A Process Model
As soon as we have more than one process, the body is the other process, the one that is not stopped.
We will now define a stopped process. If some aspect of en#2 is missing and the body does not die, it continues in an immediately different way. Some of the usual process will not go on. A distinction has been created. There is the stopped process, and some other process which does continue.
The body is the new process which does continue.
Until now we had no way to speak about the seemingly separable thing that we ordinarily call "the body." Now we have defined the "body" as separate at least from the stopped process.
But in what way does a stopped process exist, since it is not going on?
Let me first say that not every change is a stopped process. The changed occurrences might very well change the implying as it implied itself changed. Implying is not a determined occurring; it is not some single way. But if the new occurring does not change the implying as it implied itself changed, the implying will stay the same in those respects, and the stopped process will continue to be implied.
What continues is different than if there were no stoppage. In section e) we will be able to discuss these differences. Right now we can let them define the sense in which the stopped process exists as an occurring. Since it is stopped, it does not exist as itself. The stopped process exists insofar as what does continue is different. Now it continues alone without what is stopped. We can say that this difference in the ongoing process carries the stoppage.
A stopped process is an unchanged implying carried by a changed occurring. It is carried by the process that does continue, by how that process goes on differently.
The differently ongoing process includes some unchanged implying which implies the object (the missing en#2-aspect which would resume the stopped process.) The object is implied by the carried stoppage. It is carried by the respects in which the occurring is different and by the respects in which the implying keeps on being the same. (Of course these "respects" are not separated. Only the continuing process is separate from the stopped one.)
The carried stoppage is the body-version of the missing object. I put it this way to remind us of the old representational way of thinking, so that we can notice: A carried stoppage is nothing like a copy or a representation. For the same reason I also want to call the carried stoppage the "schema." In the old model the term meant a kind of picture which enabled a body to "recognize" an object. Here the carried stoppage fills this role, so that the missing process resumes if the object occurs.
I have already said that "recognize" is used "too early" here. This resuming can happen even with plants and simple animals. We want terms for this widespread recognizing, so that we can later build more elaborate terms for more developed kinds of "recognizing."
We are setting up a new conception of the living body, one in which the body means or implies. So far we have defined three ways in which the body implies: within body-en, the next occurring, and the stopped process and object. We will now develop a fourth: When there are many processes, how they imply each other.
If the stoppage is new, what continues has never occurred that way before, alone, without what is stopped.
Were there "two" processes before one of them stopped? "They" had never occurred separately before. The spectator can always divide in many ways. But let us give a different status to a division between occurrences that can occur without each other.
What continues would not be new if the two processes had already been distinct. In that case the one that continues would continue unchanged. But we think of the process as undivided. What continues has never happened without what is stopped. So the division is new, and what continues is a new whole.
We can see novelty developing also, if we consider this: When the stopped process resumes, it will do so into a changed organism, one that went on in new ways during the stoppage. So the resumed process wonít be as before either. When it resumes, there will be a new whole. The whole process won't be as it was before the separation from what continued.
What continued was different during the stoppage and is changed further by being together with what resumes the stoppage.
Are there still two processes in the whole once the stopped process resumes? This question is in the old model: either one or two. Our result is more complex.
If there are many stoppages and resumptions there will be many processes, i.e., many newly organized occurrences, ways the whole body is. For many processes (perhaps all) there will be phases when "they" occur only together, and other phases which tempt us to think of them as separate processes.
This result is what most people begin with: coordinated processes. Instead, we derive the fact that there are many processes, and that they become many in such a way that they are already coordinated. Let me show this:
In our new model the processes are originally and inherently coordinated. In phases when a process is resumed, the rest of the body occurs only together with it. Whenever that process is stopped, the rest of the body lives without it. So the other processes have phases during which they are always together with this one process, all one with it, not differentiated from it, and other phases during which they have gone on and formed without it.
The processes may seem independent along their whole sequences, but they are different processes only during phases in which one went on without the other. When a process goes on, it goes on together with a lot of other processes. Each phase of each process developed only together with some, but only without some others. All the phases of each process developed during the stoppage of some others, and only together with some others.
Therefore how any one of them is, at a certain moment, is part of the bodily whole that includes just certain phases of the others. We can now say:
The exact way a process is in each of its phases implies how the others are. This is a fourth sense of "imply".
It is an empirical question whether all processes imply each other in this way, or just which ones do, or what shall be considered "a" process. We are not saying that two processes cannot be independent, even if our model so far does not formulate such independence. The empirical intricacy can always again exceed any conceptual model. Once we know this, we can use many models.
When one defines separated processes or bodily "systems," their interactions can be puzzling. They are often much more coordinated and affect each other mutually in more ways than one can account for. Then "holistic" medicine seems to be outside of science.
Once a process has become differentiated by not going on during some phase of another, one is tempted to trace them as if they were separate even in the phases in which they occur only together But let us not assume separate processes when they are not separate from each other all along their way.
The spectator could formulate complete and distinct strings of separate processes, for example, digestive, respiratory, reproductive, etc. These are not separate all along their way, nor are their subprocesses at the microscopic level.
The illusion of separate processes arises also in studying social change. For example, one traces changes in work patterns over time. Then, separately, one traces changes in family patterns, in health patterns, in economic patterns. Different terms are developed in these different studies, as if these lines of development existed separately over time, when in fact they are often merged in each event that people live through.
If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their coordinations as one finds them, as if unexpectedly. Currently science is only slowly finding more and more kinds of them.
As simple as this model is, so far, it gives us another way to think of coordinated processes.
Many processes and their resumptions happen only during certain phases when others are ongoing, or only during stopped phases of others. They will seem separate but coordinated. But they are not separate during phases when they occur "only together". Those stretches need to be considered a unity that has never been divided.
They are separate in the phases when one occurs without the other, but even so not simply separate. Rather, the stoppage of one happens only together with certain occurrences in the other. As we saw above, when one process continues on by itself, it becomes different just because the other is not happening. That is why although they seem "separate," their phases are coordinated.
There seem to be separate processes which "interact." It seems they are first many; then they inter-act.
Instead, let us use the type of concept I call "interaction first." The interaction process may exist long before they become differentiated. "Their" interaffecting precedes their being many, and continues when they have become many.
Above we defined the body as the process that continues. Now we can define the body from the viewpoint of any one of these coordinated processes:
For any one process, the body is the other ongoing processes -- and also this one in those phases in which it is ongoing.
One usually says that a process happens in the body, but this "in" is only an observerís space-location. Without as yet having a space, "in the body" can be defined for any one process. A process goes on in the body insofar as it goes on in the coordinated interaffecting with the others. The body is always the other ongoing processes -- and also this one when this one is ongoing.
Any one process goes on in the others.
Let this intricate relation stand as it is, so that it can help generate our further steps with all the logical force it is capable of having. We need not artificially make the concept sharper and more separate from the development in midst of which we are here. On the other hand, we wonít let its subtlety fall back into a merely vague wholeness. Let us keep and name just this pattern which has emerged so far. How shall we name it?
"Interaffecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we have been formulating "original interaffecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they" interaffect each other before they are a they.
We can also say that the processes are "coordinately differentiated". They became differentiated in the first place in a coordinated way, and are "separate" only in this way, with their phases implying each other.
The bodyís implying is always all one implying, but to make this clear let me raise a rather technical question:
When a stopped process resumes, does it then imply the rest of its own sequence? Or is it still only the other processes, the whole body, that implies this oneís further continuance?
It might seem to be an odd question. If the whole process with which we began implies its sequence or cycle, and we call the resumed one "a process," it seems that it must imply its own further sequence. It seems odd that the other processes would imply this oneís continuation, and it would not imply its own continuation.
Let us not unthinkingly transfer our concept of "the whole process" to each of the coordinately differentiated processes singly. The whole process implies the next occurring of the coordinated processes. But, let us not just assume that each of them does its own implying of its string of further events. We saw just above: They are not separate strings.
To let new concepts emerge, we must permit exactly what has emerged, and we must tell ourselves carefully just how we have it so far. We see that we have used the singular whole "process" (and "the rest of the process") somewhat differently than the use of "processes." The processes imply each other in the same occurring. When one is stopped, the whole other process(es) (the body) implies the continuation of the stopped process. When resumed, still the whole process implies each. But now we are not sure if a single process implies its own continuance also, or if only the whole process does.
We are sure that the body (the other processes and the resumed one) implies the coordinately differentiated next occurrence and the subsequent occurrences. We have it from II that the whole process implies its further events. But we have to say that a resumed, coordinately differentiated process does not imply its own continuance; only the body -- (the other processes)-- implies this one's subsequent events. Of course the body is now the other processes and this one (if it has resumed); so it is part of the implying of further events, but only together with the others in the whole process.
So we can also say that the schema is the whole implying.
Implying is always one implying. This is an important principle for our later understanding of how the body can, in one felt meaning, imply so very much.
When a baby lamb can first walk, it will not stop before a cliff. It walks right on and would fall, were it not for the experimenterís glass plate. After a certain number of days when "the perceptual system" has developed sufficiently, the baby lamb will stop at the edge of the cliff, even if it has never seen such a drop before, indeed even if it has been blindfolded since birth and has seen nothing up to this time. Since it stops short of the cliff, the spectator says that the lamb "recognizes" the difference in the spatial relations which constitute the sharp drop, and so it stops. When the en does not carry the implying forward, the sequence stops! We will have concepts with which to explain this in VI when we have built them for (from) behavior and perception, but we can say even now that a perception that can be what "was" implied does not arrive to carry the sequence forward; it stops. The implying remains the same implying. Without a perception that "was" implied at every step, the walking stops.
But there is another finding which is my reason for telling the story: When a baby lamb has been separated from its mother at birth, and raised carefully away from her until it is of the same age as the lambs that stop at a cliff, it will not stop. And this is so even if the lamb was never blindfolded. That is to say, if it is separated from its mother, then even with much experience of spatial perception it will not fully develop its normal "perceptual and motor systems."
"Impossible", commented a lot of people at first. "The perceptual-motor system is separate from the reproductive system." They knew that a lamb raised apart from its mother will not develop a normal sexual instinct in adulthood. That was understandable since adult sexuality and early mother-infant relations were understood to be part of the same functional system. The mother forms an "imprint" in the baby, and this controls its sexual choices in adulthood. But it was not possible to trace how being with the mother in its early days affects its perceptual and motor processes. Nevertheless, this was the finding. I don't know if it has been widely replicated or not. But it is a good illustration of the point here.
At a given stage of science not all interrelations have been traced in spatial mechanical terms, nor need they all be traceable in that way. The body, as we are defining it, is not only a filler of mathematical space. The coordinately differentiated processes are together not just as neighbors that can affect each other in space. How the body (all the other processes) occurs is not only how it is rendered in the flat terms of spacial diagrams and mechanics, although what is so rendered is highly useful. We can retain all the advantages of the usual reduction to space-time-fillers as far as they go, but we are also becoming able to think about the body always also as the whole bodily occurring.
So it is a logical implication of our concepts that a resumed process does not imply its own continuation; only the process as a whole implies it.
This is not the simple either/or of unity or many, but rather a new type of unity and many: just these phases of the new processes occurring "only together".
By implying the whole process, each implies the others and in this way it thereby also in a way imply itself, but only via implying the whole process.
The implying is thus always the whole bodyís, one implying. This will be important in many ways also later, for example for focusing2. The processes are not separate. How each would imply just itself is not how it is implied by the others-and-it, that is to say by the bodyís one implying.
Just as there are not simply separate processes (as we just found), so also there are no simply separate parts of the body. The spectator can divide the spatial body-en#2 identity in many ways. For example, there are obviously important divisions also into organs like heart, liver and intestines, and many tissues and cells that are involved in processes that define them as parts. But the coordinated differentiation of the processes is such that a great many processes are always going on in any given part. There is never only the processes that define and separate that part. Any part is involved in many processes and in many ways. In some of them it is indeed this part, just as itself, but in other processes it is only a part of a larger whole, while some other processes set up only some sub-part, while other of its sub-parts are happening within different wider and smaller processes.
There is no single set of bodily parts. In some process some "part" acts as one, but what we thereby spatially distinguish may not be one in other processes. It may be only together with more, and within it many subprocesses may involve only sub-parts of it.
As we said of the whole body in I, a part changes and may disintegrate if the processes (subprocesses and larger processes) in which it is involved stop and never resume. Parts of the body are derivative from process-events.
We arrive at the concept of a layeredness (although no single system of levels). The body isn't one body and one environment. Rather, body and environment are interspersed. Some part is "body" in some process, (and identical with its en#2 in the events of that process), but it may also be many different en#2 aspects for many other processes with other body-en#2 identities. In one process it is body with an en#2; in an other process it is en#2 with some part of itself (or in some wider part of the body). The body consists of b-en#2 process events all the way in. We can now develop this conception further.
In I we had no distinction between body and environment. We were not putting together two things which had been separate. Now also, we cannot divide body from en in these body-en#2 identities, all the way in. So far we have defined the "body" only as "the other processes and this one." In what way can these layered sub-processes give us a definition of "the body?"
The body is usually considered the stuff within the skin-envelope. But we are not assuming that the spatial distinctions in the spectator's space are the basic conditions of reality. We can use them, but within interactional terms that are wider. (Later we will derive space of another kind, and still later also the spectator's space, as well as the way in which these work in concepts and language.) "Environment" does not mean, for us, what is "out there," "external" -- except in the spectator's sense of en#1. What then does "en" mean? Those en#2 aspects which are sometimes absent (we called them objects) were the first environment that is separable from body process. The sub-processes and parts happen in many larger systems, not just to those within the skin or the skin-demarcated body. Therefore what we call "the body" is a vastly larger system. "The body" is not only what is inside the skin-envelope.
If we follow the logic, we notice that there is no single order from wider to narrower: some sub-sub-part of a part might be coordinately part of a process that is vastly wider than that part. We must not assume some classification system according to which parts and "particulars" are "subsumed" or totally determined "within" or "under" or "inside" some categories. A part of a part can be (in) a much wider event than the part.3
The sub-process of some process may go on entirely in relation to this process, but most sub-processes are involved in other processes as well. This always remains an empirical question. Just what functions as a whole and what does not, should not be obscured by some general holistic principle that everything in the body is a whole. The happenings themselves determine what the whole is. What we actually find will always supersede inferences that seemed to make it impossible. But we find more every year. The superiority of the empirical applies only to what has actually been found. It does not follow that one can deny what has not been found (this year), or cannot be found. From a lack of finding nothing follows.
We need different kinds of formulations, not just one. We donít lose the others by adopting this model. There are also reasons to expect that the usual logical models will be understood and employed more subtly if considered within this one. (See "The Responsive Order.")
Spatial parts can be defined in many ways. Also, many spectator spaces are possible, not just one geometric space.
All the way into the skin-envelope, there is "body" in the sense of "other process(es) and this one" (any specific one, when it goes on). There is no body separate from process. There is no stuff, that is the material of only one process, or no process, just stuff. It is process through and through and also concrete through and through. "Concrete" here just means "occurring," the environmental sort.
With our additional terms we can now derive the body in the sense in which processes go on "in" it, I called it "environment #3." This concept of the body is laying itself out more complexly. A process happens in many others processes and sub-processes. They are many insofar as they are distinct by sometimes going on and sometimes not. Now we are finding in what way the body is not just a structure in space and time.
The body or any part is never just environmental stuff. Because it is organized in many processes, it is never just there in one glob, as if it could be fully definable as filling up a piece of space-time. Nor is any part of it there in that way. The en#3 body in which a process goes on cannot be environmental stuff as a single space-time structure, because stuff and process are not divided; the body is not all process in one sense, while being all stuff in another. It is b-en also in all the parts. In IV-Aa we said that the body is always the "other" processes but now that includes the sub-processes and their en#2s At any level (however one defines a set of levels) a part of the body is also partly en#2 for subprocesses with parts which are again both en#2 and parts.
We have now in a rudimentary way derived the concrete palpable body made of environment. We also have more detail on how the processes are in each other, and may include some of each otherís events. The body always occurs as a specific whole.
The concepts we have built explicate (speak from, make broadly applicable .....) how a body-process has its own continuity and its own internal relations between events. The process is not only an occurring but also always an implying.
Implying is a rudimentary kind of symbolizing. A symbol is something which "stands for" something else, something other than itself. In such a view there is no inherent connection between the symbol and what it stands for. Instead, we want to understand the living body's own indicating, own implying, own way of being now or here and also being something that is not occurring now or here.
We can group our concepts in terms of how the body does that. The first three are a horizontal sort of implying within one occurrence: The whole occurrence is implied by any part of it.
(I) Body and en#2 are one event; each implies the whole event.
(IV-Aa) Differentiated processes imply each other. Each implies that the others are a certain way.
(IV-Ac) Any body-part (anything that is "body" for one process, or part of anything that so functions) is involved in and maintained by many other processes but as a different part or parts. It implies the others but not just as "it." In implying the others it functions not as itself, but as functioning-in that implying.)
The next three implyings bring (generate, are .....) time, as we will further see below, (as well as the horizontal implying).
(II) Any occurring is also an implying of further events.
(IV-Ab) Each of the processes implies the whole next event and sequence of whole events.
(III) How a process continues differently carries any stopped process and implies the object (en-aspect) which would resume it. (The missing body-process is implied, and since it can happen only with its en#2 object, that remains implied as well.)
Sometimes I stop in midst, and turn to discuss the strategy employed in generating the model. These discussions can be taken out -- to show that the model can stand alone -- and they can also be put back so as to show what else is involved in arriving at a model. We can open the whole arena that is usually kept implicit when one formulates a model. Therefore we need to discuss the strategy, and also be able to take the discussion out.
Our concepts stem from the intention to put interaction first. We began with body and environment as one event, and only gradually developed certain limited ways in which they are separable. "Interaction first" comes from many sources. I will now cite a few of them.
A great deal comes from ECM. Focusing is its application. Some instances and stories from focusing can move us on. From the process of any kind of explication we say (know, feel, wait for .....) how the body always implies its next bit of living process, and thereby also the environmental objects. But we have no specific terms for any of this as yet.
The model is intended to differ from mathematical-perceptual kinds. The few concepts we have so far generate an odd kind of time and space.
For example, two people in a close relationship may find the following pattern: "If she were a little bit better or more loving (or different in this and this way), then I could be so good, or I could be in this and this way ....). But I can't be. Why not? Because she won't let me. She isn't that little bit better. And why not? Because of the way I am. If I were a little bit better then she could relate to me the way I need her to do, so that I could be a little bit better, so that she could."
Individuals are commonly thought of as separate originative causes. In a relationship between two people, each is said to "contribute some of the trouble" and carry "some of the blame." On the other hand, family therapists say about a troubled family that "the system is sick". They rightly consider the interaction as a single system. But there has been no way to conceptualize this so that we could think much further about it.
If one person could begin to be different, and stay steadily different, then the other would change. But as often as one tries, one is soon pulled back into the interaction pattern. Perhaps if both could be that little bit different at the same time, they could leap out of one interaction pattern into another. But it would be a leap; there seem to be no steps and no way to think from one pattern to another. To think further, our model begins with concepts that begin with interaction.
My example and those to follow show that one occurrence can consist of two or more people, and that the occurrence can assign them their character in the interaction (much as an interaction in quantomechanics defines the particles).
In the West people are accustomed to think in units and nouns, and to attribute causality to individuals. "There is a boy over there" is an acceptable sentence; it is optional information whether he is running, or sitting. But one would not easily accept the sentence "There is a running over there," adding only later that the running is a boy. Nouns can stand; verbs not. Similarly, it seems we must first have a boy and a girl. Then they can interact. It seems we cannot first have an interaction.
The very word "interaction" sounds as if first there are two, and only then is there an "inter." We seem to need two nouns first. We think of two people living separately into adulthood; then they meet. A good deal of their interaction is explained by their antecedent lives. But not all of it. To an important extent it is their interaction which determines how each acts.
It is commonly said that each of our relationships "brings out" different traits in us, as if all possible traits were already in us, waiting only to be "brought out." But actually you affect me. And with me you are not just yourself as usual, either. You and I happening together makes us immediately different than we usually are. Just as my foot cannot be the walking kind of foot-pressure in water, we occur differently when we are the environment of each other. How you are when you affect me is already affected by me, and not by me as I usually am, but by me as I occur with you.4
We want to devise concepts to capture this exact aspect of "interaction first": What each is within an interaction is already affected by the other.
This will also lead to a new way to think of time. Usually one traces cause and effect separately one after the other: "She affects me and then this makes me act so as to then affect her". In our model they cause each other by "original interaffecting" and "coordinated differentiation." One need not precede the other in time.
For example, a therapist described a difficult therapy relationship with a man. He traced the trouble back and found that it was already there in the first hour, and even at the start of the hour. But he was so used to attributing causality to individual entities, and to find causality always in a time before, that he could not imagine that the interaction itself originated the trouble. Finally he said about the client: "I must have been affected by the sound of his walk when he came down the hall before I saw him." To explain something seems to require showing that it was already so at an earlier time. But such an explanation does not get at the interaction, the system of the two together as one event. Instead of "the sound of his footfall" (just him), we need to be able to think how one event determines what each is with the other.
Two requirements for our concepts are: interaction first, and a new conception of time in which we can explain something, without having to show that it was already there in a time before. The usual type of explanation and the usual concept of time deny novelty. They deny that anything actually happens. Instead, we show that it was already so, and needed only a bit of rearranging.
A third requirement is to include structuring or patterning, rather than only structures and patterns. If everything must be thought of in terms of existing patterns, then even if an interaction precedes, there seems to be no way to arrive at one that is differently structured. We would have to jump from one interaction pattern into another, (or wish that we could).
For example, Piaget thinks in terms of interaction patterns between knower and known (called "child" and "object"). But he cannot show how the child develops from one interaction to another more developed one.
Here is a fourth requirement: For us an interaction (a process, body-environment) implies its own changing. It has to be nonlaplacian. Laplace was the man who said "If I knew where all the particles of the universe are right now, and the speed and direction at which they are moving, I could tell you the whole past of the universe, and predict all of its future. What he did not recognize is that this assumption was built into the good old mathematical concepts he was using. He might as well have said that if he knew 2+2 he could know its future. We would never want to do without mathematical concepts and logical inference, and we use it in building this model, although we use other powers as well. But we require concepts of something happening, something that cannot be found already there before, as one must always do in mathematics.
Already in II we said (but did not show) that the bodyís implying Is nonlaplacian -- the implying of the whole sequence changes at each point.
Let me use another ordinary example to specify this requirement of novelty and nonlaplacian time sequences.
How people experience the present has to do with their past. If I hadn't gone through this and that, I would not perceive what I now perceive here in this situation. If we had not had those years together, we would not understand each other as we do now. This has some degree of use and truth. But the explanation from the past experience is often puerile. One explains a present by what was already so in the past -- but one doesn't explain how that sort of thing could have come about in the past, for the first time. So one fails to explain how it could happen at all.
According to the most common theory of communication, it is impossible for you to understand me unless you already have all the meanings to which I allude. The theory dodges the question how you can acquire new meanings. But if you must have them the from the past, how could you have gotten them in the past? If there was a way to understand something new then, why wouldnít there be a way now?
This has often been remarked before. Why then does this kind of explanation continue to be assumed? It is because it is indeed a very powerful kind - the mathematical kind, also the kind used in constructing anything out of pre-existing pieces. But we need other kinds. Everything is not reducible to pre-existing units, nor is everything something constructed. When something is constructed, each constituent is first alone, and is therefore conceived as capable of existing alone. When "it" enters a combination, "it" is "the same one" as before. It acts as itself. (See RO. We will derive "human making" in VIIB.)
If something new can ever happen, then something new can probably happen now too. So we need not assume that to explain an event must mean to show that everything that makes up the event was already there before.
Past experience does not alone determine present events, yet it does function in some way, now.
Sometimes the role of the past is viewed along the lines of Freud's transference: I am not "really" perceiving and feeling you, just my father. In revolt against this view, many current psychologists emphasize the " here and now." But these notions of "present" and "past" come from what I call the "unit model." The present is supposed to be just itself, as if the past is just another thing. They are placed in successive positions along a line. Then one seems to have to choose between them.
Instead, we need a new conception of time, to speak from how we experience the present , but experienced (with and through and by means of .....) the past. Let us enter into this more closely.
Obviously I am not experiencing the past as such, when I experience the present, else I would be thinking and feeling the past events, and my images would be of those incidents. If that is happening I am missing what is going on in front of me. This happens when I day-dream or relive the past. But the past does play a role when I am fully in the present. Obviously, the present wouldn't be what it is, if it were not for how I have lived up to this point. I experience the present, but my past experience is part of what makes up my present.
My actions and thoughts come out of me from out of my body. I donít know a great deal about how they come. Mostly they are new; they belong now and have not been heard, known, or felt before, but although they are new creations they obviously involve what has happened before.
The past and the present cannot be understood if we think of them only as two different things in two different positions on a time line. The present is a different whole event. The past functions in every present.
If we can develop concepts for this, we can then differentiate the different ways in which the past can function now, for example so as to force the present to repeat it, or so as to become part of a fresh new whole implying, or in many other, more intricate ways. Our actual experiences cannot be understood very far with a merely positional conception of time
We can apply the concepts we have built so far, and say that past and present are both occurring now, and the present goes on in the remains of the past, and lives them forward, as we said, en#3 is a kind of past in which the fresh body-en#2 process goes on. And en#3 is altered in being lived further by the process. Yes, there is a past that is now, and this past is being altered now. Of course this is a different past than the dead and gone past which was recorded on someoneís video, and functions no longer. For some purposes we will want to keep the usual notion of that all gone past which happened long ago. But there is also the past which is inherent in any present experience, and which can function in it in various ways.
What I now do, feel, and think comes out of my body. This may sound odd, but where else does it come from? The mind? To separate mind and body deprives "body" of certain vitally important characteristics of living tissue. I am not referring just to the famous mind/body problem on the abstract level. The problem involves a way of thinking, a type of concept, which removes implying (and as we will soon see also meaning and symbolic functions) from body. For us it is vital not to miss the fact that living bodies imply their next bits of life process.
The usual conceptual model deprives everything of implying and meaning, not just living bodies. It constructs its objects in empty positional space and time, so that everything consists of information at space-time points. The space and the objects are presented before someone -- who is not presented in the space. It is rather someone who connects the space and time points. The connections come to the points only externally; they are added by anonymous people called "the idealized observer."
The observers are living bodies; they are us! The connections which they supply are inherent internal connections.
Shall we now study the observers (ourselves) by positing still another set of observers to connect us in their spectated space and time? Concepts that consist only of external positional relations are too poor to enable us to think about what living bodies can do, even plants and certainly animals, let alone ourselves.
Instead, let us think-from and speak-from how we experience the present with the body, and how the past is in the present and in the body, indeed how the body is a kind of past, a past that is now involved in experiencing the present.
If you attend to the middle of your body just now, you will find your intricate (more than defined) body-sense-of the present -- which consists of my words and also a vast amount more. Language is always implicit in human bodies, so that a present body-sense always leads to the formation of fresh phrases if you allow it. Even before those come, you can sense the past that functions in this moment, much of your thinking and reading, (more than you could explicitly remember), your reasons for reading this, what you hope for, your curiosity, excitement, perhaps even disgust at some of what I am saying, but also what else went on today that allowed you the time for this now, what your alternatives were, perhaps what you wanted to avoid, perhaps what you are always good at in philosophy, also what has often been hard for you, many past events bearing not just on this reading but on what else is going on in your life just now. These are my words. You would first find only a slight seething body-quality (often just ease or unease) which can open into your version of "all that."
Suppose you are talking with someone and you would like to say something funny. Not much you can do about it! At other times a funny remark comes and even slips out. When you examine it you might find that it has beautifully integrated certain unlovely traits of the person and certain background facts in the situation, often quite a number of them. If you can reign it in you might prefer not to say it, just because it is "so true" in so many ways. You can observe how the past has functioned in the production of this snide remark which is a novel present creation.
Let us be guided by this more intricate past which has at least the kind of role we find.
These many past experiences are now functioning within one new experience. This is not the past as it was then, but as it is here now, relevant now, involved and being lived, participating in the experiencing that your body implies and enacts -- now. The past comprises many events, but the present is only this one. Many experiences participate in one. We will want a concept for this way in which an as yet unseparated multiplicity functions in one fresh formation. That is a fourth requirement for our further concepts.
We find a pattern I might call "many making one," in which the many and the one mutually determine each other. "The past" which now participates in shaping the present is not what happened long ago, but a past that functions in this present. The unseparated many are in interaction first, and only then specifiable one by one. What each is, has already been affected by the others which were already affected by it. There is one implied next step which many facets have shaped in one fresh formation that is not deducible from an antecedent pattern or set of units, but from which new units and patterns can be generated.
Can there be such concepts? In what we said, we have them already, but as leaps. I call what we have been saying "leap concepts." They speak-from experiencing. We tell a story, or we say "we need a concept that is like such and so." But "like such and so" is already a concept. In saying "many into one, like a snide remark," the incident has already "applied" itself to other situations; it has implyingly crossed with them. A kind of "concept" is already in action, but we have not yet formulated a concept as such. That comes later. There is not yet an internally articulated concept, but this "naked" use is actually more intricate than an articulated concept. (See TBP and my article on Wittgenstein.) The intricate crossing cannot be equated with an articulation, but we can articulate from it. (This odd phrasing avoids the error of equating.) In articulating from the crossing, we gain the power of a few more complex patterns, and we can always return to the incident for more.
In stories and in odd sentences we first let the concepts work. Then we can enter and explicate (some strands of) how they have worked. We articulate some of their internally differentiated linkages and sharpnesses so that they acquire the power of logical inference. We must therefore let them stand as we have them so far, and protect especially the ways in which they are odd and not immediately amenable to logic. (When our terms are more developed, they will enable us to say more about the process in which they are now arising. The role of "like" is discussed in VIIAc and j-4. More is shown in VIII.)
We can explicate from how we went. Backwards, we can generate a new set of units with which we can then locate where we began, and move from there. But the naked sense-making is not determined in advance by units that last across. Such units are made from how the whole is changed by the move.
A sixth way in which our model will differ is that we do not assume a given set of units. Units are generated from interaction, from making sense. They can be newly generated and regenerated, both in regard to their number and what they are.
This is like saying (as we did just above) that interaction process is not determined by the antecedent participants. Our rudimentary conceptual model already says this.
If one looks directly at the assumption of units, one may not wish to hold it, but it is a silent assumption that inheres in the structure of most concepts. If we ask someone whether they assume that everything comes in already fixed mathematical bits, particles, time units, space units, chemical units, they may say that the assumption is simple-minded. But this assumption is nevertheless built into how most concepts function when they are used to explain something. The explanation consists of an assumed set of fixed units, pieces, elements, constituents that remain the same and are traced through. Such explanations are highly useful, but need to be considered within the larger context which is not reducible to them, and in which other units can be generated.
Looking back over two centuries from Kant and Hegel to the present, notice that nature, life process, and animals were given over to mathematical mechanics, time and space units, graph paper, deterministic logical necessity, Laplacian uneventfulness. Only humans were thought to have events, and even this was a puzzle. Even very recently, still, human bodies seemed completely determined by logical mechanics, so that creativity and novelty were possible only in art, which was to say only in "illusion." Novelty-making had to hide in "transitional objects" (Winnicott), "ambiguity" (Empson), or bizarre exaggerations (Bakhtin, Bataille). So convinced were thinkers that nature is graph paper. How odd! Logic, math, and graph paper are quintessentially human creations -- nothing natural comes in equal units that can be substituted in logical slots. Every leaf and cell is a little different. Only humans make graph paper. Where do you ever see it in nature? The larger process is creative, and generates among other things the wild and world-shaking production of graph paper.
So we surely need not give nature and bodily life-process over to fixed units and logic -- however powerful their use is. We need not think of nature as artificially constructed out of separate pieces, although it is useful (and dangerous) to construct and reconstruct them.
We have as yet no good conceptual model with logical links that does not assume fixed individuated units at the bottom. I do not mean to slight much elegant work which is moving in the same direction as we are here. On the contrary, I hope to contribute to it. I am only pointing to a difficulty that is often in the way. It helps if one recognizes the assumption of units directly, so that one can let what makes sense stand, even if it does not assume such units.
We also need to recognize the way time is assumed in what I call the "unit model." At time one (t1) some set of basic elements have to be already there, so that t2 is a mere rearrangement of them. In such a system of thought nothing can ever happen. When something happens, it is an embarrassment and an anomaly.
In our new model process is happening. An occurring is a change. We are devising concepts for real change, not just rearrangement. So we forego the type of explanation which requires t2 = t1. (The latter can be derived as a special case.)
When the past functions to "interpret" the present, the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in.
Our next concepts will need to formulate what is said by this odd phrasing: "not as itself, but as already changed by." The concepts we have built so far do already imply it. Of course I developed them from stories such as the ones I told here. My stories will let us develop our concepts further.
Our sixth requirement is: Rather than a fixed set of units being determinative, we need concepts to think about how units emerge, and can re-emerge differently.
Our concepts will retain logical consistency, but they will also require:
1) Interaction first. The interactional event determines the individual entities (or the "slots" for individual entities).. Each functions "not as itself but as already affected by."
2) A model of time in which a past and an implying function in the present.
3) Process events
4) A nonlaplacian sequence
5) Many factors shaping one event.
6) Units emerge, and can re-emerge differently.
Let us now pick up the thread and develop more concepts with the requirements we just formulated. In IV-A a-c we built concepts for a sequence of whole events. In such a sequence each bit (any this) is a specifically differentiated whole. Let us now develop more exactly how original interaffecting and coordinated differentiation produce differentiated wholes.
A stopped process is "carried" by the differently ongoing process. Now we want to understand more exactly how this new whole, a newly differentiated multiplicity ("all the differences") forms itself as the continuing process.
During stoppage the new whole (the next event) forms from how the processes interaffect each other, the phases where some subprocesses stop or resume being together. In this way they become differentiated into many processes. Therefore I called their relation "original interaffecting.
What continues during phases of stoppage is new and becomes separate. When the stopped process resumes, some of its phases occur only together with a phase of other processes, or only without some of those. In this way they become differentiated.
So the specific differentiations are determined by what occurs together as a whole, and how this differs from what occurred earlier as a whole.
In each new whole there are new internal differentiations between processes.
In IV-Ab) we found implying is always the whole body's one implying rather than that of separate processes. They are one coordinated multiplicity rather than many really separate sequences side by side . So each process and subprocess is the implying of the same whole next event. The same implying is thus in many parts of the body.
A change in one of the processes implies changes in how the others are implied in the one implying of the next bodily event.
Even a very tiny process in some microscopic location implies (is also the implying of) the larger processes of which it is a part. The various processes each imply the continuance of the others as the whole process, and thereby also its own continuation.5
We also said that any piece of the body occurs in many processes and subprocesses, and is not the same piece in them. Similarly, what is "a" process different from the others is determined in each occurring.
If something different in one of the processes makes other processes different, and we don't assume a single identity of our first process, then the difference it makes in the others depends also on how the other processes affect and differentiate our first one. That is to say, the first-mentioned difference in our first process is itself already affected by the differences it makes.
A process or part does not function as itself; it does not function as an individuated "it"; rather it functions as already interaffected. What "it" is (and its effect) has already been affected by the differences it makes in the others which affect it.
Let me develop this more specifically: From one multiplicity the whole process moves to a somewhat different multiplicity. How have the members of the first multiplicity functioned to bring about the second altered one? In coordinated differentiation and original interaffecting there is a change in the numbers and identities of the members of the multiplicity.
If we have introduced the change externally, we think of "it" as what we know we did. The old model assumes that what we did (from outside the system) is distinct from the differences it made (within the system). But for the system the event is just those differences. The same relation exists between one difference and the rest of the differences. In the old model, the difference one thing makes in the system is an event in its own right (outside of the rest of them). But for the rest of the differences the first difference is not a separate event, but only how it affects them. If we consider the first difference as within the system, what it really is will include how the others affect it. In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in turn affect it. But such an "it" is an event only in the en#1 observer's process. In the process we are looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already affected by affecting something, if it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected? Let us appreciate this problem. It will solve itself below.
With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it." And only still later can how it is affected also change the difference it makes to other units. If we must think of the changed difference-making as happening at the same time as the original difference it made, this would be called an anomaly.
But in the old model the unit-event has been separated from the differences it makes; these differences must occur before they, in turn, can affect the first event and thus change the differences which the first event can only then further make (now that it has in turn been altered).
If we do not assume these separations, then some well known anomalies dissolve. In the model developing here, what occurs is the result of how the effect of each process, part, or difference is changed by how its effect on the others affects it.
Why is this so?
The separate differences made do not occur. Only the result occurs.
Our model moves from one differentiated whole of multiple aspects to another. Instead of leaving it at a gap, we can make concepts for the process in which a newly differentiated multiplicity forms.
We assume neither independent units nor a mushy undifferentiated whole. In a coordinatedly structured whole, no aspect exists just so without the others being just so. (IV-Aa) Each is also the further implying which they all are (IV-Ab). The material "parts" are relative to the processes (IV-Ac) and not as if they existed identifiably apart, and only then entered into processes.
The single occurring includes all the differences, and the differences made to each other by these differences, and again by the differences they make. Occurring is an interaffecting of everything by everything (evev).
The interaffecting or difference-making goes on just as far as it can, which is not indefinitely (we will ask why) so that there is an occurrence. (Why there is then still another occurring we will also ask.) All the differences that interaffecting can involve have already make all the differences they can, so that no more differences are made.
If we want to imagine this happening in linear time (differences occurring one after the other) I can tell a story: When I was in the Navy, I learned to repair and tune the radio receivers of that time. They had several parts called "IF cans" (Intermediate Frequency), each of which had a screw on top. I had to turn the screw on the first one to the point where the signal is loudest. Further turning diminishes the signal again. Then I would turn the screw on the second to its maximum. But this would make a difference to the first. I would turn the screw on the first to what was now the loudest point. But this would affect the second, so it had to be turned to its loudest again. Now this altered the first again, but only a little. After going back and forth a number of times, both are at their loudest. Now came the third, and then each time going between the second and the first again, second and first, second and first, between every tuning of the third. And so with the fourth, where one must return third, second, and first, second and first, between every two tunings of the fourth. Eventually all differences all of them can make to each other, and all the differences that makes to all the differences, and so on, is taken account of. (In section h) I ask about how "loudest" works here as the direction.)
The point is that there is a result. All differences having made their differences, the result is what it is. It is the result of everything interaffected by everything ("evev"). But in our model the differences do not occur. Only the result occurs.
There is no single set of separate things that could be "everything" or "all." What happens remakes "all" parts and differences. Implying is more ordered than a structure of parts, processes, or differences; occurring redetermines its multiplicity. (In ECM this is discussed as the "reversal of the usual philosophic order.")
In the story of the IF cans, each new tuning takes time. But everything x everything does not take (or make) more time than the occurring itself. The differences which each makes in the others, and they in it, are not actual occurrences, nor actual time-spans.6
Differences are results of comparing or measuring. Unless someone does something, differences are not actual events. In the old model "reality" consists of universal space-time comparisons which are not events. Newton showed that the water in a bucket at the end of a twisted rope climbs up the sides when the bucket is rotating, and not when it is not. This showed that motion is not just a change in the relation of the bucket to the earth. This showed that there is something utterly different and empirically independent when a thing moves. But Newton continued to think of motion as a change in space and time relations. So he concluded that the space and time relations (which are really just passive comparisons) have to be considered "objective" and must be given primacy over actual events. The comparing process became "absolute." Einstein modified but did not alter the claim of mere comparing (localization) to overarch and determine actual occurrences.
Relativity theory limits the greater number of solutions one could write for quantum mechanics alone. Physics is slowly moving past those restrictions. Mere comparative localization would no longer have a status equal to interaction (CRL, RO). Only interactions, for example measurements that affect the process, are events in it. The space-time localizations are mere comparisons by a merely spectating observer. Comparisons are not occurrences in the process.
Differences are comparisons; they do not occur.
"Eveving" is a way we can think of the formation of implying and occurring. We have to keep in mind that implying is always orderly in a more intricate way than an occurring. The concept of "eveving" is a way of thinking about implying without assuming the differences as such. In forming a new whole, all differences "implyingly cross" with each other (the concept of "crossing" can derive from here) in such a way that each acts on the others not as itself but as already crossed.
We need to ask about time, everything by everything makes it seem that everything happens at once and takes no time. Time might be said to be the fact that everything does not actually happen at once. But why is the implying eveving carried forward into an occurring? And, why is there then still another occurring? There is another and another, because occurring changes implying into a new implying. But why does the change within eveving (which takes no time) stop so that something occurs, and what is there about the kind of change which is made by occurring which is not part of the eveving (the crossing of all the differences which takes no time)? What makes an occurrence an occurrence?
The answer is of course that implying never happens alone, always along with occurring, both from occurring and into occurring. And occurring is body-en; it occurs in the environment, or we can say that the en occurs into implying. Therefore implying implies the environment, since implying implies an occurring and that is always body-en#2. So the implying (the eveving) does not go on forever because a body-en occurs, and changes the implying in a way that does not happen within eveving. So the question why eveving does not go on forever is the question: Just how is the implied occurring related to what is occurring?
We said at the start that implying (or implied occurring) is never equivalent to one occurrence. Implying is always more intricately organized and in that sense more precise than any environmental occurring can ever be. Our concept of "eveving" is a conceptual way to speak from this intricacy. (A concept does not represent; it speaks from or carries forward.) Eveving happens in the implying; occurring and environment is not eveving, but occurs-into the eveving. More concepts concerning this will soon develop. Just keep in mind that occurring into eveving is not eveving. V will make this difference quite clear.
We also said that the process goes on largely in en#3, that is to say in an already life-organized en which speaks back to the implying as, for example, the beaverís tree is already the one the beaver felled. And even if the en is not already modified by life, it is already implied by implying as the en#2 that is part of any life process. So there is more than a new and accidental relation between implying and body-en-occurring. But although the en is already implied, it must still also occur, and that is not determined by the implying alone, both because implying has a more intricate order and because occurring is the actual body=environment.
The question why eveving doesnít continue forever concerns the relationship between implying and occurring, or between the implied body-en and the body-en that happens into this implying. IVB and V will develop terms from and for this.
In terms of linear time we would ask: how is implying related to what has occurred, to what is now occurring, and to what will occur next, but this division cannot be accepted as the frame of our discussion. Neither can we insert implying between the last and the next occurring, as if the implying took up its own time between occurrings. We will return to this question in the next section.
But now we have developed two ways in which the implying can change -- either the original carrying-forward change which the implying implies, or by an eveving during a stoppage (if it doesnít die). But can we still distinguish these two? In stoppage we found the development of many coordinated processes in phases of many stoppages and resumptions with many objects. What decides whether the life process has developed and is being carried forward, or whether the whole development is still a version of stoppage? Rather than this either/or, more distinctions will develop in V. There are at least two different ways in which the life process is carried forward by this coordinated development.
I - IV is only a general model, an alternative to the old one that now inheres in most concepts. We have not distinguished tissue process from behavior and perception, nor these from culture, language and action, let alone from what goes beyond these.
In VI we will find that behavior constitutes a still further way in which the regular life process can incorporate and regularly exhibit stoppage (with its implying of objects) and resumption.
In our general model here, shall we still maintain a simple original carrying forward of a single process, the stoppage of which produces the development of many processes and many stops and resumptions? Or should we think of every bit of every process -- if it is being carried forward -- as a kind of environmental resuming. Of course there is not eveving until there are many differences, and many differentiations among processes and objects, but even the simplest known living things have many. The development we have been discussing has already occurred. So we need not take the development as a history beginning with something simpler than we find. We can also take it as the development of our concepts. In that case we can consider all carrying forward as carrying eveving forward, even though we developed eveving from the simpler general model of carrying forward. Carrying forward is an occurring that changes the implying in a way which it implied itself changed, so that it is no longer "the same" implying.
"Stoppage" has now become derivative from carrying forward (and we can say that we now see that we used the conceptual pattern of "stoppage" to get at carrying forward, and that the concept was altered in functioning for us in this way).
Just as we spoke of processes that affect each other and then find original interaffecting (and an unseparated multiplicity), just as we first think of differences that cross, and then discover that they are already crossed, so we are discovering that carrying forward is an original resuming.
Eveving and original resuming might be due to an earlier stoppage, or a stoppage might be due to an eveving that makes the usual process impossible.
But the concept of "stoppage" must keep the function it has been performing in our model. It marks a juncture where the usual process cannot happen, and a new development arises. We need not assume that the development comes from the impossibility of the usual process due to some unaccounted for change in the body or the en (as I said in II). It is equally likely that a development makes the usual process impossible. (See "increased sensitivity" in Philosophical Critique of the Concept of narcissism.) As long as we are clear, we can proceed with both of these two schematic alternatives, unless at some point we find them making a difference we need to pursue. (See ECM VI on the functional equivalence of alternative concepts.)
For now, "resumption" is both derivative from, and explanatory of "eveving" and "carrying forward."
We can now apply the concepts of "schema" and "resumption" to every bit of life process, just as if every bit were a stoppage and a resumption. But of course we still distinguish "carrying forward" (resumption) from events that leave the implying unchanged. Since implying is more intricately organized than an occurring, it is only from the occurring that one can say if it was something that can be what the implying implied. Only the carrying forward determines what can carry forward. (See reversal in ECM, See also a very different instance of the reversal, the concept of "reinforcement" in Skinner.)
Events are a life-processí own only if they carry it forward. We will be specifying many kinds of carrying forward, although never a single list.) Occurring can happen into implying without carrying the process forward in any sense, and some of those can make for stoppages. Of course we retain the vital distinction between the bodyís own process and other events that happen to it. And, of course stoppage as such must be distinguished from carrying forward (or stoppage-and-resumption).
Our concept of "eveving" is an expansion of the concept of "implying." Eveving implies further occurring, and occurring involves the en, so of course eveving implies the en, but it is still only the implying. How en actually occurs into the eveving will be taken up in V. For a while now, let us pursue the eveving.
In my story about tuning the radio, the direction was given in advance by my desire for the loudest, so that I could receive distant stations. The purpose of a machine (or anything we make) remains in the designer. But how does it arise in the designer? If it must be brought to the designer by still another designer, how could they ever arise? So we need to ask: How does purpose and direction arise from within a process? For lack of this question today, everything is treated as if it were a machine, and moreover a machine that had no designer. Our purposes are left unthinkable within our science (which is nevertheless influenced by many purposes).
In re-tuning each IF can, the differences became smaller and smaller and reached a stable result. But without a purpose or direction, how can the eveving arrive at a result?
In our model the occurring brings and changes its own implying of the next occurring. The bodyís own implying is the focaling of the many processes, the many parts and differences into one implying. Purpose and direction are aspects of the process. The purpose is not something added on. For example, in human events what we call "purpose" already inheres in what a given action is. Or, as Dilthey put it, "every experiencing is already inherently also an understanding." The plant doesnít need a separate purpose to turn to the sun. To render purpose as a separate, added thing is artificial. It is usually artificial to say what "the" purpose is.
Many "purposes" and many possible actions are focaled into one. Only one action occurs next. Our concept of "focaling" develops from this relation of many into one. It develops from this function at this juncture in the model, and from many experiential instances. For example:
"Wouldnít it be sad," I ask students, "if you had exactly the same values now as when you were fourteen? But wouldnít it be even sadder if you simply lost the values you had then? So we are sad if they are the same, and sad if they are different. What do we wish? Obviously we are looking for a more intricate relation, something like more developed, more complex, differentiated, realistic, from a deeper human level, more understanding ..... -- something like that. In other words we hope that your values continued to play their role in how you lived, but that they developed by playing this role.
When an artist draws an exactly right line in an unfinished drawing, no aim exists in advance to determine the line. The artist feels and says that the unfinished drawing "needs something." Not the drawing alone, but the drawing and the human body together imply something more. But of course the artist has no finished drawing already in mind. The aim and the direction develop from the process.7
The artist does not try out and then reject all possible wrong lines, and does not "select" the right one. In geometry one can say that a plane contains an infinite number of lines, but those lines do not exist, nor does the line that will eventually be drawn. That line does not exist on a blank sheet. The already drawn lines (and much more) participates in the formation (the eveving) of the "needed" line. When it comes, it changes the interrelations of all the lines so as to carry this one implying forward. Neither the aim nor the line exist in advance. The artistís one implying is an eveving of the relationships of all the lines to each other. The artist focals the right line.
Another example: A new theory can expand science in a way that does not follow logically from any earlier theory. When you think forward, you can observe the focaling process at work. You pursue unclear but possibly rich edges. You sense more than you can as yet think clearly. Once you devise a new theory, you can specify what has changed. In advance you cannot. (What dialectical logic can do is similar; Hegel could arrange the history of thought behind him in a neat dialectical progression, but this could not generate even one step forward.)
The direction and result of focaling comes from implying. Eveving (each already affected by its effect on the others) is focaling; it arrives at one implying of a next step.
We can formulate this point also in terms of "relevance." In ECM I showed that the many meanings are always already involved in any one. Here we are just coming from the many meanings (everything by everything). We have really already said that relevance is eveving and focaling.
What determines which factors make a difference? Obviously they first make whatever difference they make, and so they determine themselves as having been relevant.
When a process is carried forward, all that is involved in forming the next event was "relevant" to the previous event. But there might be an objection. (See Williamsí objection in L.P.) It might seem that just any event whatever would be relevant by our definition. But consider: From itself, a process does not form "just any event whatever." The next event will be relevant, not just by definition, but by carrying the process forward. We will be able to see how the preceding event has functioned in the formation of this one. We can define "relevance" more exactly: It is the function performed by (the role played by) the many in the formation of a given one (the next one).
Many factors are indeed relevant, and do indeed have a part in the shaping of what occurs. But in participating in the next formation, they open and cross. They do not do it as themselves, but as already crossed with whatever else participates in shaping the next event.
It is just my point that a process differs both from arbitrariness and from logic. From the next step we can specify how it is relevant, why it carried the process forward. But to formulate this will constitute a further carrying forward. The terms in which we can do it must first be derived from understanding the steps of the process. But this is nothing like saying something is relevant just because we say it is. Most anything that might happen would not be relevant. Even totally "free play" makes sense (usually new sense) when it is enjoyable.
A process is a relevanting. This verb says both that a process occurs relevantly, and that the relevance is made by the process. What occurs makes itself relevant. So we cannot use relevance as if it were on another level from which one can pre-determine what will occur.
Implying, eveving, focaling, and relevanting are "forward" relations; they are made by "carrying forward." Retroactively one can specify them (in various ways). But we do know something of great importance in advance: We know that the process will form relevantly.
But nothing is lost if we give up the pretense of determining what is relevant in advance. One always finds the relevance retroactively, even if oneís conceptual model demands that one read it back as if it had been determined in advance. Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty struggled against this pretense.
Events that "were" in no way implied and do not carry forward can impinge on the body. As we will see, even such events happen into the ongoing relevanting, sometimes with a new but highly organized result. But irrelevant events are not produced by the body. Even with all your human capacities you are unable to think of something that is in every way irrelevant. Right now something irrelevant would be a relevant example in this discussion. But at other times when you think of something irrelevant you can usually trace how it came -- quite relevantly -- in that situation.
Do we not lose what is called "technical control" with this reversal which puts the process first, and makes the seeming "determinants" retroactive? No, we lose nothing, but our model enables us to think differently about technical control. We badly need a better way to think about it.
We lose nothing because technical control is always obtained only retroactively after many repeated observations. Only then can one predict. Then one can change something and observe again. One may predict the effect of the change, but perhaps it will do something different. Only from seeing a regular effect many times, does one gain technical control. We are not altering this. But should we say that what we retroactively formulate are "determinants" that existed in advance? If we say this we belie our actual procedure, and lose the capacity to think about nature altogether. We need to think about the fact that our scientific formulations change every few years. Neither the last set nor the next set of "determinants" can possibly be what actually determines nature.
To read our formulations back as predetermining nature pretends that nature has the sort of order that our formulations have. Actually it is quite obvious that nature has something like the sort of order that the progression of our formulations exhibits over the years. Nature is capable of being carried forward by all those formulations -- and so it cannot possibly be equivalent to any of them.
We are building a model with which we can think about that kind of order (see RO). Of course we can still use any of various logical models within our wider model. With our model we can also conceptualize a great deal that cannot be conceptualized by the old model. But we will not read our model under the occurring processes as if the model determined the processes.
Implying and occurring (carrying forward) is an eveving, a focaling, and a relevanting.
For us the same units do not need to last through a change. If they do, it is a narrower special case. In the old model events must occur within a static multiplicity of space points, time points, and particles. A particle alone is "this one," "the same one" that was earlier there and is now here. In the new model the occurrence forms its own new multiplicity. If a space-time-particle grid is desired, it is determined from the occurrence. Nothing in the new model forces us to lose anything from the old, if we want it. But with the new model we do reject the assumption that occurring must be determined and necessitated by the units of previous occurrence.
Certain processes we will derive later do form structure, but nothing is actually necessitated by imposed structure (the origin of which then remains puzzling).
The old model has only explicit structure, "information" that is attributable to space-time positions. Most of the parameters of our sciences are structured in just this fashion, so that it is no use denying these assumptions themselves, since they are not only general; they also inhere in how everything else is conceived and written down.
In the old model something (say a particle or a body) exists, defined as filling space and time. Then it also goes through some process. Or it does not. It is defined as "it" regardless of the process "it" goes through. "It" is separate from a system of changes and relationships that are "possible" for "it."
Let us reconsider the terms "possibility," "constraint," what "can" occur, and what "cannot." The old model assumes a fixed set of possibilities. What actually happens cannot change the set. It simply fills out one of them. One of the possibilities makes good, so to speak, like the one sperm that gets into the egg. It is as if there were no real difference between what occurs and these possibility-units, except for some indefinable preference that one possibility attains - without changing the fixed set of them.
Instead, let us allow the word "possibilities" to be used in two different ways: before and after eveving and occurring. We can say that "a" (determined) "possibility" participates in eveving. So it came before eveving and enters into it but does not determine or limit the eveving and occurring. Looking back from the event there may have been a different set of antecedent "possibilities" that were (re)generated from the event.
In quantum mechanics the space-time and particle systems may not last across an interaction. The set of possibilities which "explain" the results of the event in retrospect is not the same set as those which appeared to be there in advance. Although frequent and important, these cases are considered anomalies. They must be written in a very cumbersome way, and with odd particles thrown in and taken out again, to make them conform to the consistent localization of relativity theory.
Can we conceive of a model in which actual occurring could change the system of possibilities? Of course, we would often employ a static set of units to formulate predictions. But we would not require that they be read backward.
In practice, of course, scientists revise their theories and systems of what is possible - and they do so retroactively by seeing what occurs. In practice there is a relationship between one version of such a theory, and the next improved version. Instead of sameness, we could take that wider type of relationship as our model instance.
The issue goes to the heart of the question: how shall we think of an occurrence? We are thinking philosophically, that is to say we are rethinking some basic assumptions of our concepts.
Why limit our model with the assumption that nothing ever really happens? Or can we sufficiently develop a model in which occurring creates (re-creates) order and possibility, rather than the reverse?
What have been considered the antecedent "determinants" that shape what happens are themselves shaped by participating in this shaping.
We see this easily in the case of a metaphor. We grasp it immediately. Then, to explain it to someone who did not, we can generate many explanations, many similarities which we (then) say it is based on, and many differences which it did not mean. We can say that all these "were implied" in the metaphor, but they certainly were not there as such. We have to take time to think and work to generate them from our immediate grasp of the metaphor.
A metaphor is an eveving, a focaling, a crossing.
How one devises (and understands) a metaphor can be used here as a metaphor for this point: It was long said that a metaphor is "based on" a pre-existing similarity between two different things. In our model it is the metaphor that creates or specifies the similarity. By speaking of A as if it were B, certain aspects of A are made which were not there before as such. The metaphor does not "select" this trait from a list of existing traits of A; there is no such fixed set. Nor does the metaphorizer go though the endlessly many traits which A might acquire by being compared to B.
We reverse the order (See ECM) or, more exactly, the old model reversed the order and we are putting it right again, as it occurs for us.
Order comes from implying and occurring. Occurring doesnít just fill out an abstract order. The word "possible" needs a more intricate use. What is possible in implying and occurring is not predetermined. Of course what occurred, could occur. Since it occurred, it was possible. We can reverse this and say: What could occur at the given juncture, did. I call this the "law of occurrence."
We must notice: This introduces a distinction into the meaning of "could." Everything that "could" happen enters into eveving and occurring, and is (re)generated. Looking back from the occurring, the word "could" could only say what the implying (eveving) and occurring could in fact do together. The system of possibilities which the event (re)generates behind itself in linear time may not have been possibilities that entered into the event. No abstract set of possibilities determines what "could" carry the implying forward -- this is not determined, neither in advance nor in retrospect.
Since eveving takes no time, we can say that whatever could participate, did. Whatever aspects could be relevant, were relevanted.8 Now, if we retrospectively specify them, they are aspects. The "could" and the "they" are determined along with what occurred rather than being an antecedent scheme.
In CD I have shown that a metaphor does not cross two situations; rather the one new situation crosses with the whole use family of a word (See ECM and CD for a developed theory of metaphor). All language use is metaphoric in this respect. What after Wittgenstein we can call a "use-family" -- our felt sense of the many situations in which we can use the word -- crosses freshly with the topic area or situation in which we speak. In crossing they open each other and generate more than could possibly follow logically from either.
If we can understand the metaphoric nature of ordinary language, we can move past the "postmodern dilemma" which seems to make it impossible to say anything without falling into metaphysical concepts. Wittgenstein showed very well how such concepts mislead us in philosophy, but he also showed that language is not determined by them.
Derrida shows quite rightly that there are only metaphorical uses, no so-called proper ones. But he is quite wrong to argue that the old theory of metaphor re-establishes itself around each metaphor. As Wittgenstein has shown very well, word-use is not actually determined by the concepts that philosophical analysis reads back into it. Nothing requires that we reassert the traditional requirement for originally literal propositions, or come to a dead stop because those are impossible.
Instead, we can notice that computers can neither interpret nor generate metaphors. This shows that ordinary language and actions in situations have an order that is more intricate than logic. Notice, ordinary language does not generate contradictions unless one first seeks to reduce it to logic.
There are several kinds of truth in metaphor. We can use any word in any situation, but it says only whatever meaning the crossing makes, there (if any). We can use any word about any other thing but they cross only as they can cross. What we get from their crossing is not arbitrary. A crossing has a certain kind of truth.
Nothing arbitrary happens when something is changed and opened by functioning in the formation of something else. Crossing is very precise and generates only just what it generates, although it opens the logical determinacy of the meanings that are schematized by participating in schematizing something.
For example, you can cross toothbrushes and trains. Then you might say, "Yes, I see, a toothbrush has only one Ďcar,í" or you might say "They both shake us," or "It would be great to have my personal train." There are always a great many results from a crossing, but they are never arbitrary. Two things cross only as they truly can.
The bad repute of metaphors comes from the fact that one can be led to unwarranted conclusions in the new situation if one does not know the new situation well. For example, if someone tells workers they have to accept the bitter medicine of a pay cut now, rather than an even worse one later, or that the Government is cutting "fat" out of the economy so that it will be healthier and produce more jobs, this might be believed by people who have no direct knowledge and experience with the economy. Just as medicine might be unpleasant, but saves us from worse trouble, so a given policy might be unpleasant but save us from worse trouble.
For someone who knows economics the metaphor might bring out something from that knowledge or it might not. A knowledgeable person might reply either "Yes, the deficit gets worse because interest payments exceed tax income" or "No, taking money out of the economy will lead to fewer jobs, not more. If people can buy less, then production and jobs cannot be increased. Loose money will have to go into something else."
If I tell you that George whom you donít know, is an "elephant," you cannot know what I mean. You might expect that he has a heavy-footed walk or great size. But let us say we have been discussing George Washington. Now what emerges might be how Washington seemed to be above the squabbling parties, his own prestige so totally established that he didn't need to squabble.
Of course it would be nonsense to say that of an elephant! So we see that the metaphor generates new traits, and does so on both sides of the comparison.
We must notice that "our knowledge of elephants" and "our knowledge of George" both function pre-conceptually. The example can show what "pre-conceptual" means in my use of it. There could not be new traits, new precise effects, if the word were used only in accord with a defined concept. Instead, we see that word and situation do not function like defined concepts do, although all human experience involves a welter of implicit concepts. But language use is "pre-conceptual" in that we can derive new concepts to explain it only afterwards. Wittgenstein showed this with hundreds of examples. No metaphor or fresh use of words would arise at all, if the implicit concepts didnít open in crossing. If they functioned like explicit concepts -- they would keep all subsequent steps consistent with themselves.
We notice it most when a word is used in a new way, but of course it always means this precise effect, which saying it just made in this situation.
Our model is and is about explication, this relation between pre-conceptual and conceptual, or between implying and explicitly occurring structuring.
In using eveving to think about metaphor we overturned another basic assumption of the old model: the assumption of limited "degrees of freedom," the more determinants, the less room there is supposed to be for novelty.
In the old model there is only limiting or indeterminacy. To say that the artistís line "could" occur on a blank page meant only that no determinant prevented it. The old model doesnít take account of how such a line comes about as an eveved effect. Determinants do not only delimit; they also cross and participate in implying something new.
In the old model order is only a limitation on what can still happen. The more order, the less can happen. But we are making concepts for the order of implying, which is neither structure nor indeterminacy, but more intricate than explicit structure. We think of it here in terms of eveving. The effect of all determinants is more finely shaped than any of them.
The old model has only two terms: indeterminacy and limitation. But implying is neither of those. As we have seen, it is more determinate than explicit structures, but in a different way.
In the old model, the more determinants, the less is left for novelty. When something is fully determined, no "degrees of freedom" remain.
We can use "eveving" to say why (as shown in ECM) the more determinants, the more creativity may happen. Explicit determinants make lowest common denominators. Eveving is implying. In eveving, if there are more determinants, they cross and produce more novelty.
It should have been realized long ago that more structure makes more variety. We see it all about us, Higher animals show more variety than simpler ones, and humans even more. The more a person has understood, the more complexity is brought to the next event. Something new will be understood more quickly, and more new ideas and avenues of exploration arise. We understand this if we think of understanding as an eveving, a crossing between what we bring and what is to be understood.
The more different people we have known well, the more easily we understand the next person, even though the next person will be different from any we have known. We can explain this. It is because the more complexity we bring, the more can cross so that the otherís meanings can generate themselves out of ours.
The more philosophies we have understood, the more easily we will understand the next one we read, although it will be different. The more complexity I bring, the more precisely can the new meanings be precisioned in an eveving with what I bring.
In biology Pattee9 tries to deal with an anomaly: "In a control hierarchy the upper level exerts a specific, dynamic constraint on the details of the motion at lower level, so that the fast dynamics of the lower level cannot simply be averaged out." ..."The interesting problem ... is to explain how such ordinary molecules ... can evolve such extraordinary authority as members of a collection." Pattee seeks a kind of "constraint, which does not simply freeze-out degrees of freedom, but imposes new functional relations between them."
Now note the example with which he thinks about this: "As isolated individuals we behave in certain patterns, but when we live in a group we find that additional constraints are imposed on us as individuals by some "authority."
The underlying model assumes individuals that are complete in themselves, and antecedent. When they enter a group, there are "additional" patterns put on them, conceived of as constraints.
Sociologists would deny this, but since their underlying model is the same, their denial leads to the opposite error. Pattee thinks of society as an addition to individuals, but it has long been recognized that the individual individuates in a collective matrix, so that group-relations are deeply inherent in what an individual is. But currently this is misunderstood as if social and cultural determinants functioned like explicit concepts -- as constraints. So it is assumed that the individual cannot exceed the culture.
Actually the cultures provide paths for living -- always insufficient and always further developed and changed by any individual who lives them forward into developments that could not possibly follow from them as patterns. Individuals differentiate themselves in and with the patterns that the group offers. The patterns function in eveving together with implying intricacy which has never been structured or separated.
The point is not to attack Pattee's illustration, but to carry forward what he points to. He seeks a "concept of control (that) involves a more active dynamical role than simply limiting the available space in which matter can move ... such constraints . . . can lead only to fixed structures ... the general difficulty is that we need to find how to add constraints without using up all the degrees of freedom." (82-83) Of course the puzzle is due to the model, not the molecule that acquires more functional relations. (See ECM "The more factors delimit a next step, the more creativity they also enable." See footnote 5.)
One ought to leave room for eveving or crossing even when the old model seems to work quite well. (See Responsive Order.)
I want to set up a term for the relation between two things that cross with each other in eveving. I say that each "is schematized by schematizing the other" or "sbs".
"Sbs" means that the two do not function as themselves in relation to each other; rather, each functions as altered by affecting the other.
When two things cross they do not do so alone, since they occur as part of some eveving and some event. The next event may look as if it were only "their" crossing, but actually there is always an eveving of the whole mesh of experiencing. (See metaphor and relevance in ECM.) There is no line dividing the two that cross from all the rest because each moment and each "thing" is (involves, brings, functions as, means .....) an intricacy.
There are two different ways in which two things may schematize each other and be schematized thereby. We do not get the same results in the two directions. This is difficult to grasp. Let me illustrate it and then say why it matters.
For instance, if we are writing history and using the elephant as a metaphor for George Washington, that's quite different from using GW to help us say something about elephants. In one case the elephant is available for anything it can help us to say about GW. (He pretended to be an elephant as if he were so far above the squabbling parties that he didnít even see them, but usually he did what Hamilton wanted.) In the other case we have just lived with elephants two years in the bush, and we are writing our report. Now anything from GW (and anything else) is available to help us to schematize our elephant-experience.
Is it apparent that in each direction the crossing will bring out new aspects of both, but different ones in the two cases?
Let me now use "past-present," and "sbs" instead of GW and EL. Let me first use the concept of "sbs" to schematize the relation of past and present, and then use that relation to schematize sbs. I am taking the very term "sbs" and putting it into an sbs relation with "past and present."
Can sbs help us to say something about past and present? Yes, the past functions in the formation of the present. So we can say that the past has a role in schematizing the present, and by doing so the past also becomes schematized (what from the past is relevant, or functions now). What it "is" can be defined only backwards from the present, since it is by schematizing the present that the past is itself schematized and becomes relevant. If someone has a past event on video, it doesnít change, but (the sbs relation can help us to say:) how the past is still now at work in our bodies -- this past is changed in the present. This can lead further: The way our past still affects how we live can be changed in the present by living and acting differently.
We can now say more about the way body and en#3 imply each other. We left this relation in I. There we said that the life process goes on in en#3; it goes on in the spider's web as well as in its body. Now we can say that life process sbses en#3 and goes on in the sbsed en#3 (not in an en#3 that is past and not here anymore).
We have already gone in one direction by using the sbs relation to speak about the past-present relation. Yes, past and present schematize each other and are also both schematized thereby. Can we now do this in the opposite direction? Can we use the past-present relation to help us explicate more about "sbs?" To do that we would cross them again, but this time to use the past-present relation to say more about sbs:
If our theory were already closed, and if we used it only logically, we should get the same thing, just as the road from Athens to Thebes is the same as the road from Thebes to Athens. But since we are forming the concepts (and since even finished concepts can always be used experientially), what we know experientially about past and present may be more than we have used so far. What might emerge if we use this experience to think about sbs?10
Of course! Now it pops out. How could we not have seen this before? The two directions are very different in the case of present and past. In fact, now we see that sbs cannot apply in the other direction at all.
It is very well to say that past and present schematize each other so long as we mean that their crossing creates aspects of both. So we can say both "the present schematizes the past" and also "the past schematizes the present" but these are both still only the same direction and the same thing. The present is the essay we are writing about GW, and both acquire new aspects as the past participates in constituting the present.
But in the reverse direction the past would be going on now; it would be the essay we are writing now. The present would only participate. The past would be happening, going on, occurring.
The past may intrude on the present to such an extent that one loses track of the present, but it remains the past even so. There are odd times when one does indeed relive the past, but that happens in the present even so.
We can say that past and present sbs each other, but still only in one of the two directions. So, yes! We can use past-present to schematize the concept of "sbs" itself. We learn something about both, which we did not find the first time, when we used sbs to schematize past-present. Now we can say that in an sbs relation one term occurs (like a present occurring), it happens-into; it goes on in. The other term is gone on in, (like the past). If we write about elephants then that functions like the present, and GW functions like the past.
The words "schematized by schematizing" cannot express the difference since both happen even in one direction. But now we can use time to define the two directions:
In an sbs relation one term functions in the presently ongoing formation of the other term. The result of sbs differs depending on which term is the one that is occurring, and which term is not occurring but only participating in the otherís occurring. For example, the present is occurring and the past is not, but participates in the occurring of the present.
Let us take what we just saw about sbs and the past and present with us to the next section.
Modified 10/2001 (c) 1998 by Eugene T. Gendlin. All Rights Reserved. webmaster