction at home after the FLIP, since then it would be one context, their interaction context. Until the FLIP, however, the contexts are still those of behavior space, and related through behavior changing other behavior possibilities. At this stage we see the interaction contexts forming. The interaction sequences do each function in the formation of new ones, but they are still separated, each is a pause in a behavior context.

Since they function in the formation of each other, the interactions from other behavior contexts are implicit in the gestures which pause this one. If these implicit gestures occurred, they would reconstitute the other behavior contexts. But, as we saw (VII-A.o)) what is implicitly functioning is not all of what we term an implicit sequence, but only what participates now in the occurring one.

More exactly: A reconstituted context occurs. The behavior context which a given set of gestures version, is occurring, had, and felt. That is the context they know they are in, as they gesture. But the

other contexts are not occurring, except insofar as the given context is what the others could take off from. As we saw exactly (in VI) these are the other behaviors which make up this space, in the form in which they could occur from this spot. But why cannot the other gestures occur from this context? That is exactly like saying "Why is there not yet one space formed by all gesture sequences mutually implicit in each other?" That is exactly what is now forming, and we don't yet know at what stage it will have developed sufficiently, nor just how it takes over in the FLIP.

We have gotten four clarifications:

1) The sequence will be different as the whole body is different, at home, and in the garden. The patterns themselves, which form freshly still, will not be the same (though each will function implicitly in the formation of the other, as they elaborate).

2) There is not yet language, not the use of a stock of the same patterns-as-such. Patterns themselves now carry forward, but they form freshly and differently in different contexts.

3) We should therefore not say "the same sequence" happens in different contexts, it will be a different sequence. The notion of the same sequence in two contexts assumes language, whereas we want to see how such a sequence can develop. It has not yet. Also, it is always a different context. If they versioned the garden-context at home, they would experience themselves in the garden and lose track of being home. No, they version the garden-at-home context, not the garden context.³⁶

4) The FLIP is not yet. Interaction contexts are developing, but each is still only within its behavior context, as a pause. Gesture sequences do function in the formation of new ones, and are implicit in them, therefore. Such an implicit sequence would, if it occurred, reconstitute the behavior context it versions. But the contexts have not formed a unity, a space of their own yet. That would be the FLIP, exactly.

e) Crossing of clusters, and so-called "conventional" symbols; (exactly why they are no longer ikonic of the body in each situation, and how they are nevertheless organic rather than arbitrary: The internal relations of proto-linguistic symbols.)

Let us now examine much more closely the formation of these

gestures and symbolings we have been discussing, to see some further, necessary ingredients of language-formation. The symbols we are discussing are not yet language, but its pre-conditions.

It is well-known that at some stage in the development of language there had to be a shift from direct bodily expression to signs of a kind that are not directly expressive. When signs still look and sound as the body would in the signified situation (usually called "expressive"), I will call that "onomatopoeic" or "ikonic." (I want to hold the term "expression" to the technical meaning we have given it.) But little clear thought has been possible on just when, why, and how signs change, and indeed how signs could possibly develop, that are not themselves like what they mean.

When one calls such signs "conventional," the word alludes to a meeting of people, convened for the purpose of adopting some kind of agreement which is then called a "convention." Of course everyone knows that is not how language signs came about. The word "conventional" means non-ikonic or not onomatopoeic. But how can signs like that form, if there is no inherent relation between the sign and what it means?

The difficulty has been that signs have been thought about as if they were units (just as everything else, in the old model, is studied in units). Viewed that way, one tends to think that signs are related as direct expressions to the situation in which they are used, or else there is no inherent relation at all. But inherent relations can be much more complex, as we will see.

Then also, language confronts its students as an extremely complex system. If it is broken into units whose arrangements make meaning, then implicit rules, the syntactical system of language appears unnecessarily complex and puzzling. The intricate system is first cut away, as if language sounds fell from heaven like separate hail stones, and then that system returns as a puzzle. But the system suggests that the units formed as a system, that is to say they formed in and with their complex internal relations.

But how can we think from bodily onomatopoeic expression to sounds that are not ikonic, and yet intricately and systematically related to the contexts in which they form? We can and we now will.

We have seen a little of that already, in a general way. The patterns of objects, and gestures with them, formed, we said, with bodily expressive (dance) sequences functioning in their formation. This already meant that many gesture sequences formed in many action contexts, which were not onomatopoeic for those action

contexts (but only in the one action context in which the dance appeared). All other action contexts now have that one dance implicit. Their elaborations look and sound like that dance, and not as the body would look or sound in the given action.

Recalling this more exactly: The first dance versions some action context. That context (behavior space as it is just then) consists of many other behavior-possibilities, although just then it is this occurring action which carries forward, not the others. All these other sequences, if they occur, will have the present one implicit in their contexts. But the present sequence now has the dance-pause. That dance is therefore implicit in all the other behaviors. That doesn't mean the dance will occur in them, rather, what of it can occur, will.

What I call a whole "cluster" of pattern elaborations (gestures, and patterns of objects) will form,³⁷ each differently, but each with the dance functioning in the formation.

All this has been said before. I say it here to show that already such a first cluster is no longer onomatopoeic, except for the first dance itself.

Let us say all of this cluster is finished actually occurring (a whole cluster of "second sequences"). A new "first" dance now arises in some action context. (That action context already has some derivatives from the first "first" dance.) Again, a whole new cluster of derivatives from this new dance is now pre-formed, and will form, since all those action sequences are implicit in the danced one, and it is now implicit in them. In each of these actions, when they occur, the change from the new dance will cross with the previous change, and something new will arise. The gesturing from the very first "first" dance is now further altered by those from the new one. I call this interaction of the whole first cluster with the second "crossing."

For instance, let us say that earlier there was a dance that versioned fighting. The whole cluster of behavior contexts was elaborated by gestures derivative from (similar to) the fight-versioning dance. Then a dance that versioned hunting developed. Now the whole system of contexts is elaborated by the derivatives from the hunting dance, forming in a crossed way with the extant fighting-dance-derived patterns. A further new dance, versioning sexual intercourse, would now provide new gestures, functioning implicitly, so that the gestures in all the action contexts would form as crossed products from the extant gestures and these new ones.

The whole crossed system would look more like the body does in the three danced contexts, than in any of the others.

We can now show exactly how patterns develop, which are not "onomatopoeic" or whole-body expressive! When there was only one first dance, the patterns in all the action contexts are derivatives from only the one dance. Thus they are already expressive only of that one danced context, yet the derivatives form in all the contexts. The one dance has provided a pattern dimension. With the next new dance, the whole cluster is crossed with another, so the resulting gesture sequences are even further away from what the whole body is like in each action context.

For example, suppose a certain hand-motion³⁸ forms as a first dance. All or many of the extant sequences making up that context now form with some hand-motion (as well as perhaps other alterations due to interaffecting, in the crossing). These will be many, many different hand-motions, "like" each other in being derivative from this new hand-sequence, but otherwise different in various ways.

The original hand-motion that versioned the action context of the dance was a sequence of variations of some hand-motion or hand-posture which really occurs in that action context. The hand-motion sequence would be "onomatopoeic" for that context, but obviously the derivative hand-motions will not be onomatopoeic for the many other action contexts in which, by crossing, they form.

The "likeness" I just mentioned cannot yet be sequenced or seen or heard, at this stage. We were saying the above. An important point must be noticed here: Two gestures may seem very much alike, only slightly different, yet they may version and reconstitute very different action contexts. To an external en#1 observer the likeness can seem striking, the difference minimal. But when one such gesture forms, both for a person doing it and another perceiving it, it forms as a versioning of an action context. The other action context which has a look-similar gesture is quite far from their minds, or rather, their bodies as they are now. This is so also for us. If the contexts of similar-sounding words occurred to us as we speak or hear at all we could not talk or think.

Language theory has never had a way of understanding how such minimal differences in similar sounds reconstitute different contexts.

Symbolic communication thus becomes separate from expressive communication by whole bodylook and sound and movement. The patterns, after a few crossings of clusters, look much more like each other than like the body in the given action context.

In all the derivative sequences that are crossed, it is no longer

whole body carrying forward. And yet another new "first dance" can form, that is again whole body carrying forward.³⁹ As we will see later this cannot continue indefinitely.

I call it a "first-sequence" if it functions like a new dance. I call all the many thereby changed sequences making up the cluster "second-sequences." Seens are second sequences, also makings and all the pattern sequences of pausing in action. Each new first sequence gives a new cluster which crosses with the already crossed earlier clusters.

Each second sequence, when it occurs in its new way, becomes implicit that way in the already formed ones, and in the subsequently forming ones.

The relation between one second sequence and another is like that of one behavior sequence and another, except that we are now speaking of doubled sequences. Therefore the formation of each sequence alters both how actions are done and their gestural aspect. Are these two levels quite clear to us?

The behavior contexts are implicit in each other in how one behavior or action changes how the others are possible. If you chop the tree down you can't then climb it. If you climb it and it's chopped down while you're on it, you can't climb down. This is the relation of the actions within one cluster. When gestures form they relate to each other via how the action-contexts they version relate to each other.

But there are also other inherent relations, not only those of the behavior sequences to each other.

The gestures arise from how the body looks and moves in a given context. The body implies the behavior space--all the sequences. The body implies just this sequence by evening them all into just this focal implying. So the behavior sequences are related not only externally (if you chop the tree down you can't climb it), but also in the body.⁴⁰ Therefore how the body looks is related inherently to this behavior context, and also constitutes always an eveved relation between all the contexts.

The different ways the body looks in different contexts are related to each other in both the above ways.

As one context is versioned (each bit of a gesturing sequence reconstitutes the same behavior context slightly differently), a whole new set of bodily organic relations arise, as each bit versions the context which, after all, consists of all the sequences. So the gestures (the symbols) in a given context are inherently related internally within

the body to other contexts with their gestures.

Crossing is a bodily meshing, as every body-event is an evening.

While the gesture is now no longer how the body looks in this given behavior, it is a crossed product of how the body is in this behavior, and how it is in the danced behavior context, from which the gestures derive. Whatever does form, forms from the body in this given context, crossed with the implicit dance sequence. So it is not a matter of arbitrarily sticking derived patterns and gestures into the given context. It forms organically and the crossing happens in the formation of body-events.

This applies both to the body's sound, looks, and motions, as well as to the patterns of objects. Both are their own patterns, but they form in the evening that includes the implying of the dance sequence patterns.⁴¹

The patterns are therefore inherently related to what they "mean" (what they version and reconstitute, what they let one have and feel and sequence and "keep the same").

Gesture and meaning form as one event. The having (sequencing, feeling, "keeping same") is a string of slightly different versions--which have not been before. The word "same" is in quotation marks, to version a behavior context (and thus have and feel it) is to create a whole new set of versions. (It is the versioned context, that is felt and had, not the original one, of course.) Again this shows that between gesture and what is reconstituted the relation is not arbitrary, but organic.

The same is the case with the relation of different gesture sequences to each other. They are related not only as their contexts were already related in behavior space, but also through the formation and crossing just described.

But since the contexts are versioned, and thus vastly re-created, and this happens in gesturing, the relations among the gesture-formations also give the contexts a new kind of relation between them. And these new relations are not just added on, but are inherently part of how these contexts are re-created (or, if you like, elaborated).

Directly ikonic onomatopoeia is now very far away, but it is through non-arbitrary bodily and environmental formations that a cluster of often-crossed derivatives of pattern sequences elaborates action.

The system of interrelated gesture sequences in different contexts has thereby a very deep bodily underpinning of inter-crossed relations. It far exceeds in complexity any mere spatial positioning of unit sounds or moves. It is symbolic not by one-to-one label relations to objects or situations or actions. The system beneath language has in fact the character of bodily organization, the system we also described formally as the metastructure. I will say much more about it in VIII. Obviously, it far exceeds the kind of relations set out in the usual logics.

The body functions here, in these formations, so that it isn't possible to reduce the formation to arrangements of pre-existing units. Between behavior and how the body looks in it, the nature of the body is involved. Again, between the gestures in a given crossed cluster, and the next crossing, again bodily formation is involved. And it is not just a physical outwardly moving and sounding body, but one that implies the behavior sequences and behavior space.

If I call these elaborated contexts "interaction contexts," then I speak after the FLIP. I have been speaking about their formation, and not yet their taking over, as the space in which action occurs. Here we don't yet see how this happens, only how the interaction contexts form as inherently related to each other and to their gestures, as the gestures are related also to each other. The body event and the bodily implying during gesturing reconstitutes (is an occurring, a feeling, having, and carrying-forward of) the elaborated behavior context as well, of course, so that the relations I have been setting forth are all one system. It is a new system of how the gesturally (interactionally) elaborated action sequences are implicit in each other.

Filling in what we have said schematically, what can it mean to say that the gestures elaborate and also newly connect different action contexts? It means that the interactions between people (which at first merely seem "about" action contexts) come to be the more important interrelations between the contexts. The symboling sequences between the people are not now so much about action, rather action comes to be about the relations between the people. That is the meaning of that FLIP which we have not yet derived, although the system of interrelated interaction contexts has formed before us.

What has been presented are essentials for an understanding of the formation of language and culture. Of course these essential parameters would not need to be couched in the terms of our schematic, but they cannot be done without. They can be translated into other terms if someone will devise other, hopefully ever better, terms.

Among the tasks of this work are: to re-conceptualize the body so that we could understand how focusing is possible, how we can feel complex situations, how the body can come up with an answer to a complex human living question we cannot figure out, how body and cognition are not just split apart. That obviously requires a different conception of the body than physiology currently offers. I think I have shown why (IV) both what physiology says, and the kinds of concepts it uses cannot conceptualize these aspects of the body we know and have.

Another task, quite similar, is to form concepts for the pre-conceptual. (This is the same point without attributing it to the body.) We want to be able to think about what a felt sense or an "experiential sense" is, before we have explicated. Even before that it has already an incredible fine structure. Without our scheme that is about all one can say: experience is not indeterminate, it is very finely ordered but not like concepts (a helpless statement I have made so often). "Not arbitrary but not conceptually determined." Not this, not that. Here we are deriving the way to think about what it is. We are formulating how language develops in a bodily way, and the sort of "system" its internal relations are. Language is not something grafted on to the body. Speech forms directly from the body. Its inherent order is vastly more than arrangements of its audible units.

Further, we need to be able to think how the human individual is actually part of an interactional system, and how the basic "psychic contents" are really process aspects of interaction.

(When we have enough concepts we will then be able to go on in those, to see if we can state how we did it: how were we able to think about what is before thought?)

Culture has to be conceived as a system of situations, that is to say interaction contexts, or implicit mesh of possible interactions. Culture is what one does (and says) in different situations--but of course a situation is inherently itself made up as a system of interrelated possible acts and their consequences, how the situation is thereby changed.

Action goes on in a situation, and thereby changes a situation. Conversely, a situation is the need (the focal implying) for some action. If one does not act to carry the situation forward, one has "not met the situation." There is always much mere doing, which fails to meet a situation.

Different cultures cannot be said to have different ways of meeting "the same" situations, because the latter are not the same, of

course. As yet we have said nothing about how cultural variety enters. What we have seen is that the rudiments of language and of culture form together, but a crucial development has yet to come before there is language. So far we have had only freshly formed (not "used") sequences.

The formation of the archetypes of human culture (if we call them that) is before language as such.

f) Language Formation: Two Kinds of Crossing

f-1) The mediate carrying forward, what language use is

When language is used each word and phrase carries forward its own universal context (as it seems:) regardless of what context it is used in. The words have their own meaning, so that we can say what that is, quite apart from the particular situation, now, in which the words are used.

To define how a word is used, we would tell a situation and also what the use of the word does to the situation. For instance, "democracy" has to do with large groups living together, with government, with dividing things up, and then in that context "democracy" refers to a certain way of doing that, namely Or, another example, "voluntarily" comes up in situations where some act could have been done on one's own, or one might have been forced, and, in that context, "voluntarily" is used when we want to mark the situation as one in which it was done on one's own. Every word or phrase, if used, changes the situation a certain pre-determined way. The word "means" both the situation (the context) and just how the use of the word changes that context (how the use of the word carries the situation forward).

Both of these are the word's own context, it has its own carrying forward of its own context.

By means of the word's own carrying forward we also do something in this particular situation, now, if we use the word now.

The structure of uses involves an indirectness, it is "mediate." We carry forward this present situation, now, by means of the word's carrying forward its own.

f-2) Collecting context(s), the formation of kinds

How does the word or phrase acquire its own context? This is the

question how universals form--the kind I call "thirds." (For "first" and "seconds" see VII-A.)

We have seen that patterns are versionings – each bit of a pattern sequence is a version of a behavior-context that is "kept-same," so that the string of versions enables us to have and feel and sequence the "same" behavior context over time. I also say that the versioning-sequence (the gesture sequence) reconstitutes the behavior context. It occurs, it is felt, had, lived in, bodily. We saw this as the way symbols enable us to live and feel (sequence over time) the behavior context.

The way the body moves and sounds in that behavior context is what does this versioning. First it is the whole body-look (including sound and movement), then what we called "patterns themselves" carry forward. The phrase in quotes means that some specific visual or sound pattern does the carrying forward, not the effect of the whole bodylook of one person on another.

If we wanted to assume kinds and categories from the start (as we can do), we would say that the pattern stems from how the body looks in that kind of behavior context. We, with our capacity for universals, would observe that the body always looks that kind of way in that kind of context.

We could then say (by assuming kinds to begin with) that we grasp how kinds form: the pattern, after all, reconstitutes not just this context now, but also each of the other contexts (of that kind). We could ask: "which context does the pattern reconstitute and enable one to feel? This one, or yesterday's or one long ago, or another long ago?" The answer would have to be all of them, at once. (Of course we don't want to assume that everything is already organized in kinds; we want to derive that, and understand what is involved. But let that wait for a moment.)

I say that a word or phrase reconstitutes its context(s). This way of writing the plural "s" marks how, in one sense there are many contexts reconstituted, while in some other sense it is all one universal kind of context.

We see that patterns have inherently this kind of relation to particulars, they reconstitute all of them. But of course, we don't assume that someone has gone in advance and has organized and grouped contexts into kind-piles, we want to understand, not assume, that. So we don't say the pattern reconstitutes all of that kind.

We therefore first turn the above around and say: it is by

reconstituting that the pattern creates a kind or a category. (We must still see, how.)

Let us say that the pattern-sequence reconstitutes whatever it reconstitutes, and then let us see what that would be. It isn't just only this behavior context now, because it reconstitutes via how the body is in this context, and that is also how the body is in other contexts of that kind--but there are not yet kinds. It follows that the reconstituting will make a kind-relation by reconstituting--it will enable the person to feel (have, sequence) the context(s), now. Thereby a kind is forming.

As this happens again and again, what is reconstituted is different each time, but is the context(s) each time. Every new one is versioned in the present now, by being reconstituted as the context(s). The fresh one is of course newly part of this collecting, and affects just how or what the others, as reconstituted now, are.

They are all crossed with this one. What is reconstituted now is a crossed product of this one and the (somewhat new) way in which all the others are now reconstituted along with this one.

All the above is an instance of how metaphor was dealt with in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. We do not assume antecedently existing "similarities" or "commonalities," but see them forming by the crossing of the present context with another or others.

The kinds are a result--along with the words and phrases that reconstitute them.

We have just seen the formation of kinds, but not yet their use. On the contrary, we see clearly that in each situation there is a fresh formation of a versioning, and it only happens to reconstitute the context(s), rather than only this one. The present context is thereby elaborated, we can even say that it is thereby kinded. What it is involves the others that are reconstituted with it. But there is not yet the use of a stable extant stock. These are still fresh sound-formations. The context(s) and the reconstituting sounds are made together.

f-3) Lateral crossing and collective crossing

Traditionally, it was thought that the different details of all these situations drop out, leaving a commonality, an abstraction, just what the different situations have in common. I will show that this is an error, a very bad error. The collected context(s) is all the richness and complexity of each context crossed with every new one. In crossing the details don't drop out, they are part of the evening that a bodily

event is. I will say more about that in a separate discussion in Appendix to f) at the end of VII-B.

Let me contrast the crossing we have had, with this new collecting-crossing.

We saw earlier how a new pattern dimension (from a new dance) has a whole cluster implicit (type a implicit, pre-formed), namely all the behavior sequences that make up the behavior space--how they will each be elaborated or modified by this new pattern dimension. In each or most behavior sequences some new elaborations will form, which have the new pattern-dimensions from the dance implicit in their formation.

We next said that when that has all happened, and a further new dance gives again a new pattern dimension, the new implicit cluster will cross with the extant cluster. Later a still newer pattern dimension will again cross with the already-crossed cluster, and so on.

I call that kind of crossing "lateral crossing." It is based on the way the behaviors in behavior space form a mutually implicit cluster.

Our new kind of crossing is not like that. Collecting crosses contexts of a kind, rather than the behavior-space cluster.

For example, running relates in behavior space to many other behaviors. If the animal runs, it cannot drink, and if it drinks it cannot run. Every behavior implicitly involves a mesh of other behaviors that are different.

In contrast, running as a kind would collect all the instances of running. An animal's running does not bring with it all the other instances of running. Running does not collect.

(Past experience functions, as described in IV. Past times of running may function in the present running. But past experience does not function along kinds, only--as is so often wrongly assumed. The kind structure must not be assumed as a basic reality given in advance. We want to understand it.)

f-4) Word-formation

Let us see these two kinds of crossing:

Say a sound, kinnickinnick from a dance now functions in the formation of many different sounds in many different contexts. This type of sound now functions in the formation of many different sounds that have the "k" or "kin" sound.

Although the "kin" sound is derived from how the body is in some one behavior context, this now crosses (as we saw in the last section) with how the body is in every other behavior context (that was implicit in the first one). And that is called "lateral crossing."

As "kin" is used in one context, and "kind" in another, and "ken" in still another, these sounds each reconstitute and thus create their kinds. Each collects its context(s). "King" comes to collect context(s), and so does "child."

These collected context(s) are not as our universals in logic; "kind" reconstitutes not only all of the members of the clan, but also how one acts toward a member of the clan differently than toward an outsider.⁴² The sound "ken" reconstitutes the context(s) of familiarity. The collected context(s) are not a logically pure fenced-in multiplicity of exact particulars, like stamped-out pennies that differ only in particularity. On the contrary, it would be an endless job to state logically what a word collects, and reconstitutes.

Each time it forms, it also adds to the collected context(s) a fresh complex context, in which it can form (since it did).

We see clearly that the details of each context are not at all dropped out in favor of abstract bones. On the contrary, the details are retained and crossed with the collected context(s). The universal forms as the crossed product of these contexts.

f-5) Short units

We can derive from the above, that there is a strong tendency toward the shortest units, as a result of the collecting of context(s).

Let me first think about this in the wrong old way that assumes similarity in advance, and then rethink it more correctly.

Say two long sequences form in two different contexts. Some parts of these two are the same, the rest differs. The part that is the same in both would collect the two context(s) and would exist as an independent unit. Thus the units would get shorter and shorter, until syllables would have their own meaning, i.e., their own collected context(s) which they carry forward.

Instead, we say that it is by collecting, that a "part" comes to form as a part. It is by collecting, that there is first a sameness. (Collecting, we said, involves reconstituting a context which is the crossed product, what can form, with the many reconstituted contexts at once.)

So we need not assume in advance that the longer sequences

already come as a string of parts. Nor need we assume that certain sounds exist as "similar" or "the same." It is only when the sound finds itself reconstituting the collected context(s) that "it" becomes a sound-part in its own right, something that can recur as itself, something that can be both its other occurrences and this occurrence; in short, something that can be such.

Collective crossing thus makes for the shortest units. As soon as some incomplete sequence reconstitutes collected context(s) it becomes an "it," becomes an independent entity, "a" part, and it falls out as such. It does so because it now has carried forward its own collected context(s). It reconstitutes its collected context(s)--that is to say its carrying forward in them--even without the rest of the sequence.⁴³

We see this as soon as we look for it: Most longer words in a language are combinations of syllabic words that can mean independently. Original word-formation appears to have broken sound sequences down to syllabic units. The first words were all the way down to syllabic units. Then, when word-formation in the sense of the creation of language was over, new words were (and are still) formed by combination or metaphor--which is not the original creation of language.

We will inquire shortly, what this critical point is, at which language-creation ceases, and all further new formations must use only certain combines of what is extant. It is obvious that many sounds which would be just as useful as those in a language are always possible, but this is not how new words are formed once the original creation of language ceases. This cessation happened long before all obvious new possible syllables were exhausted. This shows also that the formation of word units was anything but an arbitrary use of possible syllables, rather a very specific process that must have been involved, which could go no further at some point.⁴⁴

f-6) The context of a word; collected contexts and interaction contexts

When fallen out (because it reconstitutes its own context(s)), a word-unit retains its relations to other contexts and to other word-units. We can see this exactly, if we consider:

A context consists of many other implicit sequences not now occurring. The occurring sequence carries the context forward in its way, whereas the implicit sequences in the context would carry it forward in other ways. Therefore a sequence is always also implicit

relations to other sequences.

We saw earlier that the gestural sequences make new relations both among the contexts they version, and among the patterns themselves. Until the FLIP, the gestures still occur as pauses in the sequences of behavior space. After the FLIP even actions go on in the mutually implying interaction sequences as the overarching (internal/external) space.

Every word-unit is therefore implicitly a very large system of mutually implicit sequences, as well as being its own occurring, its own carrying forward of its own context(s). These mutually implicit sequences are gestural and of course reconstitute action-contexts. Both the sounds, and also the contexts, mutually imply each other, and are implicit as the context that the word-unit reconstitutes.

The word therefore forms only in certain interaction-contexts, and only in certain relations to other words, only in certain places in a sequence.

It is important to realize that for us today, also, words form in a bodily way. The right words must come to us. (If they don't, there is little we can do about it, except wait, and in a bodily way, sense what our situation is, and what we sensed that we were about to try to say.) It is our bodily being in the situation we are in, that lets the right words come. If the reader would stop for a moment, and self-observe, it will be immediately clear. The words of speech and thought "just come." How do they come? We do not sift through many wrong words, as if going through a file. We don't "select" words from among many other words. The right words, or close to the right words, "just come." What precedes this coming? Sometimes a bodily sense of the situation. But often there is no separately attended to sense, of this kind. Being in the situation lets the words come. The system of interrelated words and the system of interrelated situations and interactions is, in some basic way, a single system. And, in another basic way, there are two interrelated systems: the system of words and the system of our living in situations.

The basic link between the two, in schematic terms, is the way patterns reconstitute (we feel, have, sequence over time) situations without changing them as action would. A pattern is a pattern of . . . , and lets us version a situation without acting in it. After the FLIP, however, such gestural sequences become the main action (interaction), and new marks come to determine the difference between changing a situation and merely doing or merely talking about. The basic division is no longer between gesturing and action.

After the FLIP, therefore, the two systems are no longer distinguished by the differences between gesturing and acting. Rather, it is now the difference between the words' own collective context(s) on the one hand, and the particular present situation they mediately carry forward now.

The situations thereby, as we said, become kinded, so that every situation is not only this one, but also a situation of a given kind.

The difference remains, therefore. Words are used (because they always carry forward their context(s), and only mediately do they carry forward this context now). Interactions are not used--one uses words in interactions. Of course the very same speech-act is both. Let me show this more exactly:

You say to your friend, "I'm tired. Let's stop working for a while."

You are using existing words. But the interaction is fresh, you are tired now. Could we try to say that the interaction is also used? In our culture it is an appropriate move (we might try to argue) to say that one is tired. It will usually obtain a rest period or an approved cessation of work. In another culture one might have to use a different excuse. But there is a difference here! Your friend will resent it if this is indeed a move you are using, whereas no resentment is involved in using words. We see that, indeed, one can use interactional moves, but it is a special case. The normal case is that interactions do not form as existing moves that are used.

The speech-act as words is a use, but as interaction it is fresh.

There are two systems of contexts here, the mutually implicit situations which I will call the interaction life context, and the mutually implicit collected context(s) of each word, which as the language system I will call the collected life interaction contexts (coliacxt). The words thus always carry forward their own life contexts, and we use them to carry forward this present fresh one in which we live.

Notice that the culture as a system is the collected life interaction context--it is the same single system formed along with language-formation as kinds of situations. We saw earlier how interaction-contexts and language form together.

The interaction contexts we live in, are particular, although of course the collected life interaction context is always implicit in our situations.

Let us not forget that before language, even before humans, behavior space is very complex. Gestures and patterns version and

elaborate this vastly. By no means is it the case that all this disappears, as though we were left only with the relatively few kind relations, as abstractions. Kind relations version and reconstitute situation(s), with all their details and complexity. Thus vastly more occurs than is kinded. Also, in the kinded situations, and in the collected contexts vastly more occurs than only what is kinded in them.

It is also clear that vast crossed complexity occurs in the collected context(s) as such; words can have much more cultural meaning than an individual grasps, and usually they do. It is not at all the case that the collected(s) are poorer. The universal is not only commonalities.⁴⁵ Nor are individuals merely mental--they are bodies that imply the collected life interaction context.

The fresh situations we live can certainly exceed the collected life interaction context, since we live fresh formations. But it must be kept clear that the collected life interaction context also vastly exceeds what we can reflect upon. (We have not yet discussed the kind of sequences in which we reflect upon what we are living interactionally.)

f-7) Syntax

Before a shorter unit fell out, something like that unit was an event in the longer sequence. Like any event in a sequence it implied the rest of the sequence.

As short units carry forward context(s) of their own, that is now quite a different sequence. But each unit still implies the rest of the sequence (now the new one).

The use of any word changes what other words can now be used. We have seen this in terms of the interrelation of situations (contexts), and also in terms of the interrelation of words. But the use of any word also changes what other words could occur to complete what used to be a single gesture sequence.

In the previous example, you say to your friend: "I'm tired. Let's stop working." You couldn't have said "I'm round," because the word "round" belongs to a different context. But you also couldn't have said, "I'm tired. Let's." this is because the word "Let's" implies that another word will come.

Every word is also implicitly the system of all the words that could come next, and sometimes also words in further spots down the line.

You could finish the sentence with "let's" if you follow it with some

gesture or indication, for example you could point at the door. This shows that it is an interaction unit, not necessarily a word, that must come. But words imply these slots for other words also where there is no meaning content that can substitute for it. For example, word order. You cannot say "I tired am," even though the meaning would be clear. You cannot say "I'm tiredness."

It has been noted that the syntactical structure of language is far more complex than seems warranted by the requirements of meaning. It is also an odd kind of structure difficult to reduce to explicit rules. It is in fact the kind of structure the body has and makes. It shows the bodily origin of the character of bodily behavior sequences, and their relation to each other.

Syntax has the complexity and mutual interrelatedness characteristic of the body. We can feel the need for a certain word, not only from the situation we are in, but also from the words we have used up to the given point. The word is implied focally, even if it doesn't come, much as exhaling is implied when we hold our breath, or eating when hungry.

Therefore there is no mystery how people speak without knowing the "rules" of syntax, any more than how people manage to sit down in a chair without falling, even though they know neither anatomy nor physics. The "rules" we explicate are a very late product, and they are never quite successful--if we had only the "rules" as stated we would not speak very well, and we could not do all that we do with language. If we had only the rules of sitting we would fall down. But these "rules" do show something of the nature of one aspect of the possibilities space, one aspect of the collected life interaction context a word brings with it, and reconstitutes for us in a bodily way we can feel.

It is right to say, in a way, that the structure of syntax is inborn,⁴⁶ as also much of behavior and of interaction. One could explicate many structural aspects of behavior and of interaction. The relation between learning and inborn must be taken up--every sequence is both, and in a variety of ways. Of course it isn't syntax alone, as such, that is inherited. The body is inherited. We have seen that the living body is a functional and interaction system. Its ongoing interacting with the environment is inherited, including how it builds cells, mating dances, gestural body-look interaction, and the basic human interaction contexts. Along with all this is also syntax.

Of course it seems mysterious how syntax could be "built into" the kind of body physiology conceptualizes. But that is equally true of all functional implying, of all behavior and human interaction. The

animal organism has been conceived of too simply and mechanically. There is then no bridge from physiological concepts to behavior ones. How can the squirrel's innate nut-burying be "built in" the body is another mystery like syntax. But the gap is not at all between body and behavior and symboling. It is between the kind of concepts currently used in physiology, and the kind we need in the study of animal behavior and symbolic interaction. Therefore we have reconceptualized body-process (I-V).

True, physiology books usually assert that the body is functional and interactional. But the detailed concepts are all along the lines of the old unit model, so that there is no way to think about any specific bodily processes in functional terms. Although still general, we have taken many steps into making new specific concepts for body-process, with which we can think about the body character of behavior and now symboling.

Of course what is inborn is not "the rules" that linguists formulate. It is the body which is inherited--but not only the physical body, also its functioning. Indeed, the physical body itself is a kind of product of its functioning, of life process. We inherit not only the lungs, but how we breathe, and not just the stomach but how it digests and what food it can take. This applies also to what must also be learned. Nothing can be learned unless by some organism, which already has the sort of structure which makes it possible to learn that.

Some of the structure of the human brain is related to language, and much else in the human body as well, I would add. The development of language and culture is the development of humanness, of how the human body differs from other living bodies. It is not only a question of the brain but of the whole body in which the brain functions, the whole system of action and interaction which this body implies.

No doubt, there can be many other different concepts, and others will develop better ones. But let us be glad to have at least one set, and the questions and derivations that set gives us. It lets us enter territory not charted until now, or, to shift metaphors, how body and language (and much else we discussed) relate allows us to think one whole level deeper, under most of what has been said on these topics till now.

f-8) Language use; novel situations

We saw earlier, that we are always at a specific "spot" in the collected life interaction context, depending of course on how we are

in our interactional life context (in which the collected life interaction context is implicit). There is therefore a set of speech-acts focally implied by the situation. Or, we can say more exactly, that certain further interactions are focally implied (that is what a situation is, it has to be "met," that is to say it requires or implies certain further actions). Only some of these focally implied next interactions are speech-acts.

When circumstances are routine, the next interaction is also routine. But even when a situation is novel, when we don't know exactly what to say or do, there is nevertheless a very finely exact implying of the next interaction. Only, the next interaction is new, it has never happened before.

Is it surprising that something which has never happened could be focally implied? Not at all! That has been so in this schematic from the start. In changed circumstances either the body dies or something new happens. (See IV, V, VI.) A body event is an evening, it always also is the implying of a next (and a whole) sequence.

But we also said throughout, that even when the observer seems to know exactly what next event is focally implied, we say the implying is never equivalent to a structured sequence. It is rather an implying for some way of carrying forward, not necessarily for the way familiar to the observer.

We have been able to think about development and novelty more clearly in this way. A new sequence may happen instead of the one that usually happens at this focal implying. The new one is then pyramided on the old one. The old one will recur if the new one cannot. Every sequence is a new one, from its own viewpoint. The new sequence is the new-new (the old one was also a new one).

Now, however, these syllabic word-units (and combinations) have developed, which are their own carrying-forward on their own context(s). As always, the formation of the actual speech sequences is fresh and new. But it is a formation that consists out of new arrangements of extant units that carry forward on their own. I must explain this more exactly.

The formation of these words in this sentence now is the interaction which, as we said, forms freshly.

The reason linguists form "rules" is because language-use is creative. The regularity is not what is said. That shows a great creative variety. There is a regularity in how these creative sentences all must be structured. The notion of "rules" deals with this kind of regularity in the formation of irregular creative variety within certain regularities.

These rules are not just about order and combination. As we saw, each word implies what other words can come next, also in terms of meaning contexts, not only in terms of sequence order.

One is always at a given spot in one's interactional life context, and hence a given spot of the collected life context. If exact words and sentences are not extant, nevertheless one's being in the interaction life context implies in a definite way.

It is now this implying which re-evevs the extant words (and the vast system of implicit sequences, which each word is).

Language use, in our schematic terms, is this re-eveving.

One might call every renewed eveving "re-eveving" but I use the term here because words constitute a repertoire. "Repertoire" is another word indicating use and re-eveving: each piece in the repertoire is its own eveving, already. To use them, one does a fresh eveving.

The next section will make this clear.

f-9) Discursive use versus art; re-eveving versus re-recognition

When a painter borrows a motif, for example a raggedy dead tree like those Ruysdale freshly created, could we say the motif is "used" like words are used? The answer is no, but exactly why not? After all, it is well known that such a tree adds a desolate, and at the same time dramatic effect. When that effect is wanted, the painter might "use" such a tree. We could think of a painting put together almost completely out of well-known elements and some very bad paintings are made like that.

A painted tree is a visual pattern. The quality of its lines and colors affect us. A melody affects us through the quality of the sound-pattern. In contrast, a word does not affect us through the quality of its sound-pattern. We must recognize (the "re" is like the "re" in "re-evev") the word, and so we must recognize the sound-pattern that the word is. But, the recognition then has an effect that is independent of the quality of that sound pattern as sound. Except for the few words that are onomatopoeic, the sound effect doesn't matter.

When the painter uses a Ruysdale tree, it is still the quality of the visual pattern that affects us. For example, if instead of the tree a little plaque were painted in, saying "dramatic desolate tree," the effect would not occur. The tree also has to work together visually in terms

of line and color patterns with the rest of the painting. A word, in contrast, must work with other words not in terms of sound quality, but in terms of the system of other words and sequences which the word implies. It doesn't matter about the sounds, except in poetry – which is again a type of art.

Each art-work is a fresh new whole, not made up of units each of which is its own whole. This is a second difference. Does it relate to the fact that art still has its effect in terms of sound and visual quality? Yes.

Both speech and art build a fresh whole, and of both one can say that the effect of each part is different in context, than separately. But the units of speech are, so to speak, self-enclosed. Each unit must first have its own effect, only then do these effects build to a whole that modifies each. If words were still carrying forward by sound-quality, each subsequent one would merge into the effect being accumulated. A sound just after another has a completely different effect than if it came after a different one. The only reason words are independent of this merger is because their effects are in terms of meaning, not sound. But meaning is precisely not the sound-effect. It is no longer the sound-quality but the "re-recognition." In terms of my schematic use of that word it would be the re-re-recognition, since I used that word in a too early sense twice already. Here, however, it is used in a different way, precisely not as a recognition by the body of its own "expressive" production. That relation still obtains in the total effect of one's speech, one responds to the meaning one has expressed, and if that is not what one was about to convey, then the sequence stops. So our technical sense of re-recognizing applies to the achieved meaning. It does not apply to the independent meaning of each word or phrase. The terms I have chosen for that new relation is "re-eveving" and "repertoire."

The word-unit is, in a self-enclosed way, its own eveving and carrying forward of its own context(s), and that independent eveving is then re-eveved in the speech-act.

f-10) New expression

Art creates new visual and sound and movement patterns. These then function in most other action and interaction. For example, today still, new art influences how we can perceive. How we see nature and design furniture and arrange our rooms is affected by visual art, and what sounds music first lets us perceive influences what sounds nice to us, and what doesn't. Conversely, of course, art creates new patterns by versioning aspects of our world that have not been

pattern-versioned before. For example, industrial machinery and noises are versioned in music, and in painting, whereupon the patterns themselves then are also used in new factory design. (I wish the newer music would also influence ordinary noise-production but it hasn't, so far as I know.)

When patterns first emerged for humans, they were not art. They were culture-forming and human-making. Then as now the patterns versioned ordinary contexts (versioned = sequenced, let us feel, have, spend time having). Then as now these patterns are symbolic of our living contexts, because they version. Although just patterns, they are also a bodily feeling and having of the life-contexts they reconstitute. But there is a big difference: now such patterns are art, that is to say a separated and different context, not life but art. But it isn't art that has changed--in art a new pattern still does what it always did: it versions our living in a new way, and it also elaborates and recreates our living. What has changed is that now there is language, and our living situations (our interaction contexts) are structured with language.

There is therefore (with the exception of VIII, to come) no way, now, for visual or sound or movement patterns to act like a "first dance," and to regenerate the whole culture. This effect is now minor (although very precious).

When language developed, there was also a split between language and art. This split is because of the self-enclosed (I also call them "discursive") units of language, in contrast with the new visual and sound expression a new work of art always is.

But exactly at what point did art get split off so that a culture-regenerating new expression could no longer happen as in a "first dance?" That is the same point at which short independently functioning units of language developed.

f-11) Fresh sentences

Having seen more exactly what discursive units are, we can finish discussing the fresh formation in language use.

We said that as interaction, the speech-acts are fresh formations. As a use of words, they are a re-eveving, since each word and phrase is its own eveving already.

The "rules" have to be understood as the re-eveving, the ways that one can fit together units each of which is a huge system of implicit sequences, that is to say possible further steps.

Whereas until now a whole sequence was likely to go through

uninterruptedly (as we said in VI under relevanting) before a new sequence would form, now there is a new evening between each unit and the next. That is another way to define "re-evening."

What seems like a system of rules added on to units, in order to combine them, is really inherent in each unit. Each is many implicit sequences. To combine units is to re-even the evenings that each is.

In doing this a new kind of novelty is possible, not any longer new sound-patterns. The new kind of novelty is combinations, that stay and become units in their own right, as well as metaphors (see Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning) wherein a same unit acquires a radically new context(s). This is done from the crossing of the two (the old and the new use of the word) in the metaphor. There are other ways new words and phrases come to be, but always out of the static stock of ancient syllable word units.

Even the routine use of words as usual is creative, however. The exact sentences we say might never have been said before. The interaction life context (the way all our situations, mutually implicit in each other are) is now a certain way. But our situations are speech-structured. The interaction contexts developed, and continue to develop along with language. The distinctions that structure one situation differently than another, which make this a learning situation and that a friendly discussion, for example, are not two separate systems: the situations; and the language use in them. Without language there would be no way at all to have so many distinctly different kinds of situations. It is only because of the fineness of language that our situations are so varied and finely structured. Or, say it in reverse: the formation of language is also the formation of finely distinguished situations. The situations are distinguished not only by what one says in them, of course, but by how one interacts. But so much of the latter is spoken interaction, that the rest cannot stand alone.

People have seen these things separatedly, and thus unclearly. Culture has been studied in terms of odd rituals and beliefs. But, of course, culture is the way one behaves in different situations, just what these situations are. It is how one says good-bye and what else one does before leaving, when one gets up to go, and the kind of meetings one might have, the roles of the kinds of people that exist, just when one feels insulted and just when one is content to go along, when and how one fights or argues, and about what. In short, culture is a patterning of situations, and this patterning is very considerably (certainly not wholly) linguistic. It would ignore the most important interactions of life to say that it was all linguistic--but even the very

physical and spiritual interactions that are seemingly before and beyond words, are implicitly very rich in the distinctions and experiences that involve or have involved words as part of what happens.

Language must be understood as part of the system of culturally structured situations, which also means human roles and identities, and also means living, interacting.

Only so can we then easily think how it is that even when we are in a quite new situation and do not know what to do or say, there is an implying not only of what we next need to do, but (as part of that) what we need to say.

(It is a further distinction, in VII, that some saying is interacting, while some is only about. There is a strong tendency for the about-saying itself to become interaction in its own right. You are only confiding in this person, talking about your relation to another person. Still, you are thereby also living your relating to this new confidante. In this new relation what you talk about also changes. It is itself an interaction now.)

At any point in our living words are implied, both as further carrying this situation forward, and also as being "only" about it, helping to have, feel, sequence and sense it, without changing it (in the way interacting with the people concerned would change it).

Language is always implicit, not at all as a new addition. When we explicate in words some private feeling that seems utterly autistic and only our own, words are nevertheless already implicit in it, because they are implicit in our very living, our bodies, our interactions. Putting words to a feeling is never the first time words and that feeling have met.

Ever since V we have seen novelty⁴⁷ as easily thinkable, provided one doesn't begin with the assumption that further events must consist of existing units or places. We conceptualized living process as eevening, meaning that all extant structures are taken into account and still the next event might be new. The structures do not function as themselves (so that what results is consistent with them), but just as they can function in the given eevening. Thus life events are inherently always new.

Therefore it is easy to see that humans would often find themselves in a quite new situation with a quite new implied next event. Such a next event has as yet no form. It is not yet structured (in the sense of explicit form and structure). But it is an extremely definite implying.

One can see this easily in that one always knows at such times without any trouble that what one thinks of to say and do is not what needs to come next. One can easily think of thousands of doings and sayings that will not carry forward one's bodily being in the situation. It is difficult, and a new creation to do and/or say what is implied, and will carry forward (or "meet") the situation. Thus it is easy to see how definite this implying is, even when we don't yet know what to say or do.

But the use of language does look like an arranging of pre-existing units, and now each unit does seem to function as itself, and it is not restructured in how it now functions. Or so it seems. More exactly, the creation of fresh speech is still as above, with this difference: Discursive units function as carrying forward their own context(s), and only thereby do they then also function in the fresh process. The way they are now freshly used does indeed add (and cross with) their own context(s), so that every use of a word or phrase adds to its meaning. Something like metaphor goes in every use, as fresh meaning is created by the crossing of the words' usual context (s) and this one. But each word-unit closes itself off, and cannot be sound-merged with the others. Each carries forward its own context (s), and only in doing so is it then (in regard to meaning, not sound) freshly modified somewhat.

f-12) Deliberate

The capacity to stop and then sense, without doing anything, that one might do one of a number of possibilities, is deliberateness.

Every versioning is already the capacity to pause action, to keep the action context "the same" through a string of changes that don't change it as action would. But such a pause forms, it cannot be deliberately introduced.

Once there is language, a new evening occurs with each unit. Each unit is a system of possible nexts, a system of its own. What it does in a given use, now, is to reconstitute (to version, to let me feel and have) this situation, as one of the word's context(s). I let the word version this situation now, for me, and it does that by reconstituting this context as one of its own. But so does the next word, and even if I am not talking, the word-system is implicit in what my situations are. Much that could be said is implied, and more: sayings are implied that I might find no way actually to say.

Speech is deliberate, and much action and interaction has also become deliberate. It can stop at any time, and is actually pausing at

all times. Each bit of it is a pausing. What was behavior has been absorbed, and the pausings (after the FLIP) have become the main processes, the interactions, and lone gestures and makings.

Emotions provide an exception that we must consider later.

There is also a pathology of deliberateness, due to the "thinning" which makes each bit of interaction usually much less bodily potent than when the whole space was simpler. Only rarely do we change our situations radically enough that we really feel it. Most often this occurs emotionally.

There is also a way, to be understood in VIII, of making such bodily powerful and situationally radical changes. One would think that complex human living ought to be thicker, not thinner--so much is always implicitly involved in any action. But this can only happen in the way shown in VIII. While we continue with culturally patterned interaction, so much is now implicit which is not wholly carried forward, that the same actions that once were "thick" are now thin (using these adjectives to describe the quality of the bodily event). They still enable us to eat, or have intercourse, to work or create, but we are not full-bodiedly being carried forward, often.

f-13) More than one context; human time and space

We have discussed human space (internal/external space, interaction-life-context), and can now add: the system of mutually implying interaction-contexts involves speech (gesture) sequences. These are mutually implicit in each other both via the relation of the contexts, and as word-units. The word-relations have additional aspects, those stemming from their origin in longer sequences, and these relations are how each word unit is now a system of implicit sequences of many other units.

Each word is its own evening, its own carrying forward of its own context(s). One is therefore always in two contexts, the word's own (the kind), and this interaction context now (the kinded one).

Each word brings its context, that is to say its relations to many other contexts. Each kinded interaction context, now, also consists of implicit interactions that would be other situations if they happened. Speaking now to this person, all I ever did or do and could do with this person is implicit, as well as all the situations that would thereby be altered, and all the people of those situations, and all I could do with them. While no person is totally unified, I call this whole system the interactive life context, knowing that it might actually have some disconnected places (empirical holism: it is an empirical question

whether "all" or some are mutually implicit in all or some others).

This was true as the interaction-contexts formed, but there was then no way for a person to reconstitute and live in (feel, have) some of the other contexts now implicit. For instance, having made hunting tools, and used them, on the way home there was no way to feel and have the next hunt, so that one would still recognize the tools, as such. To do that would be to see the tools as universals, as that kind of thing, as belonging to that kind of context, and there was no way to have kinds. (No "thirds," we called it.)

But even though there are now word-units, these still form from the context one is in. How does their existence and use enable one to be in a situation one is not physically in? Once there is the FLIP, then the interaction, not the physical present, is the context one is in, we said. Thus "present" has a different meaning. It is "this situation," not "this physical behavior space." It includes all the interactions I might have with this person, and all the situations as they are mutually implicit, and all those physical times. These are now not only past experience implicit in the make-up of an event, but situations I can reconstitute and live in.

We all know humans can do that, but can we think exactly how? With words we can reconstitute other situations. But why would these words form? Through the mutual implying of interaction-contexts the next event might be in a context that was only implicit before, and in a different physical space and time. But why could one not move that way before? In behavior-space such a movement was physical and would be a concrete change in physical space and time. But the interaction contexts implied each other before the FLIP. Yes, but then the whole system was only a pause within a given action in a given physical context. So the FLIP also makes it possible to live one's way from the present interaction-context to one that is made present, but isn't physically present. And to this must be added that kindred interaction (explicit use of words implicit in what every situation is) is deliberate. Each re-eveving is a new opening to implicit contexts, and the fact that then there is another re-eveving immediately after, enables many shifts from one physical context to another in a brief time. It looks as if we could move anywhere with our attention, and to any time. Actually we cannot. We still cannot move to something that is unconnected to whatever we are now living in, feeling and thinking. It must "come up." But the mutually implicit relations are now available at each word, and at each kindred act.

Humans live in many contexts, and this opens a complexity I must discuss in another time and place.

g) When is the FLIP? Cessation of sound-formation in language use

In the footnotes to f-5) we last considered this question.

Short unit formation, we said, is probably the point at which use begins, since language use is of such units. Patterns collect before, and reconstitute not only the present context, but as long sequences they are not a repertoire to be used.

When and exactly why does language cease to take in new sounds? This is the same question as when no new "first dance" sequences can occur any more, or when art begins. Why would a new dance no longer version a context in a new way?

As soon as new interactions (or elaborations) form without new sound-gestures, obviously that is the point at which language continues to develop but without new sound formation. So we can ask our question this way: why would language develop further by combining existing sounds, rather than letting the sound-quality keep newly forming and versioning?

As interactions elaborate, further, that is not done by rearranging fixed units. Each interaction is a fresh event, not a use of fixed moves. Two points here: the development culturally is not in units, and also each new individual context is not an arrangement of units. Language of course develops along with interaction contexts, but its development is in terms of the same ancient stock of syllabic word-units.

When and exactly why did new sound-formation cease? Language continues to change, of course, but not by taking in new sounds. Old words are drafted into new uses, new words are fashioned from old words or syllables that are already meaningful. Even Linear A, the ancient language of Crete prior to its great civilization, when at last it was deciphered, turned out to be a kind of Greek. Sound-formation ceased very early. Once language has formed it is amazingly conservative. An infinite variety of sounds that are not language is possible, yet these are no longer drawn in to add to language. At some critical point the basic stock of linguistically used sounds is closed, and what is thereafter added must always consist of already meaningful sounds.

With every new crossing there is a phantastic differentiation. All the aspects that existing gesture-patterns version, and let one have, are now elaborated by the new pattern-dimension. Each multiplies with the whole cluster. A vast number of new facets become

noticeable, experientiable, capable of being felt and had. Thus each crossing vastly increases the number of facets that are capable of being separately sequenced. The variety that is possible increases very greatly. The fineness of definition and structure--that is to say the number of facets that must be carried forward (eved) by a next act becomes quite great, and life becomes complex. What a situation is and implies (means) becomes subtle.

Even so, we said, there can be a new first dance, which again versions some elaborated situation by sheer sound-pattern (or visual, or movement pattern). Why would this become impossible at some point?

We also saw that soon given sound-patterns carry forward not as part of the way the whole body looks, but as sheer sound. We called these "patterns themselves," rather than a whole body-look or sound. These are still patterns of sound-quality, however, and new "first" sequences are possible even when sound-patterns already carry forward as themselves. When can they no longer?

Today it is clear that sheer sound-expression is still powerful to carry the body forward. We have it in music and in tone of voice. Why can it not, today, add to language? Why can it not, as a first dance would, version the whole of a situation? Suppose I try it. I am in a complex interaction with someone, I am stopped and find no act or speech to carry me forward. Something is implied, quite focally and definitely, but I don't know in words or acts what that is. Now I grunt, and my companion certainly senses something. There is some communication here. Why is it not a "versioning" of our situation? Much of the situation is versioned by the grunt. But how much? "Versioned" means you get to live, feel, have and sequence the situation. To what extent, in hearing the grunt, is my companion having and feeling the situation? Relatively little of it is conveyed thereby.

Of course, the interaction was conducted with deeds and words till then, and as an addition to that the grunt can be very expressive and communicative indeed. But only within the interaction context, not at all as a versioning of all of it.

Talking can be used to conceal, too, and bodylooks and sounds can then especially be very informative--but again only within the complex interaction.

This is the "within" after the FLIP.

Ellen made a dance about the man who smashed the Pieta in the

Vatican. But from the dance alone one could not have known what it was about. It was a dance of sadness. (The Pieta's sadness and the sadness of the smashing.)

A new bodylook sequence is now within a wider interaction context, because it no longer versions the whole interaction context. How the bodylook patterns and sound patterns are is now never as differentiated as the patterns-as-such already are.

The first time the body-sound quality no longer versions the context, it is within it. Versioning means reconstituting the whole context--each bit is a version of the context. If less than the context is reconstituted by the pattern, then it has remained within the context.

But let us go over this again. Something is odd. Just as the gesture sequence for the first time remains with the context, instead of versioning the whole of it, that is also the moment gesture contexts take over, and are no longer only pauses with behavior contexts. Isn't this contradictory? No--it is the interaction context that is now too wide to be wholly versionable by a new sound. The new sound remains within the interaction context. Thereby the interaction ceases to be a versioning of the behavior, and becomes the context instead.

There is really no interaction-context until the FLIP. It is still a behavior context with elaborations. When these elaborations become more complex than sound can version, then they are the context, that is to say wider, and the sound happens within it and becomes one sequence among the interaction sequences, and never again a pattern that versions the whole of the implicit interaction sequences at once.

The FLIP is the same moment as the cessation of new sounds entering the language. Since there are a variety of languages (but very few, if we consider the basic stems) the FLIP and sound-cessation happened somewhat later (but not much) than cultural and linguistic variety. Therefore variety probably goes very far back (there are and have always been various species of any type of living being). But the common structure of language is its type of structure it is, not its specific "rules." The search for universal linguistic properties, as currently conducted, is as silly as the search for universally applicable human or cultural traits. It is silly because one seeks these commonalities in the wrong place--in the contents, the developments that came later. The type of structure that language-and-culture are is quite the same all over. (I will say more about this in another place.) (See also "Neurosis and Human Nature," Humanitas 1967, and "Eternal Return.")

We have located FLIP and cessation of new language sounds together. Now what about use? Does it begin at the same point? And is that also the same point at which short units fall out? Certainly we saw that short units must be re-eveved unit by unit, and that is use--because the reason for their falling out (and the re-eveving by unit) is exactly that they are each an eveving, a carrying-forward of their own context(s). There are thus two evevs, two contexts, the word's own that has to be re-eveved by the body. Yes, short units and use are together.

Now, are FLIP and cessation the same point as short units and use? Shall we say that the short units formed, and that was why the behavior context could no longer be whole-versioned by sound? Or shall we say that the FLIP and cessation happened, and that is why the short units then began to fall out? Which of these helps us understand the other?

Before the FLIP a pattern collects (reconstitutes not only this context) but it is a pause in behavior. This means the pattern collects and is a kind, but the context is not kinded, it is only versioned and felt.

After the FLIP the pattern collects as before, but now the context is carried forward by the pattern--not versioned. The pattern-sequence is now like action (interaction) and carries forward the situation. Contexts are now carried forward (not versioned), and only so can there be two contexts, the word's own and this one. Why? Because the word carries forward its context. This isn't possible before there is a context that a word can carry forward! In other words it is not possible before there is an interaction-context.

My difficulty has been to forget that there are not interaction-contexts till after the FLIP, until then there are behavior-contexts elaborated by pauses. Such a pause cannot have been its own context-carrying-forward. Clearly, units that carry forward their own context could not have developed until after the FLIP.

But more: As soon as there are interaction contexts, as soon as sounds carry forward contexts (rather than versioning), the short units would fall out because the first bit would have carried forward and changed the context. It would not have been paused, it would have been changed.

Another way to say it: before and after, sound-patterns reconstitute patterned contexts. But before the FLIP, "patterned" means the context has pattern-pauses in it. Afterwards "context" means interaction context, pattern-context. So the context has come

to be of the same nature as the sound-patterns, and only so does the word have "its own." The collected context(s) are its own, (it had these before the FLIP, but "context" was then behavior context) only because now there is the fresh present interaction-context.

We have clearly shown that FLIP makes the doubled contexts, the word's own and this one.

Only then would the short unit fall out because it would have made its change, it would have functioned as a word, it would have been used. Use, we see, is of course always in. One uses a word in a context which the word reconstitutes along with its own.

We see also that there is never again a reconstituting or versioning of the whole. There are no more "new first dances." There is now only always one sequence among many other possible ones within the context. (Even if "versioning" means "talking about" rather than carrying forward the interaction context, it never again means versioning the whole.) All sequences reconstitute the context, but never the whole.

Appendix to f) Details do not drop out; universals are not empty commonalities

The distinction of kind and instance (universal and particular) does not exist before VII. Animal situations can be called universal (the animal responds the same way to any tree) or one can say they are all particular (the animal responds to just this tree, always, not the category). Before a distinction exists, it is not really correct to say either, and one can make some case for either. The human observer brings the kind-structure, and the instances.

We do not assume the kind-structure to begin with. It is poor to say that reality is organized in "typicalities," as people like to say. Instead of helping us think about what universals and particulars are, they merely assert what we all know.

It is not the kind-structure that determines how kinds arise. Also, a great deal that is explained with the kind-structure really antecedes it, not only in time and development, but also in the priority of thinking.

Idealism assumes (so to speak) that an adult, developed philosopher meets Being (so to speak, on the street) and they introduce themselves to each other. It is the first time they have met. The philosopher contributes the kind-structure (reason, the forms of unity in judgments, and so on) and Being contributes sensation-bits

(as in Kant) or perhaps it contributes an as yet indeterminate other. The human side of this meeting brings possibility, future, connections, order. In such a creation myth the human side is left understood. Idealism is an instance of the more general way of using the human observer to determine everything, whereupon, of course, that observer cannot be studied inside that system. Indeed, Idealism is the philosophy that went with the science that depends on this idealized, generalized human observer. If now we wish to think also about the observer, namely we ourselves, it cannot be in concepts that assume an unclarified observer in their very structure.

We have seen that in living process itself there is a much greater and different order, and in and from this we want to see how kinds arise.

Even after they arise they are not determinative of more than a small portion of the order of living. The kinds, and the elaborated situations that are developed with the kinds, are not an independent system. Rather, they are new versions of the much larger order that existed before, and is now lived, felt, sequenced, and elaborated.

Past experience functions (see IV) in any present. But this is not determined by a kind-structure. It is not the case that there is a system of similarities, such that the past experience knows which present to function in, or such that the present experiences knows what kind it is, and so also what past experiences (of the same kind) to pull out of its file. Even today, long after the kind-structure has developed, past experience still functions in vastly more ways than along the lines of the kind-structure.

One can say, in reverse, that the function of past experience makes similarity-relations. It is because past experience can function in just this way, that the present and the past have just these new similarity-relations, now. The functioning of the past, now, is the same event as the occurring now. What the present now is (how it forms, now), and what past is relevant now (is similar, now) are a single formation, the occurring now.

If we examine any present experience, we can find very many relations of similarity to very many past experiences. You are reading. All past experience of reading should function now, along with all discussions of philosophy, along with all discussions of language, that you have ever had, along with all instances of the same kind of excitement or annoyance, which this argument now generates in you, along with all your relations to other people which were something like your relation to me, the author here, right now, along with all the times

you argued similarly. But in what respect exactly shall we say you argued similarly? The same sort of conclusion, the same sort of reasoning, the same sort of overly righteous tone, the same way of giving examples, the same type of endless sentences--any number of facets could be lifted out to be the respects in which a similarity might exist. I have lifted out a few that recur in various of my writings. You will probably have thought of quite another similarity than my string of examples, above. Indeed, without your way of arguing (in some instance you think of), I could not possibly arrive at the right similarity, the right kind to use here. That shows that the similarities are determined by the two experiences we cross! Without the other experience, a given one cannot be defined as to kind.

Please notice also, that words don't exist to mark many of the kinds I have made in this example. I have had to make new phrases to lift them out. Every experience is capable of giving rise to endless numbers of kind-relations, similarities, depending on what we compare with it. (See Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning-V.)

It is evident that any experience is vastly richer than the existing verbal kind-structure.

The function of past experience (of "everything," in the formation of a present event, see IV) is organic. If we falsely assume that it is the function of separate aspects, then we have to say that a vast multiplicity of respects exist, in which past experience functions in the formation of any present. But this is not a multiplicity of separates. It is a multiplicity of a different kind. (See IV.)

Animals "remember," people say, since animals recognize this instance as the same as last time. This obviously doesn't depend on language. (Animals can learn similarities between two things, two places, two kinds of events, which are made with language.) Human situations are recognized by animals, which were originally made by humans and could only have been made with language. Thus language is implicit, in an odd way, even in a house-pet's experience.

The cat knows the difference between the living room and the dining room, and the difference between a car and an aeroplane, between the clothes that go with going out, and those worn at home. It does not need the language implicit in these situations, in order to recognize them. But this is the function of past experience, not the kind structure. The similarities are not just those that the words collect.

We cannot assume a single set of kinds in nature, and certainly not as determinative of nature.

The organic crossings in how life process goes on in (see VI) determine the mesh of organic further structure forming now. Only metaphorically can we think of it as a vast mesh of not-yet-separated similarity-relations.

Our scheme is of course only one way of making new concepts (new kinds) from this organic process. Our scheme does what our scheme is about. The fact that the kinds we articulate are always only one set among many possible ones, is inherent, and is nothing against it. Rather, it is one aspect the scheme must let us think clearly about.

Carefully defined, internally clearly structured concepts are a further development, on a new level. Here we are still trying to understand how words form--and as we will see, each word is a gigantic system of implicit sequences and contexts--and not like a technical concept. But for us too, our new concepts first emerge as an unclarified family of uses. Only after we use it a while, are we able to take the further step of structuring a concept internally. (See Theory Construction for an articulation of how we have been doing this, and how it is possible.)

Certainly we will not confuse ourselves by asserting that some formal system of internally clarified technical concepts is the structure of nature or of experience. Rather, we want to see what the power of such concepts is, how they arise and remain related to experience, and what they do. Their "truth" lies not in a photographic relationship or equation.

The function of past experience does not involve kinds. When an animal runs, this does not bring along with it all the other instances when it has run. (As we saw earlier, one wouldn't know which of very many such similarities to invoke . . . it is running, it is breathing, it is running away from . . . , toward . . . , with . . . in the sun, and so on.) The animal runs in behavior-space, and not in a kind-structure. For the observer "running" may be a kind. The observing ethologist creates many new and odd kinds in observing each specie of animal. Behavior does not collect, it is not made of similarity-units, not made of "a" running and "a" breathing. It is not kinded.

But human action is only kinded in just a very few respects, compared to the vast multiplicity of how past experience functions.

The kinded respects which first formed us as humans, which first constituted culture, are very powerful.

In the section on pyramiding (in VI) and on meshing (VII-A) we saw that the original sequences are always still capable of occurring,

if later developed ones cannot. The inherited body implies all these sequences.

These basic culture-forming kinds are not commonalities, as though everything else were "only" detail. I mean, for example, that "cat" is a common structure, and Siamese versus Abyssinian are additional details that do not, in any way, alter the shared catness. What a cat is can be known independently of these additional details.

Instead, every new formation is a crossing, so that the original culture-forming kinds are organically elaborated and altered, as well as continuing to function in their original meshed way.

The elaboration of interaction-contexts and the elaboration of gestures and sound-patterns are one development. There is no separated word-system even though, as we saw, language has its own contexts and its own interrelations among words.

Every human action and experience is kinded, it is "a" such. But this is so, not at all only along those kinds that we can verbalize in existing words and phrases. There are always vastly many kinds, that we can verbalize, of which a given experience can be made to be an instance. Then we say it "was" an instance of that kind, or that similarity. We can say it "was," after we explicate. This time relation is inherent in explication.

We cannot experience this rabbit without implicitly versioning "a" rabbit. This requires not just rabbits, as the cat might know. It requires the visual look of "a" rabbit, which would let us recognize a picture of a rabbit as the picture of "a" rabbit. It requires the patterns of movement of "a" rabbit, and the collection rabbit(s). We experience it not only as this but always also as "a." Experience is kinded, the kind-structure of collected context(s) is implicit in all experience.

Situations are kinds (they are "kinded"), created by versioning, that is to say as instances of a collected context. A human is a mother, a son, a ruler, a peasant, a man.

The first kinds are "archetypes," original kinds, types of interaction contexts. In these the people acquire role-identities, not as single individuals but in context with each other. And, of course, these are structures of interactions with each other, that is to say they are situational structures: the ways a husband acts in relation to a wife, a younger person toward an elder, a wife's brother to a husband, etc. We will return to this.

Here it is crucial to see the inherent connection in one cluster of the different dimensions we are deriving. Please do not settle for a

merely factual recognition that humans have language, and also roles and interactional identities. Everyone has always known that. The point is to become able to think about the inherent way these are internally connected so we can think about what they are, to develop concepts for them.

If we see how human situations are always such situations (even when unique, because had uniqueness is a further development) we can also thereby derive the IOFI principle of Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning-V. But if I derived it here there would be too much more to say, which belongs to VIII.

From the inherent connection between language and situational structure we can also understand how it is possible that we can articulate in language, what we feel. What we feel is interactional, has to do with our living--in situations--with others. (Even the hermit is in a situation away from others. Further developments alone are of course possible, but on the grounds of our interactional human nature.) We can "find" words to say what we feel because feelings, interactional situations, and language are one system. This is so even when we have to devise new phrasings and metaphors.

Because patterns reconstitute (let us feel, have) behavior contexts, therefore a relation of universal and particular is created. Both sides of the distinction are made distinct together. (As in the case of formation of the "external/internal" distinction, we have to guard against thinking of what was before the distinction as if it were either one or the other.) Before versioning sequences collect, everything is neither universals nor particulars. Now a sequence carries forward "this" context by versioning and reconstituting the collected context(s). Both collected contexts, and this context, arise first in such a sequence.

In one sense the third doesn't distinguish; it carries forward the present context as a merged member of the collected context(s). But of course, the people know they are here, now, and not in any of the other collected context(s). How? We see that in the very way this collecting happens, there is also a new kind of space and time, a new "here, now" and a new "other times and places!"

New marks develop to mark the distinctions between the collected context(s), "this" context, and "a." This is another VII-derived symbolic distinction. Even with these distinctions, the pattern always reconstitutes the collected context(s). One cannot say "this rabbit" without reconstituting rabbits. Similarly, "a rabbit" reconstitutes rabbits.

The patterns "this" and "a" are of course only results of this distinction. They don't make that distinction. It is the collecting which makes it, by reconstituting the context(s) in what thereby becomes the particular context.

A pattern is always both universal and particular, all the contexts in this context. The collecting is a crossing, but not the lateral crossing in which the different sequences that form a cluster cross with a new first-dance-versioned (pre-formed) cluster. Here there is a crossing of all the "same" contexts with each other. All of them are actually reconstituted and versioned in one versioning. These too are not side by side, like a card file of instances. They are meshed (see VII-A.o)) in evening.

We see now that a universal does know when to form! Aristotle and Kant were wrong to think that a separate "practical wisdom" must say which universal applies in which particular context. There is no need for another judgment to say when the given one applies. It seemed so, because universals have been considered empty of their instances, empty of their detail. What was common was supposedly abstracted away from what was different in each instance. We find it not so! The third reconstitutes all the particular contexts meshed, crossed, that is how it forms in this one.⁴⁸

The present context is not merely an instance of what was collected already. Even when they are fully formed, as currently for us, they go right on forming. Every new application of a third adds to its collected context(s), and crosses with the earlier applications so that what the symbol "means" changes (or, one can say, a new way it can apply is found). The present context is crossed with the earlier ones, in the very formation, now. Conversely, the context in which the sequence now forms is carried forward by the third's own carrying forward of its own collected context(s) (among which the present one is now constituted). The present context isn't just discovered to be a member of the class. To think that way assumes everything we must try to understand. Rather, the present context is made into one of the collected context(s) by the formation of the sequence now.

We are still discussing fresh formation, not yet use. The fact that the sequence forms (i.e., it can form because it does) shows that the present context can be reconstituted as this collection. Otherwise the sequence would fail to carry forward now. But both collected context (s) and this one are mutually changed thereby.

Each formation changes how the sequence will again apply, that is to say, it changes the other contexts (the other instances).

This is nothing like dropping out the details!

Details are and have to be part of the evening, each time the sequence forms. Only the present context with its details determines whether the sequence can form or not! If the details were not part of the formation, each time, how would one know what details to "drop out?" That was exactly why Aristotle and Kant saw a problem here which could not be solved. Universals, if they lacked the different details of their instances, would have no way of functioning in the "decision" of just which details to drop out. Such an empty universal could not tell you to what particular situation it applies. But in fact they form in particular situations.

The issue stems from the deeper error in Kant, of rendering nature as mere incoming bits which are then organized by rational universals. Many other errors stem from this. The animals have to be mere objects in such a view and our own animal nature gets utterly lost. To be sure, our "animal nature" is very much altered and elaborated by human development, but neither people nor nature make sense as bits + empty universals. Even our thirds, full of the crossed detail of their instances, are insufficient! We have seen how much organization there is in nature before thirds ever form. Without that organic order, they could not.

Universals (thirds) must be understood as forming in and of actual situations and their actual character. They also, in forming, carry situations forward, and in their original formation they further created what situations are.

Human situations are kinded. The particular is also a one of its kind. To grasp this relation, we must let go of the old notion that universals are abstract, or are mere fences that collect particular instances. As Whewell said long ago, of course it's easy to "abstract" horse nature, if someone has kindly selected a series of horses for you to see, one after another, with no other thing between. Nor will it do to say that kinds are all arbitrary, you can cut any way you want. There is indeed a vast variety of ways to classify, once classifying as such becomes a capacity for us. But, still it can only be done with the actual characteristics of things and situations. Just as, coming into human pattern space, the object reveals its own look and sound pattern, so also can they be collected only as in fact they are reconstituted together by one sequence. Cats never have puppies, but any other way of classifying, too, will collect what is reconstituted together, and not any old heap. Therefore the actual things and situations, contexts, with their detail must function in the formation of universals.

For us "falls out" always means the whole context is implicit in what falls out. We say universals fall out from crossed contexts they reconstitute. Similarly, the bird cannot be an object without the scene--the bird falls out from a series of scenes which must be present too--so the universal cannot be had except as all its contexts that it reconstitutes. But the relation is not exactly the same, because the scene-changes which let the bird fall out are a string, whereas the collected context(s) are crossed and reconstituted together. But birds and universals are both often taken as if they were objects that exist without their contexts.

Thirds make those contexts "the same" in kind, which they cross, and from which they fall out. They make them "the same" by reconstituting them together.

All the situations in which we form the given sequence are reconstituted in the present context which is also reconstituted. All are versioned, not just this one. But they are all versioned in the versioning of this one.

That is why our thinking and talking is so very much richer than it seems when considered as empty universals. There are no empty universals.

This explains a good deal of what I say elsewhere more descriptively, about how a given sentence or phrase means so many different experiential aspects. The having of an explicitly stated meaning is very much more than the explicit statement .

So long as we play given routines we need not be too aware of this fact. But as soon as we try to think newly, or to understand something for ourselves, however old it may be we must allow the functioning of this texture of crossed instances, as well as crossed clusters of interaction contexts, themselves bodily elaborations of behavior and life process.

Symbols are not at all merely "about." They change us, they engender a bodily process. They carry us forward. A universal is not separate and on another level--it is a way of having, living, and feeling the particular(s).

What is symbolized is what I call reconstituted, that is to say it occurs, it is carried forward and felt. When we speak of a situation, we live in it. It is present, even if it is physically non-present. It is our present interaction-context.

That is why we never use words except in some context, even if it is to give an example, in a philosophical discussion, of using a word

without a context.

Einstein thought in a situation, of course. He was concerned with his (and everyone's) incapacity to perform certain operations and get certain predictions right. Since he knew a lot of physics and math, and since knowing is bodily, Einstein had (as he reports) a "feeling" all along, of what the answer would be like. This feeling was his bodily implying, and he could "have" it because he had symbols (versioning patterns) by which to reconstitute that situation. He could not yet carry the situation forward, which would mean "meeting the situation," doing what is required (in some way, not of course in a pre-defined way). But he could reconstitute the situation.

Similarly, even if one says only "Oh, well . . ." or "Whew" or some explicative, one thereby reconstitutes the situation. We say one "knows" or "feels" what situation one refers to. I say we live in that situation, it occurs, there is a string of versions of the body's implying it.

Are the universals poorer--can one say that the particular is always much richer than the kind structure? No, that would be to assume kinds in the old sense. Rather, we can say that only some aspects of the complexity have given rise to kinds. But every kind brings with it the whole complexity of the collected context(s).

That collection is surely richer than the present particular context which is made one of the collected context(s) and is crossed with them, as we carry this situation forward by using the words. The present context can be different, but in speaking we carry it forward by means of carrying forward the collected context(s), one of which it thereby becomes. This may fail to carry forward much of it, depending on the words. What we usually say in situations is quite poor, and carries forward the present situation only in a distance way. But this is not always so, we can also carry it forward very deeply. Never the whole of it, however (see VIII).