A Process Model
a) Body looks
b) The Dance
f) The New Kind of CF
h) Seens and Heards
j) Universals (Kinds)
j-1) Separate senses
j-3) Three universals
j-4) The pre-formed implicit (type a)
k) Action and Gesturing
l) Slotted Rituals
m) Making and Images
n) Fresh Formation of Sequences and Tools
o) Schematic Terms:
o-2) Implicit Functioning
At last we are ready to derive symboling. By "derive" of course I mean build concepts that will let us think clearly about what it is to be a symbol, how something can be "of" in the way a symbol is. We will see that much of the foregoing has been necessary.
To think clearly, one needs concepts that share an internal structure, that develop together, so to speak. What each is, and what the others are, constitute a single structure so that one can grasp what each does in relation to the others.
It won't do just to add one thing to another. We don't enable clear thought and we don't penetrate into experiences, if we just announce: "Humans have a power to symbolize." Everyone already knows that.
In developing the symbol power, as it seems, from animal behavior and body process, I am not trying to do a natural history. I think, quite in the opposite order, that those who study actual developments of this sort will be aided by the concepts developed here. Why? Because these concepts stem from out of what symboling is.
Why then have we needed to reformulate body-process and behavior? Because only by developing those concepts more clearly, and more in accord with what symboling is, can we hope to think about it. The body and behavior are once and for all involved in what symboling is, and we cannot think about symboling in the poor concepts now in use about the body and also about behavior, perception, feeling, space and time. That will now become clear.
Let me now lead to symboling by discussing briefly that kind of animal behavior which is most like it, namely "animal gestures" and "animal rituals." That will let us see shortly exactly what symboling adds, and what it does not.
An animal's species members are of course among the most important "objects" (environmental aspects that resume behavior sequences).
Sexual intercourse, fighting, nest-building and other important behavior sequences can involve certain postures and sounds on the part of another animal. When a male cat sees another, its tail gets thick and it hisses and growls. This either causes flight or fight-readying on the part of the other cat. The behaviors, postures and sounds of each cat carry forward the other. In a mating dance one bird may display certain feathers the design and color of which carries forward the other animal's intercourse-readying, which in turn affects the first, and so, on into intercourse. One monkey's raising an arm to hit may carry forward the other's fight-readying, and fighting. In the fighting, when one monkey is ready for flight he turns his back and this stops the fighting sequence.
Among animals who live together in the same territory there is a social hierarchy. Each monkey turns his back when he sees those above him in the order, and receives this submissive gesture from all those below him. This "animal ritual," so-called, takes the place of the fighting sequence. Only the last bit of fighting sequence occurs, and obviates the fighting. However, if the lower monkey fails to turn his back, then fighting does occur. The fighting sequence is implicit, even though it rarely occurs.
In these ways the higher animals and especially the social ones, have a functional role for some of how their bodies look and sound in certain behavior contexts. The growl, the turning to run, the beginning to hit, as bodily patterns, have certain carrying forward effects on the behavior of others, and are part of behavior sequences.
An animal "gesture" can make a quite major difference: the shift in the body that is involved in getting ready to fight, for example, is a very major bodily shift. There is nothing slight or subtle about the changes in circulation, muscles, posture, and other bodily aspects in such a major shift. The whole behavior space is suddenly shifted by such a gesture, and this is also a major bodily (evev) shift.
Some very small single movements or ways the body can look or sound can now make very big differences, for instance between fighting and not fighting. We humans also see much other expressive behavior among the animals which makes no difference. To us these also indicate much, and let us sense how the animal feels.
For example, Jane Goodall reports that a chimpanzee mother, hearing its wounded young one crying, will find it and pick it up. The mother responds to the young one's cries. Not only does she come and pick it up, but she also feels the behavior she is doing (the string of evev-cf which is a bcxt-cf). To the human observer it is obvious that she is upset and concerned. However, Jane Goodall observes the mother pressing the young one against her side as she carries it, and this despite the pain she is inflicting with her tight grip across where the young one is wounded. Now too there are cries from the young one, and facial expressions of pain, to which the human observer is responsive, but which the mother does not hear or see.
It is clear in this example, that the animal is not responsive to the many bodily looks and sounds which--to a human--are expressive. Rather, the animal responds with certain behaviors (and that means also with feeling in-behav) to just certain sounds, looks and movements. All the rest of the body's expressive looks and sounds are extra, they are there for us to see but they do not relevant anything from another animal.
Eibl describes a snake whose tail rattles during intercourse, but if that rattle is cut, everything proceeds just the same. The rattle is how that body happens to be sounding during intercourse, but this sounding has no function. (Then, in an evolutionarily later species, it does come to have a function. Even then the human observer can pick out and empathize with many other ways the body looks or sounds during intercourse which have no function in that later species either.)
So there are two kinds of animal body looks: a) those which are called "rituals" and do carry forward, do resume or obviate behavior sequences, and b) those which we humans notice but the animals do not. The first kind could involve a very large shift in how the body is, since they might relevant or obviate a complex behavior sequence.
The body's looks and sounds to which the animals do not respond are simply how the body happens to be, look, sound, in just that behavior context. Even though it has no function, it isn't mysterious that the body would look and sound different in different bcxts. Bcxts are complex aspects of the body event, the evev.
Let us suppose that two monkeys meet, but neither turns its back, and yet the fighting sequence doesn't form (either because it cannot, for some reason, say there is a river between, or because something new does form).
Let us imagine, instead of either fighting or back-turning, that the initial "threat gesture" repeats, only slightly differently. The "threat gesture" is the relevanting first bit of the fighting sequence. The bit that is also a major bodily shift, fight-readying. (As usual in our schematic, if a first bit has happened, the implying of the whole sequence is altered. If the rest of the sequence doesn't occur, it is still implied. So it begins to happen again, if it can begin. Hence the first bit keeps recurring always in an altered way.)
The "threat gesture" had a large-body-shifting effect. If this "gesture," this way the body looks and sounds and moves its arm is now somewhat different, the effect on the other monkey will also be different. That will alter that monkey's bodylook, sound, and movement somewhat. This, in turn, will carry the first monkey forward somewhat differently, and so on.
We get a sequence of slightly different versions of the same "gesture." I call this a dance. (It's is a new kind of versioning sequence.)
The effect of one monkey on the other, each time, is a version of the major shift in the body (evev and its behavior context) which such "gestures" already have in animal behavior. A change in such a "gesture" would have a changed effect. Each monkey changes this shift in the other's body. Instead of one shift, we get first that shift and then a whole string of versions of how that shift is. A somewhat different bodylook and sound on the body of each makes for a somewhat different body-evev in the other, and hence a different bodylook and sound.
This elaboration of the "gesture" into a whole string is a pause in the usual behavior. The behavior context is not cfed. Instead of fighting, or backturning, this string of versions keeps the behavior context the same.
In this new sequence each bodylook is a version of the same behavior context. The bcxt is not changed as it would be in behavior. For instance, fighting is focally implied, but fighting is not occurring. It continues to be implied. The bcxt continues to be the one that implies fighting. The new sequence is not behavior, it does not change the behavior context as a behavior sequence would. The new sequence is a string of versions of the (otherwise) unchanged bcxt.
The new sequence is a string of renditions of the bcxt in terms of how-the-body-looks-in-that-bcxt. The new sequence is a string of bodylook renditions of the same bcxt.
Just as behavior was a detour within body process, so now this dance is a detour within behavior; it pauses (is a string of versions of) the same body-process stoppage and the same behavior context.
In this sequence there is a new kind of carrying forward, a new relation: the bodylook (let me use that word to include sound and movement) of the other is a bodylook-rendition of how this one's body just was.
A new use of the word "recognize" fits here. (Schematically, this is a re-recognition, since we used the word twice already; we used "recognize" in III, and "re-recognize" in IV.) The body recognizes the other's look as how it itself just was. But this recognition is made by the sequence, and is a relationship within the sequence. The bodily expression now cfs. This recognition is expression (without quotation marks, not too early now).
We are not assuming that a body would know or sense what it looks like, and see the likeness on another body. Just the opposite. Animals exhibit looks and sounds that we humans recognize, but which are not recognized among the animals. In our new sequence the other's bodylook first carries the body forward. Thereby a given way the body is, comes to imply such a sequence.
Before the new sequence forms, most of the characteristic bodylooks and sounds have no function. Only some few specific bodylooks are "animal gestures," but even these do not form a kind of sequence of their own. They merely relevant behavior. Only now is there a sequence of bodylooks.
The bodylooks are whatever the body looks like in the given behavior context, only now there is a string of versions of this.
The human observer could have said, before the sequence ever formed, that the way the animal looks is expressive and characteristic of that behavior context. But now, the bodylook in that bcxt carries the animals themselves into a sequence.
The behavior context is thus rendered or represented in terms of bodylooks. We can say that the bodylooks are symbols of being in that bcxt. They are not "conventional symbols" arbitrarily using just this look or sound or movement to mark just this bcxt. Rather, there is an inherent organismic bodily relationship between the bodylooks and the behavior context they render. They are (versions of) how that specie's body happens to look and sound and move in that behavior context.
Bodylooks are a new kind of environment that renders the bodily evev, carries it forward into the next bodily way of being with its bodylook. In this sequence each bodylook implies the next. More exactly: each bodylook is the look of a bodily evev which implies the next bodylook. When that next bodylook occurs on the other's body, it occurs into this implying. But this implying is generated by the sequence. At first the sequence is cfed by the variations of the relevanting shift. Once it occurs, the sequence finds itself with this new relationship. Each bodylook is how the other's body just was. Only the sequence gives the bodily evev an implying of bodylooks.
There is now a way of feeling, having, sequencing, an unchanged behavior context. It can be had without being cfed. Before there were only the behavior context changes as perception (open cycle) and as feeling (body-changes). Now there is a new kind of perception, the body-look sequence (how the body looks in that behavior context), and a new string of body-changes (feeling). There is a new kind of environment and a new kind of rendering.
But in ordinary behavior the body feels the behavior context. It perceived how it moved. Is this not a feeling of, and a perception of its behavior? Only in a "too early" sense of "of." Behavior is felt only in-behaving itself.
Now, for the first time we can use the word "of" or "about." The dance is about the fight-implying behavior context. The dance is not a fighting, nor a fight-readying, nor a fight-ending. It is not among the behavior sequences that make up the context, but about it.
A time-span is made during which the fight-context is sequenced about, rather than in.
Here emerges empathy, representation, likeness, universality, symbol, meaning, picture, and a good deal more. Let us take these up slowly.
The human aspects we are concerned about develop very much further, of course. This rudimentary schematic sequence gives us grounds for conceptualizing the later developments.
Empathy is often talked about as if I naturally somehow know what my own body looks like when I feel a certain way. Then, when I see someone else looking that way, I assume that they feel as I do, when I look that way. This view fails to wonder how I can know what my body looks like, considering that I rarely see my own body from the outside. Since G.H. Mead, many others have also reversed this order. First others respond to how I look, and only thereby does my body feeling come to imply a look.
Empathy comes first, that is to say: first there is a bodily shift made by how another body looks. My body thereby comes to imply another's looks, and only then does my body imply its own looks. (We will have to examine this lone implying further. Right now only the sequence with another is implied.)
This sequence first generates the likeness between the other's body and my own. Our bodies are alike, but this fact appears to the developed human en#1 observer. That observer could always have said that the specie's members have bodies that look alike. But only now, for the first time, are we making concepts with which to understand how the human observer can notice, have, sense, likeness. Representation is born. But we have not yet gone far with this. We have only shown how a bodylook can come to be had in a sequence of its own. Rather than a relevanting behavior.
A likeness, a picture, a pattern, something that is here and there, is a universal, a kind. But we will have to understand this much more clearly and further.
Looks as looks are now implied and carry forward. They are had, sequenced. A look, we might say, is no concrete thing. What is it, after all? These two bodies are of the same kind, have the same kind of look, they look like that . . . when they are in that behavior context.
On the one hand, our new sequence is a rendering of the behavior context, which is thereby had, felt, sequenced (continues to imply the next behavior that isn't happening). In this respect the new sequence is about the behavior context.
On the other hand, the new sequence is itself a special kind of behaving, a kind of moving around, or raising an arm or other limbs, and throat muscles.
Each bit is a kind of behaving and also represents (renders in bodylook) a behavior context.
Taking it as itself behavior, the sequence requires the same open cycle feedback as any behavior sequence. For example, the dance would stop at the edge of a cliff, or move around a boulder.
Every bit of our new sequence is doubled, it is two kinds of carrying forward, the VI type and our new bodylook VII type. I call this doubling.
On its behavior side our new sequence is a special case. First of all it seems rather simple--just certain movements, gestures, and sounds. Compared to complex behavior (e.g. nesting, tracking, etc.) gesture sequences can be very simple; just turning the body, or moving the arm, or a face muscle.
But the seeming simplicity must not fool us. These movements are doubled, they version (they reconstitute, are the having of) the behavior context in each bit. The sequence is both a simple movement and versions of the major bodily shift which the "animal gesture" was (the relevanting of some behavior sequence). What is rendered is here, going on in the body, being shifted, even if we observers don't see the behavior context and the behavior sequences being implied. We see only the (sometimes simple) movements.
Behavior goes on in behavior space, a "filled" (we said) space consisting of all the implied behavior sequences. The simple gesture movements go on in another space, bodylook space, or gesture space or simple movement space. But this space is doubled. It is the doubled space of simple movements. The behavior context is not being changed as it would in behaving. Rather, it is being versioned, rendered, sequenced, had, felt, while staying "the same." (Of course, this is also a major bodily change sequence, but not as behavior would cf the behavior context away into another behavior context.) We have generated a symbolic space, that is to say a double space, the space of movements that symbolize. The behavior context is versioned. Behavior is not going on. The movements do not, as movements, alter the implied behavior possibilities, the implicit behaviors, and the focally implied next behavior. Therefore these movements move in an empty space.
Pure movement exists now for the first time in our scheme, in what for the first time is an empty space, that is to say a space of pure movements. But we won't forget that this space of these sequences is doubled, it is also bodily the sequence of versions of the behavior context, the full space.
While the change made by the new kind of sequence isn't behavior, it is a bodily change. (Later we will remember this, when we understand than an initiation ritual, for example, really does physically change people into adults in a bodily way.) (This dance is not yet a ritual. See Section 1.) Similarly, healing rituals. Rituals (which we haven't yet defined) are not merely signs of something. For us, so far, a symbol sequence is bodily changes (a string of versions of the major kind of change which occurs when a behavior sequence is suddenly relevanted by an "animal gesture").
Our human being moves in a new simple movement space (three dimensions, just space and ground and the other's simple motions) as well as in the behavior-context in which the one turn was a fight-obviating gesture. The gesture-sequence occurs both in a simple movement-space and in the complex behavior context which it versions. The simple three dimensional movement space derives from here. The monkey always turned in complex behavior-space, not in the simple movement space which people can have, and in which they observe the monkey. The simple movement space (and thus most of the ways people have thought about behavior) is a human product, a result of the doubling sequence.
But this simple movement space is symbolic: simple movements version the behavior context. The sequence is a set of bodyshifts (feeling), which are versions of how the body is in that behavior context. This feeling, sequencing, and versioning is a new way of changing the "same" behavior context in all its complexity. A little motion of this kind is a string of versions of the powerful shift we noted, that an animal gesture makes.
This space is symbolic: a move of the arm is a feeling-versioning sequence of a whole behavior context and all its implicit sequences.
Raising the arm with the fist relevants fighting. The versioning sequence alters how fighting is implied. It alters the behavior context in a way behavior cannot do.
Think of yourself sitting in a meeting. It comes to a vote. By the simple raising of your arm you vote and perhaps alter your whole situation. Humans live very largely in terms of symbolic sequences. By signing your name in a certain spot you may alter your whole situation. These premature examples only show here that a behavior context can be altered by simple movements that are not physically related to it. Our dance sequence is the first kind of such a sequence. It does not yet provide any of these capacities. It forms only in the behavior context of which it is a versioning, and we don't yet know how it could form at any other place or time. It changes the behavior context in a new way, but we don't know what difference that makes; for example, if the dance versioned the fight-implying behavior context, we don't know how the fighting would be different (it would still be implied, the behavior context is "the same" after the dance is over). But the new sequence has the doubled character; it is both its own kind of behaving and moving, and also each bit is a version of a behavior context that is not being behaved in. It is about.
How did we achieve this? It was with bodily expressive looks and sounds and moves, which we see in the animals, but most of which have no function among them. We took this as a new kind of rendering. What the complex body in a given behavior context looks like gives humans a new way to feel and have how they are in the behavior context.
In VI, I defined "expression" in a too early way, along with "re-recognizing." Expression proper is at home here in VII. How the body is, in a given behavior context is expressed by the body-looks and sounds and moves.
There is an inherent tie between body-in-behavior-context and body-looks. For a given specie the body looks just how it happens to look, and sounds as it does, in the given behavior context. This is not a system made up by anyone. (How symbols develop beyond this expressive relation we will see in VII-B.) Here it is important, in order to understand the relation between symbols and the body, how there is a symbolic relation in the body's own nature.
Expression always involves being carried forward. We cannot call something "expression" from an external point of view only. Beautiful ice patterns are expressive to us, who are carried forward by patterns, but not to the ice. The animals express quite a lot, but except for special behaviors, these carry only us forward. The animals do not express, therefore, to each other. What does carry them forward is that they behave with each other. Or you might say for them behaving and expressing are not yet differentiated into two different levels.
We must therefore understand exactly how expressive patterns of body-look come to carry us forward. Then we will be able to look also at other patterns, not only those that derived from body-looks.
The new sequence can be called a gesture sequence in the true sense (whereas animal "gesture" is in quotation marks, not really a gesture). The new sequence can also be called symboling, behavior-context-versioning. I called the first such sequence that ever developed a dance sequence.
Once such a sequence is implied, a body-evev implies the other's look and sound and moves, which, if it occurs on the other body, carries this one forward.
Each evev of the sequence also, of course, still implies the next behavior which is not happening.
The body goes through a string of versions of "the same" behavior context. Behavior and behavior context don't have such a string. It is a cfing rendition of the behavior context as versioned--not as before.
What can this mean? The body is already in VI sentient and conscious of how it behaves. But now this behavior context is each time repeated in a slightly different version of a bodylook. The behavior context's occurring is already sentient, felt, and now this new sequence is a string of such felt behavior context versions. These consist of body-looks, not of the behavior context. The body, in this sequence, has feeling and perception of what it already feels and perceives, namely, its being in the behavior context. Oho! Our schematic has formed some concepts that can let us think about self-consciousness!
Sentience in ordinary behavior is of course conscious. Feeling and perception are conscious. In behaving the body is conscious of the changes in its environment and in itself that are the behaving. The behavior context (the way behavior space is, just then) is bodily implied, and as carried forward it is felt.
And now there is a sequence about what is felt, a new string of body changes and environmental changes (the en is now the body-looks) in which one sequences, has, feels . . . what one feels, namely, one's being in that behavior context.
Now to be very exact: it isn't right to say that the new sequence lets one feel about what one felt before. Exactly, the behavior context one feels is not the one from before, but the one that is being versioned now. It is not like looking back and perceiving and feeling what was, but more exactly the new sequence is doubled. The new sequence reconstitutes "the same" behavior context, as a result of versioning, and not as remembered or looked back to.
What we are self-conscious of is not what was before but a new creation of the self-conscious sequence. "The same" behavior context across the new sequence is of course related to the behavior context before versioning, but it isn't some mysterious reflecting, like a mirror, on what was already there. It is a new product.
I would be unhappy if you take away from this only that through bodylooks a sequence can be about a behavior context. It is really about something quite new, "the same behavior context" that results from the symboling sequence itself. Symboling creates a new world, as is well known and will become clearly thinkable here. Right here this is only a technical difference, we don't as yet see how this versioned "same" context is profoundly different. But later when we do see we will need to remember this technical point. What is really versioned is the versioned context that results from the versioning sequence.
Self-consciousness is not at all consciousness of literally what was there before, although we could not think about it without seeing the more exact relation in which versions of what was there make a new sequence from which a new "the same" falls out. What falls out? A pattern of body-look . . . doubled with a (not directly perceived) behavior context. What is felt is doubled. The pattern is of the same behavior context.
The body is conscious of the versions of the behavior context. (There are two "of" relations.) It feels (over a time-span) the feel of being in that behavior context without cfing it (as behavior would). What could only be a bit in a feeling-change sequence in-behaving, is now "the same" over a string of versions. So there is a feel of the feeling in that context, which could not happen before. Only a sequence of body-changes can be felt, and in behavior such a bit was not felt except as it was cfed away into a different one.
In this schematic so far we have developed three kinds of occurring into the implying which just was: body process; behavior; and now gesturing. In behavior the open cycle occurs and cfs by its version of what the body just was as b-en, how the body just changed or behaved. Gesturing is a pause in behaving. The bodylooks are a new kind of environmental rendering. When they occur they cf the body into feeling the behavior context it feels. Through this sequence and its bodylooks it feels itself feeling the behavior context.
The first animals who found themselves suddenly human in a versioning sequence must have had an exciting time of it, being self-conscious! Suddenly, in so moving each other, in so dancing, they were aware of being aware.
Of course this is only a thin scheme. So far we have only the beginnings of VII, and also in general concepts are just a scheme. I am not saying that this is all self-consciousness is. I am concerned with developing some concepts that can grasp some important aspects of how humans experience and think.
Here we have just become able to be exact about how symbols enable self-awareness. As cfing renditions they are the means, "the perceptions" of the sequence. Conversely, we can also say exactly how one can be aware of a symbol only in self-awareness.
Patterns carry forward a self-conscious process. Patterns cannot have an impact on us as patterns except by being about (something other than pattern), and they can do this only by carrying us forward, in a double way (both with this pattern, and also as a versioning of something). We feel ourselves feeling what it is about, and thus we feel ourselves feeling.
It will be clear here that self-consciousness is not, at least not to begin with, a consciousness of a self, as if the self were what we are conscious about. Rather, we are conscious of being conscious of whatever it is about.
There are special further developments in which we can perhaps employ the word "self," in a more usual way, but it will turn out to be very important to see that there is self-consciousness and a sense of self without there being an entity, a content, separate from other contents, that is said to be the self.
All this is too early for our rudimentary scheme, and yet it must be said here, because the concepts that will clarify and explicate the more complex developments in a new way, are being fashioned right here in this new way.
Of course, since we respond to patterns, we see them everywhere, and we explain much with them. But that is a question we must ask: why do patterns work as explanatory? Why can we predict nature by means of patterns? We will answer that question in VII-B. Here we are conceptualizing a way to think about how patterns carry out bodies forward and are also about. And we have seen the doubled carrying forward this involves.
Later derivatives might look like a floating symbol related to some denotation out there that it is about. We have to grasp first how a symbol, here a pattern, comes to have a power to be about, and to have this power to our bodies.
We will become even more exact in the next section.
So far our humans are human and self-conscious only in an interaction between at least two of them. The capacity to supply one's own body-look cfing comes later.
The body-look version is a kind of picture of the behavior context. Let me now try to say what a picture really is, and why a picture can only occur in VII.
Animals don't respond to pictures of something. The cat will either treat the picture of a cat as a piece of cardboard to sit on or to shove with its paw, or else, if the cat does recognize the pictured cat, it will respond to it as to a real present cat. (There may or may not be some very few exceptions in chimpanzees and then only with human training. I don't insist that the human/animal division is a sharp line; it might be a gradation.) To respond to a picture as a picture is to live an aboutness. A picture is of something that need not be present. To respond to a picture is different than to behave at the object pictured as if it were present.
When humans gesture, they do it in the versioned behavior context. It need not be physically present (but it is present in the new VII sense of being versioned). Humans can bring a behavior context about by versioning--they don't need it to be present literally. Since we have our bodies with us, we can make the sounds, moves and looks anytime and thereby put ourselves into that behavior context. It is the bodylooks that do the cfing (and not the physical behavior context being versioned).
But can't we find animal behaviors done with the bodylook?
The ethologist studying animals finds that when one bird spreads its wings and displays a certain red feather the other animal goes into the mating dance. This could happen anytime the ethologist spreads the other animal's wings or even displays a picture of such a wing with the red feather on it. Nevertheless, the dancing animal is not expressing about the sexual intercourse context but behaving in one and it is bodily getting ready to engage in intercourse. Even if the ethologist shows only a picture, the animal is not responding to a picture. There is no such level of responding and of course the red feathers are not normally displayed except in a behavior context leading to sexual intercourse. Thus the fact is artificial (observed by us in the sense of en#1) that the mating dance could be done at any time and in the absence of the sexual behavior context.
Traditional philosophy constructed human reality out of rational structuring and bits of sensation. This meant that since animals don't have rational structure (which was conceived of as floating forms imposed), they had to be mere machines. We find it hard to imagine how those philosophers reconciled this basic view of reality with their experience of animals. But, today, existential and phenomenological philosophy does nearly the same. There are two basic kinds of beings, humans with their possibility-sketching, and things which are mere results. I call it a "city philosophy," nothing but people and stones. But neither human reason, nor human life-projecting meets Being for the first time. The human is embedded in nature (and not at all a separate alienated pole, though we may think of ourselves that way). Reason and language are embedded in behavior and the body.
How animals are thought about is only a sign of truth or error, much as any other blatant error would lead one to reconsider.
Here it is clear that for animals there are the two levels of body-process and behavior sequences, but not yet the "aboutness" level. Although the aboutness level radically remakes the world, nevertheless there is an important way in which the higher animals have much of what we have but without the distinction. I have already shown that aboutness is not at all adding a mere reflecting, as though animals felt, but were not aware of feeling. One cannot feel except as a doubled feeling of.
For example, animals have empathy but it isn't on a separate "about" level. The animal will sense your mood and relate to you in it (but not about it).
The same answer needs to be given about particulars and universals in animals. (We will change the meaning of those terms drastically, anyway, in VIII.) Animals could be said to treat everything as universals, every tree the same way. Or one can say that animals don't respond to a class as such, but always only to this, here. The distinction doesn't exist yet. The animal mother's bodily changes, which she feels, when she runs to her young (or wants to) are not all that different from ours.
So it would be wrong to say flatly that a cat cannot feel about something that is absent. It is true that the male cat will either get angry (ready to fight), right now, if there is another male cat here, or the fight-readying will subside. The cat cannot sit at home and nurse its anger, as we can, by reconstituting a situation symbolically, and feeling in it.
But a day later, coming to the same spot where that other cat was, our cat will sniff and search. It behaves this looking for that cat, it is not separately talking about that cat. And neither we nor cats can gesture to our cat about that other cat.
Again here, shall we say that the cat relates only to a present cat, looked for now, or to the cat of yesterday who isn't here? It is an inapplicable distinction, there are not different levels.
Similarly, the fight-inducing "animal gesture" is not "about," it is behaving.
Behavior space now includes some sequences with pauses (dance, gesturing) in them.
When an object relevants such a sequence, and the other humans aren't there to form it with, the gestural pause is focally implied and cannot occur. The implied gestural sequence would function implicity in whatever does occur.
Say the first bit occurs, and then the sequence is still mostly implied, and if it cannot form, the first bit might occur again somewhat differently.
A new gestural sequence forms with the object, and pauses the behavior with it. It might be much or little, opening parts or something further.
VII-B will be more exact about this development. I must first let these developments develop so that they will form a cluster of concepts. As we then sharpen these, they will, in VII-B, enable us to be more exact about this development.
These gestures might be perhaps some grunts, or moves of the arm, or both, or some bit of dance. The object has occurred into this gesture-implying, and in the sequence that forms the object is also perceived differently. Now it falls out not only from the behavior, but also from the gesturing (the bodylook-bodylook carrying forward). What sort of object falls out from a double sequence? What of the object carries forward a body-look sequence? The object carries forward by its look, its sound, and its simple movement if it has any.
For the first time an object has a look, a sound, or just a movement, that is to say the humans have an object's look, sound, or movement.
The gestural sequence is doubled, so the object is still the behavior object, but in this sequence it carries forward by its look. I call such a doubled object a seen (for short, since it includes heard, moved, etc.).
The sequence thus has both the human's own looks, sounds and moves, and the object's, for its perceptual side.
Gestures are patterns. Such a look or sound is also a pattern. We shall say much more about patterns soon.
I don't know if this swiftly happens with all objects, or if at first such a seen sequence would form only with a special object. If the latter, our monkey who is human so far only during the dance would find this object very precious. The object would have the power to turn our monkey intermittently human again. It would certainly be a highly prized object.
There is now self-consciousness of the object, even when alone.
The object's look is symbolic. The object's look cfs in symbolic space, like the dancer. The look is a pattern in empty space.
One can now see an object as that kind of object (belonging to that behavior context) without behaving.
The object can be seen, sequenced, felt, for what it is in behaving, without behaving. (This includes: without behavior-readying which, for us, is also behaving.) The object is seen as that kind. (More about kinds shortly.)
As these seen-sequences (they are seen+gesturing sequences) multiply, behavior space now has many sequences that have seen-gesture pauses in them. Whether actually sequenced or not, they are implicit and carried forward indirectly in behavior. The self-consciousness-pauses are implicit along with the sequences they are in. As behavior carries forward, it implicitly carries them forward (it carries forward the evevs that include them). Such behavior is implicitly self-conscious. I call it action. Behavior contexts with such pauses are situations.
Most action will include some occurring versioning sequences. Most action will thus be paused at times and at these times it is explicitly self-conscious; at other times implicitly so.
j-1) Separate Senses
A seen is a pattern. It is not the food (say the object is food) but its look and sound. One cannot feed on a look or a sound. At first a seen does not resume behavior and is not sequenced in behavior, only gesturing. The seen is (for example) the configuration of the food. A seen is of. It is about. It is a versioning. A seen is a new kind of object, a kind.
The separation of the different senses (vision, hearing, smell) arises here. It is a symbolic product. Behaviorally the separation does not exist. No animal behaves with a visualness, or a sounding. Behavior is always with the bird or the cat. Only the human observer who can already separate and respond to visuals and sounds as such can notice that the bird reacts to the outline shape of the cat's head, or that the cat responds to the sound of a bird. The bird reacts to a cat, and the cat to a bird.
For example, ethologists find that the male of a certain species of small fish fights when it sees the red dot on the side of another male. The ethologist suspends a little white piece of cardboard with a red dot on it from a toothpick, and when the fish sees this it immediately begins fighting behavior. Doesn't this show that the fish do respond to a configuration of just color? But it is the ethologist who has discovered a just color configuration. For the fish it is another fish, not a red circle. (See later, on how scientific patterns are valid in nature.)
Only humans can hear "a sound" or see something that is only visual. To be only visual it must be a picture; even if it is the present object's look, or sound, it is taken as look, or sound. Of course something purely visual or auditory doesn't exist! A disjunction is made between, say the piece of cardboard which does exist, and the look of a person or a tree which is pictured.
The purely visual, or the sound, the smell - these are symbolic products, that is to say, they are possible only after, and because of, a having, sequencing, in a way that is not behaving - just as we don't behave with the mere look of a tree. We don't climb the look of a tree. Of course, once there is the having of a look, then the tree we climb also has the tree-look. We have developed concepts for the kind of sequence that is the having of a look, something purely visual. Only thereby does it become possible to divide the senses, and consider sounds as separate from sights and from smells, because only thereby are there sounds, sights, and smells.28
A visual, or a sounding (a seen) - these are universals. They are the sound of . . . or the look of . . . . We also say this is what the object looks like or sounds like. Or we say it has the look of a tree, or the sound of a bird, or a rifle.
Bodylooks and objects' seens are both symbolic of behavior contexts (and contexts are a mesh of mutually implying sequences, one of them focal).
The body look is how the human body looks in that kind of behavior context.
But we have not yet shown how a kind, or a likeness, might be sequenced and had as such. We won't be able to do that until VIIB. The seen is a look-like, but it doesn't enable the human to think (have, feel, sequence) the class of objects that look like that. The seen, the pattern, is a kind of universal, but for now we have only shown that a pattern can carry forward, that the humans can see and hear patterns. I will explain this difference exactly now.
j-3) Three Universals
A "universal" is something that "applies" in many "instances." To understand what a universal is we must also ask what an instance is.
We have agreed not to assume a reality that is neatly cut into classifications so that particulars are already grouped under class-definitions called "universals." Indeed, when we understand the derivation of all this, we will also think about it very differently indeed.
We are cutting deeper into the grounds of thinking.
How are events or things made in such a way that they fit "under" universals? What makes something an "instance?"
The history of philosophy from Plato on has much discussion of this question. Particulars "participate" in universals, Plato said, with a good deal of discussion of what that relation is. Particulars "imitate" universal forms, he also said. Aristotle, who established this schema, also viewed the highest cause as one that is "imitated." Kant viewed it as a question of grouping together or unifying. He only gave a formal account of how objects are made with reason's unifying, which is then also the way objects can be grouped. We want to grasp what kinds are, together with what instances of kinds are.
I call the kind of universals to which we are accustomed "third universals," or simply "thirds." Two more basic kinds must be understood, or we can't grasp what is involved in these usual ones.
The usual universal, for example a word (also a more technically structured concept), is used as such, and with its use some particular situation is thereby changed, or some particular object is reached. It seems that the universal could occur alone, without applying to a particular (though this would be very odd, for instance why would one say a word just alone? To illustrate a point in philosophy? To define the word? There is always a particular context as well as the universal.)
At any rate, the usual universals can actually occur, they can be had, sequenced as such (together with the particular). Such universals can also function implicitly, for instance when we act with a particular object, knowing it for the kind of thing it is, without thinking or saying that kind as such.
The two more primitive "universals" I want to discuss do not happen as such, as universals. When they actually occur, they don't function as universals. They function as universals only implicitly.
A new body-look versioning or "new expression" (the dance sequence) is a "first universal." It forms in a behavior context. But then it functions implicitly in the formation of many seen sequences (gestures during action, and patterns of objects that carry forward). A whole cluster of such "second sequences" forms, in all of which the "first sequence" applies. O course this is an odd (a too early) use of the word "applying." I call it "original applying."
But why call the new expression dance sequence a universal at all? I do so because it is the first step on the way to the usual universals. It is a pattern sequence and it is the same sequence functioning in many different instances.
We are now able to think just about this aspect of universals and particulars, how there is an internal relation between many different instances, and also between each of these and some same single sequence.
But this is so only because that single sequence has functioned in the formation of the many instances.
The sequence can of course also occur itself, and has. But when it occurs, it does not, as yet, function as what is similar in these different instances.
The many instances are different from each other. Each object has its own different pattern and gestures made with it. We could sort out the recurringly same objects, and separate them from the different ones. To do that we would use our capacity to sequence similarities as such, third universals.
The dance functions implicitly in the formation of the many different patterns of objects. The similarity of a given group (of instances that we would call "the same") is not the dance. It is a sequence we can have. We don't yet understand how we observers are able to do that, and now we are getting close to the point where we will be able to understand it. So we are not now blindly going to assume universals as commonalities externally imposed by observers on particulars. Instead, we want to grasp the internal relation among particulars that make them all instances, and their internal relation to the universal of which they are instances.
To understand this, we must grasp how these instances are made by, and with, the universal. We have done that. We have seen how a new formation can carry forward in a new way, the implying for an expression sequence that cannot, just then, occur. The expression sequence functions implicitly in the formation of the instance.
We thus have a "first" kind of universal, one which functions implicitly, and "applies" as it functions in the formation of what now occurs.
We saw there that we must not assume already-cut formed likenesses that determine how the past functions in the present. If that were so, the present could only be a rearrangement of the past, and the past could not have occurred at all (except as rearranging its past, and so on). We saw that a past is something that functions implicitly in a new way, in the occurring of a present. That is how past experience functions as it "applies." The applying is newly made.
We see the creation of instances in this kind of applying. The dance sequence functions implicitly to help form a kind of instance of itself as applying. All past experience does this, but the dance sequence is a pattern sequence. So a pattern sequence has newly applied to generate patterns of objects, and further gestures. These have in them the implicit functioning of the dance sequence patterns.
I call seens "second universals." They are still not the ones we are used to, those will be called "thirds."
Instances and universals must be made together, or at least grasped together.
Our likenesses here are developing in an odd order--we have (to think of it in the old way) instances of a commonality that hasn't yet itself developed. Universals used to be thought of as commonalities. By the time we develop these, you will see that commonality is a too poor way of thinking of them. Here now the seens are like the dance sequences, but there is as yet no way to sequence their likeness as such. They are not literally alike, but different formations from the same implied bodylook sequence. Their commonality has never formed as such, and wouldn't be the dance sequence exactly, even if we knew how likeness-as-such could be sequenced and had.
Without forming as a likeness as such, the patterns of objects and gestures are made as instances of an originally applying "first universal."
This is an instance of what, in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, I called "the reversal of the usual order" (which is really backwards). Metaphors do not depend on pre-existing likeness, rather a metaphor creates a new likeness. In metaphors such a likeness is a new third. Even so, we can be more exact about this formation now.
The metaphor creates the likeness with something else (the old literal meaning of the words) which functions in the new formation in this new and different context.
People want to think that a likeness, a third, is already in existence, so that one merely compares externally and notices the similarity without changing anything.
Instead, we see that something can function in the formation of something else, and thereby an internal relationship can come to be, between the new formation, and what functions in it.
We also see here that a likeness need not first occur in many places, in order to be externally noticed, and become a likeness. Any pattern is always already a look-like, a sound-like, a configuration, a pattern--something that has already come loose from the particular behavior-object. A pattern is already a picture, quite without anyone's external comparing as yet. It need not yet be a commonality, it is enough if it occurs once. A pattern is always a pattern of . . .
So far we have grasped this "of" (as the having of versions of a behavior-context via the sequence of body-looks, how the body looks in that context).
We have also grasped how such patterns then function implicitly in the formation of the patterns of objects and gestures. In seen-formation, the same body-look patterns which belong to one context, now function implicitly in many other contexts. The patterns are all variations of how the body looks in the one context, so the patterns are no longer expressive in these other contexts.
All patterns are likenesses. And yet, the kind of likeness we think of, the commonality as such, has not yet formed. Even without it, the many contexts and their patterns are internally related to each other, and to the "first" expression sequence.
The groundwork is now laid for the kind of sequence that would carry forward a whole kind, a whole class, and would be the having of the likeness as such, if only we knew how such a sequence would actually form.
Our scheme lets us think clearly, for the first time, about this major question.
In order that particular objects and situations be grouped "under" some rubric of comparison or likeness, the objects must be recreated so, they must be patterned. It cannot be that they are a lot of separate objects with traits, which are then grouped by someone from outside, who comes with grouping-forms. That mysterious person, and that application must be understood.
Objects don't remain the same, as if they are merely being compared and classified, unbeknownst to themselves, as if they were simply fenced in, or cross-indexed by floating ghostly abstractions. It has seemed so, because people put those universals first, which are really third. Before they can emerge, a kind of universal must be created with which the patterned things are re-recreated.
Kant saw that there must be an inherent reason why our forms apply to objects necessarily. He saw that the universal forms must have gone into the very making of the objects, and in this requirement he has to be right. But he simply insisted the commonalities, the grouping-forms (the thirds) into the objects. Since he knew what he was doing, he realized that this meant objects that exist only for an externally imposing comparer and grouper, the observer. He attributed the forms to "the human mind" and let it go at that. (The "mysterious depths of the human imagination.")
We are concerned with grasping this more deeply. The commonalities of judgments (all mortals, all cats, etc.) are to be distinguished from the "first" and "second" kinds of universals. Before likeness is had as such, pattern or likeness can be in two more basic ways, as body-expression and the way objects look, once humans are carried forward by such bodylook-expression.
Kant created the world de novo out of an encounter between reason-forms and sense bits. That is a kind of creation myth in which the mature philosopher's mind meets sense bits and they create the world together.
We do not need to say that the tree is made with grouping-forms, even though we already have these when we begin to philosophize. We see that patterns are an elaborate development, not simply assumed unifiers like paper clips or fence-enclosures. A pattern is symbolic, it is a way of versioning and having (feeling, sequencing) a complex situation (behavior context) by a simple movement. The behavior objects now carry forward human simple-movement sequences in empty space. The objects are remade, so that they have their own doubling patterns.
The object comes into human pattern space. More exactly: it is fallen out from many sequences and these have now acquired pattern-sequences as pauses in them. The object carries these forward as it can--with what thereby comes to be as its pattern or likeness. Given human body-look pattern sequences carrying forward, the object then has its own pattern (which is not at all arbitrary. It is the look of that object, once patterns can cf).
j-4) The pre-formed implicit (type a)
There is not yet a way of sequencing likenesses as "such." But these likenesses are already formed, only not as such. (Many more will form too, of course.) They are implicit. Something can be implicit in two ways: implicit type a will refer to what is already formed but never as yet sequenced. I call it pre-formed, or "type a."
Implicit type b will mean already sequenced.
A type a implicit sequence functions implicitly in certain ways, even though as yet it has never formed. Let us use a concrete example.
In flying into the wind, a bird perceives the wind but not "the sound of" the wind. Sounds, sights, temperature, have not been separated. The wind is the fallen-out in each of the mutually implicit behavior sequences.
When seens develop, the human can hear the sound of the wind, separately, as a sound pattern. Sitting somewhere out of the wind, the mere sound of the wind can be heard. That human can also look up and see the sheer patterns of clouds. The tree now has a look quite apart from behaving with the tree at all.
In the formation of the wind-sound, cloud-pattern, and tree-look the human bodylooks functioned implicitly. Into the implicit functioning of human moaning and singing occurs the wind, and now carries forward with its sound. Into the simple movement space of human body-look expression the tree comes and has its look of spreading and reaching. Clouds now have patterns.
But it is not the case that these humans as yet sequence (have, feel) the likeness between human moaning and the wind, or human reaching and the tree. Yet the patterns of wind and tree were made with the implicit functioning of the human patterns.
Later on there will be a sequence of having the likeness. Then the wind can sound like someone moaning, and the clouds can look like people. Right now the wind sounds like the wind, and the clouds have cloud patterns.
Another way to put it; the human moan occurs in one action context (situation), and the wind-sound occurs in a different action context. There is as yet not such context as "sequencing human moaning but in the wind-context" or "seeing human figures, but in the clouds." For this to be had, there must be a way to be in one context while really in another. We must exactly see this basic human capacity to do that, and we have not yet done so.
The implicit functioning of the dance in the generating of the seens has made the likeness, we can say. But is the likeness already there? No, it isn't there, it is a type a implicit.
So far, action and gesturing are distinct. Each goes on with the sequences of the other functioning implicitly. This means that any elaboration of one affects the other.
A new dance (a first universal or "first sequence"), when it then functions implicitly, makes for a whole gamut of new or altered seens and gesture-pauses in action. When a new dance again versions some behavior context, the above developments are part of the behavior context (action context). The new dance versions all that, and is therefore influenced by the developments of action.
In the next section we will see that action is more influenced than only by gestural pauses, and also in VII-B this distinction will change.
But even here we see a mutual influence.
A new dance is a new first universal. The many developments from it are a whole cluster of "second sequences" (or changes in sequences that were extant). Then the development would cease until a new first sequence provided a new type of pattern dimension for a new gamut of developments.
Let us leave this overly simple, until we can work with it and develop more concepts. Then we will return to make it much more exact.
This mutual relation, in a very different way, can still be seen today. Does art provide new dimensions of seeing and hearing, which then enable us to develop a host of ordinary things along new designs? Certainly yes. Does art mirror the already extant things, our machine age for example, and our ways of living? Also certainly yes. Art still versions what is, and yet also thereby generates new expression patterns. Later we will see how that is different from this rudimentary stage.
A layering develops, many tiers of new first dance, cluster of changes, and again new first dance. This layering removes the patterning more and more from recognizable human expressions as they would naturally be part of an original bodily expression. I will explain this better later.
Although animal behavior sequences form freshly (they are not taken from a repertoire) an observer could notice that certain gestures form in certain junctures. Similarly, a dance and also the gestural pauses in midst of action, often form at certain junctures. Although they are pauses and don't cf action-contexts, the action doesn't proceed until after they form. I call such gesture sequences "slotted."
Such a gesture sequence enables the action to proceed. (It is a detour in behavior, just as behavior was a detour in body-process.) Slotted gestural sequences and dances are rituals.
Not all gestural pauses are slotted, some form only once, or differently each time.
The dances function in generating a whole gamut of cultural forms. We can think with some clarity now about how a ritual generates a cultural context (as has often been said).
We also call "ritual" those pauses before or in midst of action, without which action no longer proceeds. These are seemingly unnecessary elaborations without which one does not eat, have sexual intercourse, or sleep, etc. These are not, as they might be today, just extras. They enable a physical change, a bodily change without which the rest of the action is not focally implied and would not form.
We see here how, at least at this early stage, an initiation ritual, for example, changes one bodily into an adult, and without it that would not happen in the same way.
Even we today might have our appetite spoiled if certain cultural forms are not observed first, and then we could not eat, or at least not equally well.
We are working through with a mesh of sequences, ways of being carried forward, implied by the body. We can think about this implicitly functioning mesh.
On the other hand, those who see ritual not as creative of culture, but as mirroring the kinship structure and the modes of hunting, and so on, are right too, as each new dance is a string of versions of the action contexts. But we recall that these versions are bodily moves, only symbols of the action contexts. Nevertheless bodies who perform certain actions would then also dance and bodily express differently. The relation is through the body, not a borrowing of forms or patterns directly.
Rituals as first dances can be understood as generative or, when they recur, as re-generative of cultural forms.
Are these rituals "spontaneous" or "very mechanical" and routined? Both. The ambiguity comes from our use of the word "spontaneous" which means both "without deliberation directly from the body," and also "unforced." In this double meaning lies hidden one modern longing for action that will be as full-bodied (fully cfing) and another modern longing for individual novelty and creativity. Indeed, it is going to be one of our questions, just what a "new expression," a "new first sequence" for us today would be. For reasons that will appear in VIIB, it can no longer be a dance or a work of art that recreates the whole cultural mesh.
The rituals we are discussing were majorly cfing and full-bodied, compared to current cultural action. But we would think them very rigid, if we observed them. They must have happened mostly just so--not because one obeyed rules, but because they formed, by recurrent causation, in the same way, though quite freshly. Both action and gesture would strike us as highly fixed, even though great elaboration has developed, compared to animal behavior.
The capacity to stop and deliberately do something else than always forms, has not yet developed. The pauses in action, and the capacity to have (feel, sequence) action-contexts is one ingredient of the capacity to act deliberately. But these pauses still form freshly, they cannot yet be called in, or used, as it were, to think and decide to do something else.
At what point in these developments language begins and just what it adds, we will see in VII-B. Right now we cannot say.
So far we have kept action and gesturing distinct, the latter being pauses in the former. But it is obvious that action cannot remain unaffected by the fact that every action-object also implies seen sequences.
Animals make things, nests, beehives, spider webs, etc. But humans make by rearranging the patterns of things.
The highest apes can barely put one stick into the hollowed-out end of another stick, to reach a banana. They are not carried forward by the patterns of things. (There is a gradation here too, but no separate pattern sequencing.)
We don't want just to announce that humans can do that, we want to understand it.
We can already think of the human way to pause behavior, to have (feel, sequence) the action-context by gesturing.
We can also think clearly how objects come to cf our pattern-implying and so becomes themselves patterned.
We understood how pure visuals, pure sounds and movement patterns come loose, so to speak, from the behavior objects, and can be sequenced and had.
The patterns can form sequences which the behavior-objects could not (and the action-objects cannot either). The tree-pattern is sequenced in many ways that the tree is not.
But we will not simply say that humans can imagine the object looking very different from how it now is in front of them. That is what we wish to understand.
We formulated (in VI) the concept of "kination," realizing clearly there that behavior space is wider than what appears in a physicalist sense before the animal. It includes the space behind, since it is the body's implying of the mutually implicit behavior sequences. Turning back, and backing up are among such sequences along with what else might be behaved after that. This derived a kind of imagination for us which we called "kination." We thus transcended the traditional split between perception and imagination. There is no great difference whether something is presently impinging on sense organs or not, if it is in the behavior-possibilities-space.
Once pattern-cfing objects are part of action, the sufficiently long stick is focally implied, if the available sticks are too short. A stick (that is to say, anything with that pattern) is focally implied, if something were too far to reach. The focally implied pattern functions in whatever else one perceives. One looks up into a tree and sees one's stick there, one pulls it down and tears off the leaves and extra branches.
At first, such making develops slowly, since only few patterns have formed. As more form, making accelerates.
So we have a second definition of imagining, in addition to kination (the senses were not yet distinguishable in kination). Rather, in addition, we have the capacity to cf and focally imply patterns, that is to say visual configurations, sound configurations, movement patterns.
The patterns of things and of human movements are of course related. The thing carries forward implicit human sequences, and does so with is own pattern. It has a visual, auditory, or movement pattern only as it does so.
Thus we can gesture a stick, either by moving as if we had one in our hands, or by extending our hands and implying the shape of a stick. Imaging in this sense is pattern-cfing, patterns are never real, anyway, as if they were just there, physically, alone. Seens are inherently images in this sense.
Making is a kind of gestural pause in action. One is not reaching for the bananas while making a stick. Or if the stick is for walking, one is not walking while making it. Making requires pausing action, that is to say versioning action. One must of course have (feel, sequence--here version) the action-context or one would not know why one wanted a stick, anymore.
So far as we have come, it is true that after the bananas are reached, the stick would lose its meaning. We don't yet have "third" sequences by which the general useful category of sticks would be had (felt, sequenced). So far a tool is meaningful only in an action context in which it is focally implied. Was there actually such a stage? Some years after these concepts developed I learned that for millions of years people made hunting tools and left them at the hunting sites. Only very much later are tools found at home sites, that is to say they were brought home and saved. This is certainly corroborative of these concepts.
We need a term to hold, for us, that a sequence does not lose its individuality when it functions implicitly. It can still recur as itself, despite functioning in the mesh of mutually implying sequences. I call it "meshed."
A sequence is a string of contexts. Each context is a mesh of mutually implicit sequences. We also spoke of them as possible sequences, behavior possibilities and now gesture-possibilities.
With further developments the contexts of our sequence now include new implicit sequences. When the sequence recurs, it isn't quite the same. New sequences have become implicit in ours, and ours in them.
Another way to say this: by functioning implicitly in the formation of new sequences, the sequence is itself changed. What it functions implicitly in, comes to be implicit in it. Or, we can say, every new way it can "apply" (function in) comes to be implicit in it.
Such a mesh is pyramided (see VI) and layered, as we just saw. One might think that the sequence can never recur as it was, since its contexts are now different. A sequence is a string of contexts, hence if these contexts now include new sequences, then even if the sequence might look the same to an observer, it is a string of newly enriched contexts, not the string of the old ones.
How then, can the sequence ever again occur as it was before the newer sequences became part of the contexts?
We see, first, that it is ambiguous to speak of "the sequence" having changed, and now having something further more implicit in its contexts. We say ambiguously, that "it" now has implicit in it, the new way it is functioned. This is not literally the same sequence. When "it" recurs, really a new sequence occurs that has never yet formed.
A mesh of mutually implying sequences is pyramided (see VI) and layered as we just saw. It is not on one layer or level or plane only. New sequences develop so that they become focally implied instead of the previous, but if the new one cannot occur, the previous one still can. (See VI.)
A meshed sequence is always still literally implicit, as it originally was, as well as in its new form.
An actually occurring sequence is freshly formed; ("use" of standard sequences as in a repertoire doesn't develop till VII-B. Even then there is always a fresh bodily eveving.) The bodily eveving determines what occurs, or rather, is the occurring.
Under certain circumstances this bodily implying can still be that of the original sequence. Such circumstances are quite special, but a "meshed" sequence is always in a pyramided-upon way still there, in its original form, as well as in the present, fully eveved mesh.
The term "meshed" is about "both . . . and." "It" is both further developed, altered, as new developments occur, as it functions implicitly in eveving, and also still itself a behavior possibility in its original form, if what has developed since, cannot occur.
Drugs, hypnosis, sleep stimulus-deprivation, and other conditions are such that much of the usual whole eveving cannot occur.
Very primitive sequences that usually never occur for humans, still can, and so can what happened on one's fifth birthday. (Of course the body is different than it was then, but the sequence as it originally was is still there, given that now it can occur only via special conditions that make it impossible for the whole mesh to be bodily lived. Hence these conditions are largely bodily changes.)
By participating in further eveving, therefore, a sequence both is, and is not changed.
We must allow this concept to function and apply for us, for a while so that we can later define it more clearly, when it will have acquired applications.
o-2) Implicit Functioning
To function is to occur--but the sequences that "function implicitly" do not occur, rather just this one occurring sequence does. There are two ways of phrasing which together make this problem:
In one way of phrasing (which I will continue to use) we say inaccurately that "the sequence functions implicitly." A more exact phrasing would be: "a sequence functions implicitly only in so far as it succeeds in participating to shape what occurs." If the sequence functioned in every respect, then it would be occurring. The eveving going on now would be the eveving of its first bit, and the next, and so on. But "it" doesn't function as itself, a different eveving is now going on, and only in so far as our sequence participates in that, is it functioning now.
This is how we made the concept of "eveving" in IV. It is what we get when we don't assume fixed parts that determine what happens by keeping their own nature fixed (so that the result is determined by them all). Instead, eveving is a new making of parts as well as "relations," so that if we trace an old part into eveving, we would say that "it" functions only as determined by the new event, and not as fully determined by its previous character as the part it was. So, when "it," the part, functions implicitly, then really not all of it does, but only what is determined to participate by the new eveving.
Further, we saw many times since then, that there is novelty in this "insofar as it participates in the new event." The new event is really new, or can be. It is always fresh, so far as we have developed concepts, and we have as yet no concepts for a "use" of a repertoire of anything. The observer may see an event that is just like a previous one, but the event is fresh to itself. (We don't yet know how to think about the observer's capacity to sequence [have] a similarity as such. We could, of course, employ our own capacity to do this, to think, and then later come to grasp how we do that. But our model fundamentally avoids assuming that everything comes in pre-existing already-cut and fixed parts.)
The effect of a sequence functioning implicitly need not be something that was already part of the sequence. (For example, thrashing in V.) Nor will it be totally unrelated to that sequence. (For example, in V thrashing happens when walking in water is attempted. The movements are wider and different than in walking.)
So we cannot divide in the sequence between the "insofar as it functions now" and the "insofar as it does not." To try to divide the sequence is to assume that it can function only as how it itself was, and its effect now must have been part of it. And it needn't have been!
The contexts (or bodily evevs and environmental cfings) of the occurring sequence do occur. And yet also, a context is a mesh of implicitly functioning sequences. If we were to say that these do simply not occur, then the occurring sequence wouldn't either. A context is the occurring body-event and en, but these imply many sequences and each is a specific eveving of all these sequences.
So the implicitly functioning sequences do occur insofar as they participate in the shaping of this occurring one.
Any of the other sequences (now implicit) would also be a string of contexts that would carry this (now occurring) one forward, but they would carry it forward differently.
As the ongoing sequence carries the context forward, all the implicit ones are still implicit, now somewhat differently.
If another sequence has occurred instead, it too would have changed how all these sequences are implicit, but would have done so differently.
Thus the way the implicit sequence functions is not directly part of it. The ongoing sequence changes the context of the implicit one, but it doesn't change it as the implicit one itself would have done, had it occurred. If we wanted to compare the difference, we could not do it in terms of the implicit sequence alone. We cannot get at its implicit functioning by making divisions within it.
How a sequence functions implicitly is not a way that it can function as itself.
It helps to reiterate that a sequence is a forming. A sequence consists of a string of evevs, as we conceived of it. So the sequence itself is the forming that it is, and therefore, if it were the only forming that is happening, then it would be occurring itself. If the sequence functions implicitly, it means that the events are formed not just by it, the eveving is more, and therefore how the sequence functions implicitly is not just up to it.
Again, this shows that we cannot divide in the sequence what does, and what does not, participate in the new eveving, because how the sequence functions is made in the new eveving and may not have been in any sense in the sequence before.
It is the first law of explication that an explication has more or different parts than what occurred when what is now explicated "was" implicit. In typical cases of "explication" there are more parts. If you are asked to explicate a sentence you have written, you understand that you are asked for a number more sentences. In this way "your point" will now be explicit in terms of more meaning units than it was in the one sentence. (See comprehension.) Here I have said "more or different" parts, because for us "explication" has a wider meaning and application.
We saw in IV that something is schematized by schematizing. The implicitly functioning sequence is itself changed by so functioning. Its shaping effect is not, as we just saw, part of itself. Something new happens to the sequence when it functions implicitly. New roles for past experience are made in present process. In so far as it now functions, it now occurs. When it recurs as itself, it may be quite different. At any rate it will have implicit in it the sequence in which it just now functions implicitly. The now occurring sequence will then be part of the context.
Since a sequence does not function implicitly simply as itself, there is a distinction to be made. As we saw, it is not a division within the sequence.
Let me call "insofar as" the sequence does not function implicitly by saying that in that regard it is "held."
Let us now push the question a step further. If a sequence functions implicitly, are the sequences implicit in it also now functioning implicitly? And those implicit in the implicit ones, and so on?
The question needs to be stated more exactly so that we can see if we have already answered it.
We have already seen that the sequence functions implicitly only insofar as it actually participates in the eveving, that is to say in the shaping, in the formation of the occurring sequence. So our question, more exactly, is: Insofar as the implicit one functions, do all those implicit in it too, and in turn those that are implicit in the implicit ones in it?
The question comes down to this "insofar." Does it include also the "insofar" of the sequences implicit in the implicit one, and so on? The answer is yes, one "insofar" (one eveving--that of the occurring sequence) determines also the function of the sequences implicit in the implicit one. But, if the implicit sequence were itself to occur, then how those implicit in it would function, would be different.
Thus the sequences are not implicit as fixed parts would be. Of course, this is what we have said all along. Each sequence is a different eveving. The many sequences are all implicit in each other, but "they" are not the same, when they function in different evevings.
If we said earlier that all sequences are mutually implicit and each is a string of the context, made up of all of them, we need now to introduce the concept of "held." All implicit sequences are in some respects "held" and in some functioning implicitly. What this actually means is not the same from one sequence to the next. Otherwise they would all be the same and everything would always function, and in the same way.
If the implicit sequence we discussed were to occur, it would make a new distinction between "held" and functioning implicitly. (Its eveving would do that, rather than that of the sequence occurring now.)
Thus it is eveving which makes the distinction in each case, and this is another way to define "eveving."
The following will show this point in more steps and in more detail:
Let me begin with assumptions that the old model would lead us to make, and then correct them.
One might be inclined to think that what is implicit in an implicit sequence, is itself functioning implicitly. If the implicit sequence actually occurred, nothing new would be implicit in it, which wasn't implicitly functioning already (when the sequence was implicit). Then, by explicating, nothing new would become implicit. However much one explicated, still only that would be implicit which was implicit in the first place.
Of course, one would say, one gets to understand one's point better by explicating it more and more, but nothing further would come to function implicitly, as one did so.
We are finding, on the contrary, that as one explicates, new aspects come to function implicitly, which did not, before (when the now occurring sequence was only functioning implicitly).
In the above assumption one treats "what functions implicitly" as fixed pieces which somehow are thought to move from darkness into the light. (All along we have said that implying is not like that. The implicit is not of the same sort as the explicit, only hidden--or only "not yet.")
We must also remember that bodily formation (and all sequences are that) is not made up of sequences. It implies sequences, and more exactly, implies itself being carried forward in some way. So we cannot do what the old model would lead to. We cannot think of bodily eveving as if it consisted of fixed parts, namely, the sequences themselves. Rather, a new formation always forms, even if it looks familiar to an observer. The body generates sequences, it is not sequences, not explicitly structured parts.
If everything that would be implicit, if a sequence occurred, were already functioning implicitly when the sequence functions implicitly, then all sequences would really be the same. It would mean nothing that something was explicit, and something else implicit; that would be an illusory distinction.
For us, occurring and implicit are one event. This occurring sequence is different events than if another were occurring. Since the sequence is an eveving of the others, it is a different eveving than they would be. The context, which implies them all, actually occurs, but it is this sequence's eveving, and the next bit is this sequence's focal implying, carried forward. It is not how the other sequence would change the context. What is eveved and occurs as this sequence is what determines exactly which other sequences function implicitly and how.
If one of the now implicit sequences actually occurred, its eveving (its contexts) would be actually occurring, and how other sequences actually function implicitly would be different.
Let this be our second law of explication:29 To explicate what functioned implicitly allows something else to function implicitly, which might not have been implicit before.
This might have been "held" before. Or, it might be new.
As I said in A Theory of Personality Change, if what now functions implicitly in a person is responded to, and made to occur as a carried forward process, then other aspects which were not even implicit, are thereby reconstituted and become implicit.
The distinction between "held" and "functioning implicitly" is neither within the sequence (which we already showed), nor between those sequences that do, and those that do not, now function implicitly. To so view it is to assume fixed parts lasting through change, again. How a sequence functions (really, what it is) is determined differently in each eveving. We have also several times showed how new sequences can come to be implicitly before they ever occur (type a implicit).
What is "held" does not participate in shaping occurrence, and is not changed by occurrence. (Except in the twisted sense that its absence might, by an observer, be thought to influence the occurrence.)
All this has important consequences for understanding and rethinking "the unconscious."
It is vital that we don't read the old model into our new terms. If we did that we wouldn't really have new terms, just new words. The implicit, and explication have never been clearly thought about, just because concepts were all modeled on the explicit formed, only, so that the implicit had always to be construed as if it were of the same sort as the explicit, only hidden. It is therefore very important to allow our concepts to develop clear and sharp internal structure, as they have just been doing.
This term will help us further understand what is usually called "imagination," but I cannot turn to that until near the end of this section.
We have already used this term. A sequence "reconstitutes" the context which it versions. Each bit of the sequence is a version of the context (an eveving), and the sequence as a whole is a way of having (feeling, sequencing) the context. I say the sequence reconstitutes the context.
We can now see more exactly that the context actually occurs. The sequence is the string of contexts which reconstitute the-context-as-had. When an object falls out, this doesn't mean that the object occurs and the contexts are only implicit, they also occur. For example, when the cat tracks the bird (as in VI), this bird stands steady as the scene moves rapidly by (as the cat runs to keep the bird steady). The whizzing by scenes do also occur, or the bird would not fall out from them.
This becomes confusing, because we also say that a context is a mesh of implicitly functioning sequences.
We have just straightened this confusion out, since we found that insofar as a sequence actually functions implicitly, it does occur. Implying and occurring are one real event, together.
What made us think the implicitly functioning sequences didn't occur? It was because we didn't have the term "held" and the distinction between it and "implicitly functioning." If we talk of "implicit sequences," then there are ways in which they occur, and ways in which not. And we have now distinguished these. "Implicitly functioning" is thus much more specific than just "implicit."
The "reconstituted" context can be said to "fall out" from the sequence as truly as the object does. The cat runs in a scene that is perceived as steady and even unmoving, despite the fact that it whizzes by and bops up and down! (Kant already remarked on this difference between subjective and objective perception.) The "reconstituted" scene is the steady one, the "kept same" one, in which the cat runs after the bird.
Each bit, each version of the context consists of implicit sequences which, if any occurred, would change the context their way. Instead, it is being changed in this sequence's way. Either way, contexts occur, they are not merely implicit.
We always fundamentally meant that anything "implicit" functions importantly, and is an important real aspect of an occurring event. It is the notion of "held" that is new.
If the contexts are changed as a sequence changes them, by cfing, I call this simply "carried forward." But when an implicit sequence's contexts are changed, not as it would, but the occurring sequence changes them, I say the implicit sequence is being "indirectly carried forward." I need this term since the implicitly functioning sequence is now being changed in this occurring. How it can happen, at each point in the occurring sequence differs. The context in which it would occur is being carried forward and reconstituted by this sequence.
Our second law (about reconstituting) is now shown. The sequence which does occur, does also change what functions implicitly. We already saw that, and see it now in terms of the context which the occurring sequence reconstitutes.
What is "held" does not function, does not occur, and is not indirectly carried forward. It remains the same. If in another sequence something new is explicit, something new also functions implicitly. Therefore what was held in the previous sequence may now function implicitly.
|directly carried forward||implicitly carried forward
indirectly carried forward
|not carried forward|
|the occurring sequence, the string of contexts or
evevs constituting the occuring sequence
versioned behavior context or action context, as in dance and seens
|the implicitly functioning sequences which constitute the contexts or evevs of the occurring sequence are cfed by the occurring sequence||"held": how the implicitly functioning sequence is not functioning; whatever is not in the occurring evev|
The eveving, the occurring, makes the distinction between what occurs and what does not.
Occurring is not just one among a system of separate possibilities. Occurring changes what the old model would use as determinative. What the sequences themselves are and can be is altered, added to, by occurring.
When we say that some old sequence functions implicitly and is thereby altered, is it the old or the altered sequence which functions implicitly? It is the altered one. Evev is already how the differences have made differences to how they make differences (IV).
An occurring sequence changes the other sequences as possibilities (and they have not yet themselves occurred in that changed way).
In participating in the formation of seens and action-objects, the dance sequences are altered. Conversely, a new "first" dance alters all or many of the sequences implicit in the action context it versions. When these implicit sequences (gestural pauses and actions) occur it will be differently. But this difference occurring, too, will further alter the next dance.
The change is not all finished by the dance. As the changed sequences themselves occur, their different evevs make a further change.
(This is an important principle we will need later: the actual occurring of a type a implicit sequence makes further change.)
Not only are the bodily evevs changed, but also the implied (open cycle) environment too, and how it can carry forward. There new dance implicitly alters the looks and sounds of objects and of the people gesturing at the objects. What new sounds and moves they will make, and what patterns they will hear and see, is changed in the dance in a type a implicit way.
Behavior space (action space) is not just bodily implied, but the eveving of the environmental occurring, which occurs into that implying. Eveving is just that.
Let us now see how this helps us with "imagination." The puzzle of it seems to be, how the body can create an environment that is physically absent. We have already seen that the body always does so in more developed behavior space (end of Chapter VI). Many possible sequences, which are implied by the body and en that now occur, are moves backwards or behind the animal, for example. There are objects in its behavior space which it doesn't see, but would see, if it turned, or went a certain way. These are occurring in its space.
Our term "reconstituted" says exactly in what way behavior space or action space occurs, and in what way the implicit sequences do, and do not, literally occur.
The whole space is directly carried forward. The behavior possibilities from it that are implicit, are indirectly carried forward and thereby altered. The animal behaves (the occurring sequence is) in the reconstituted space. (That space occurs, it is not implicit.) It would not be behavior space if it did not consist of implicit behavior-possibilities, but these actually occur as this sequence's evevs and environments. (From the start, implying is an aspect of real events, as is occurring.)
With symboling there is an added question: are the reconstituted behavior contexts actually occurring, or only the patterns and body-looks? Although one may literally see only the seen patterns or dance moves, the behavior-context that they version, is reconstituted, and does occur. Let me show that exactly.
The doubled symboling sequence keeps a behavior context "the same," by versioning how the body is (and looks and moves) in that behavior context. The symbol sequence reconstitutes that behavior context (the body's being in it). The behavior context occurs, each doubled bit is a version of it.
Therefore we must not say that in a symboling sequence the behavior context is implicit. It is occurring. It is reconstituted (and had, felt, sequenced) by the symboling. One lives in that situation, when one symbols it.
If this were not so, if the versioned behavior context were implicit, it would be the same as all the other contexts that are mutually implicit. One could not know which context is being symbolized (versioned). For instance, in making something (VII-A.m)) a pattern versions the present action context. Of course one is in that actually occurring context. We would not feel (cf, have) the symbolized context, the one we are in, if symboling didn't reconstitute it, as occurring in each versioning bit.
We have not yet reached the stage at which humans can live in a situation that is not physically present. (Although even higher animals live in a space that far exceeds what is physically present, it is always the present one.) In VII-B we will see how that stage develops, and we will remember that the reconstituted context is not dependent only on what is physically and literally impinging.
If there were ever a reason that one would come up with gestures that reconstitute an absent situation, if we knew how such gestures would ever form, then we would also know how humans can be in situations that (by the old model) we call "imagined." We will say "live in" the next hunt, and not only in the home-going context in which they actually are, when they decide to take the tools home. But we will see that this is not a small change. Most of what we still miss in our new humans develops along with it.
Again, for us the stakes are not in the correct natural history. On the contrary our concepts will help further discoveries of that. The stakes for us are to grasp what exactly is involved in these human capacities, and just exactly how the various aspects are inherently connected in each other. All we can say is that the new sequence would be pertinent (see V) to the stoppage.
Modified 10/2001 (c) 1998 by Eugene T. Gendlin. All Rights Reserved. webmaster