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CHAPTER VIII-A:  THINKING WITH THE IMPLICIT

Chapter contents:

a) Introduction
b) Direct Referent and Felt Shift
c) The New Kind of Sequence
d) Relevence and Perfect Feedback Object
e) Schematic of the New Carrying Forward and the New Space
f) Rapid Statements of Points that Instance Direct Referent Information
    f-1) How an VIII sequence makes changes in the VII-context
    f-2) Any VII-sequence from the Direct Referent is like a new "first" sequence
    f-3) "Monad"
    f-4) VII-statements from a Direct referent instance that Direct Referent
    f-5) The new "universality" of the Direct Referent
    f-6) The old universality of VII is implicit also
    f-7) The whole VII-complexity is carried forward and universalized in the new way
    f-8) The Direct Referent was not there before Direct-Referent-formation
    f-9) Direct context crossing makes novelty but still instances the lack
    f-10) Many words, like "direction," are used in an IOFI way in VIII
g) Additions to (f)


a) Introduction

"For hours I would stand quite still, my two hands folded between my breasts, covering the solar plexus. My mother often became alarmed to see me remain for such long intervals quite motionless as if in a trance--but I was seeking and I finally discovered the central spring of all movements, the crater of motor power, the unity from which all diversities of movements are born..." (Isadora Duncan, My Life, Liveright, N.Y.: 1927, p.75.)

Isadora Duncan stands still, sometimes for a long period. She senses dance steps she could move into, but they don't feel right. What would feel right is not sure yet. She is "seeking," she says above, looking for, waiting for the right feel to come, willing to let it come.

This seeking, waiting for, looking, and letting is a kind of action. It is a way of relating to, interacting with ... What? Where? It is interaction with a right feel, a new kind of feel which will come in a new place.

This feel, and this new space, are both made in this very interaction. (This is an instance of our principle "interaction first": Only from the interaction do the participants come. A new kind of interaction makes new participants. See IV-A.)

Her new looking, waiting for, letting... These change what comes, but it is still not right. She responds to its changed way of feeling by being differently toward it in some way. She points to a facet of the feel of what she would dance, pursues it. In response to the pointing and the pursuing, the feel itself becomes more distinct, like something there, a datum, an object, something in a space that wasn't there before.

As it forms, the "feel" understands itself, so to speak. It carries its own "yes, yes..." with it. She is "in touch with herself" in a new way-not just a self that was there before, waiting. Rather, a new, changed, more right "feel" is there, and is the "being in touch with." Then she dances what she could not have danced before.

The dance itself is the kind of sequence we took up in VII. What is new in kind is the formation of this new kind of "feel," the sequence she goes through while standing still.

How is this formation different from how a new dance might develop in VII? There too new sequences develops from the body, but without the long pause in Duncan's description. Novelty develops in VII directly, in a way I there called "directly cross-contextual" (dir-c-c-). What I so named is this: the body has, of course, the whole of the usual contexts implicit. When the body changes so that something new is implied and required, there is a crossing between this extant system of contexts and the new way the body is. The body directly bodies out a new sequence, without first the pause we are now discussing.

In this new pause there is a new kind of "feel." But in VII too there are feelings. Let me recall how we thought about these. Having a feeling is a sequence, a string of events that take time (make time.) In VII one has a feeling only along with the VII-type of symbols; one uses words or one imagines actions, and only so does one have the feeling in a private sequence. Therefore, it was possible in VII to have a feeling first, and then dance from it. How is our new sequence different? The difference lies in the new kind of formation of a new kind of "feel."

Our section VII concerns traditional culture as it was for most people until fairly recently. "Culture" can be defined as the structure of situations, the patternings of human interaction. Culture is very many contexts implicit in each other. Contexts are situations. Situations always involve interaction (even being away from others, being alone, interacting with oneself, these are special cases of interaction.)

Feelings of the usual kind are part of how our situations are culturally structured. We have the feelings, and by "have" I always mean a sequence, a stretch of time-we have them in certain "slots" in the interaction. The usual, culturally patterned interactions would not continue on their regular way if one of the participants failed to have the "slotted" feeling. If you do not feel respect for the saint, chagrin when called to order by the authorities, pleased when given a gift, (and so on,) the culturally structured interactions would then fail to work, to continue as usual. Your body would then imply something else, rather than what usually happens next. Either nothing further, or something else would happen. (Even pretense is something else, of course.)

Thus, the sequences of feeling, although often private, are part of the routines. If someone defeats you in some conflict, the cultural pattern may call for you to feel frustrated anger and also not show it. Despite this privacy, the other participants have your private sequence implicitly as part of the situation they are also in, with you. How you and the others interact later on will then make sense to all, on the basis of what you have lived together here. Thus our private inner life is largely an inherent part of our patterned situations with others. (see VII-B)

Aside from such actual sequences during which we feel, there is of course also the simpler fact that any action (and, in animals, any behavior) involves feeling, but not as a separate sequence. Any action or interaction is a carrying forward of the body and so we feel our actions. I call such feelings the "in-behavior" or "in-action" type.

Since cultural situations are very complex, and each situation implicitly involves others too, which are also complex, a very great deal more is bodily lived and felt in this "in-action" way, than is ever sequenced as such in those rather few "slotted" sequences we consider our feelings.

This whole complexity is carried forward by an VII sequence, since it is implicit in every sequence. However, it is never felt as such. Neither slotted feelings nor in-action feelings are a feeling of the whole system of contexts as such. Implicitly, each carries that whole forward in a certain way, but another sequence would carry it forward in a different way. Each goes on in the implicit context that includes all the others, and therefore each is within the whole context of the others. In VII there cannot be a having of the whole, except as implicit in either this sequence or that.

Now, I am going to show that an VIII sequence carries the whole forward, and is the having of that whole. The new "feel" is a feeling, having, sequencing, of the whole. Let me work up to showing this.

Take a VII example: See how the whole is not felt or had in the way I mean, although it is implicitly carried forward in some one way. For example, once I found myself grinding my cigarette out on the table top. It was what some people would call "very expressive." As I did it, I felt what I was doing, of course, and I felt the situation that led up to it (as we do in any ordinary action.) But I did not do what Isadora is describing. I did not let a feel of the whole situation form for me, first, and then act from it. I had and felt the whole situation only in-action, in this spontaneous act. I had to go back afterwards to try to see what made me do it.

Of course, what I felt was anger, but that is too simple. Emotions "break back," as we saw in VII, that is to say they don't usually carry forward (meet) the whole situation. (That is why we often regret later what we did emotionally. Other facets of the situation, which were not carried forward, are then in evidence.) So even if I had first felt my anger (in a private, slotted sequence) I would not thereby have felt the whole situation. My spontaneous behavior also did not carry the whole situation forward. No sequence in VII symbols ever does, whether the symbols are verbal, or pictured and imaged, or acted out as in this example. Something new did occur (I don't usually do this,) but it was not what happens in Isadora's pause.

Duncan could have danced in this spontaneous way without waiting. Or she could have danced from any point during her waiting. Some dance would have arisen. Instead, she engaged in something else.

At each new moment after pausing she senses the whole context directly, as a "feel" (which isn't quite right.) No previous kind of sequence we have considered could do that.

We noticed that the space in which Duncan seeks her source of a right movement has some features in common with an interpersonal interaction space. She interacts with some "feel" even before it is quite there. She seeks it, looks for it, waits for it, lets it come, pursues and points to what has come, senses its rightness or wrongness, even before it is clearly marked as an it. These are like activities one might do in relation to a person or an object in ordinary situational space (which we derived in VII). Interaction is usually (and as discussed so far) with a person or a thing. One pursues someone or points to something. Now something like such interactions are occurring in a new space made by these activities, and these interactions are between some new puzzling sense of her, and this new kind of "feel."

In our way of thinking about any sequence, a bit of body-change is made by some environmental change which in turn carries the body forward into a new bit of body-change. For example, when I look for something in a situation, the scene I experience is altered by my looking, and what I then see affects in turn how I further seek, that is to say the next focally implicit move from my body is changed by how the environment responds to my last move.

Or, another example, as I move in space changes how all the objects can now be approached from my new spot. This, in turn, affects my next bit of motion. So it is with any sequence.

In our new kind of sequence the move she makes toward the as yet vague feel has an effect on this feel which in turn affects the next move that arises from her body. Only now these moves are not dance steps, not words or images, but her interaction with this feel, her pointing or pursuing or waiting for. And the new environmental changes are changes in this "feel."

From each bit of this new sequence, Duncan could have danced. Instead she feels the whole from which such a dance would arise, and feels this whole as not quite right. She makes some move toward this feel, and it changes so as to carry her body forward into a further move (we must see later about this new kind of carrying forward, how it happens). In this way, the new sequence is a string of changes in the whole context, a kind of change in this whole which could not be made by dancing.

Each bit of this new sequence is a changed whole. Each bit would lead to a different dance than the last bit. Each bit would also lead to a different talking, if she were to try to say what "not quite right" now feels like, and to different images if she were to image. Each bit is a new whole.

But in the sense of VII the situation throughout remains the same. It is this relevance, this sense of being about to dance, which remains unchanged in the VII way, that is, she is still not dancing. She is still waiting. The same VII situation waits, and is paused. The VIII sequence changes in a new way what stays the same in a VII way.

Each new whole is thus a version of "the same" dance situation, in the sense of VII. As with other new kinds of sequence that we developed in earlier chapters, our new sequence here consists of a string of versions of the same, paused, earlier context.

From this sequence of versions, something quite new falls out. As always in our scheme, the had feeling or object falls out from the string of versions. That's what "a feeling" always is. It is the carrying forward continuity of the series of body-states, the changing which we sense as "a" feeling (and we can only sense over time.)49

This new kind of "feel" isn't just there, waiting, it forms in this new sequence.

Both her moves toward the "feel", and that "feel" itself, are of course Isadora Duncan, her one body. As she changes her interactional relation to the "feel", the "feel" also changes, and as it changes, it leads to, implies, or enables a changed stance toward it.

Where does this happen? In a new space generated by this new kind of sequence. If you tell an ordinary person to stand "next to" some feeling or emotion, the phrase will not make sense in that use. "Where do you mean `stand next to'?" the person will say. The new VIII space is not familiar, has not been constituted by this person. In VII people feel things in their chest and stomach, that is one "where", and also in their situations, that is another "where." In VIII a new space opens.

Until now, every sequence we have discussed consisted of bits of bodily change and bits of environmental change, and this is the case here too. In every sequence some kind of environment carries the body forward into a bit of changed implying (which then makes for a further change in that environment, which again carries the body further). But in our new sequence there doesn't seem to be any environment. But it only seems that way.

We have already seen that environment is always partly home-grown. The environment that carries behavior forward isn't just sheer physical externals at all, as in the old notion of external stimuli. Rather, it is constituted by, and part of, the body. (See VI.) Similarly, inter-human interactions form a new environment (at first the body-look, see VII.) What is the new kind of environment which here does the new kind of carrying forward?

We cannot simply say that the new environment is the direct referent, the "feel" I have been discussing. That would be like saying that the behavioral environment is the objects. We want to understand the formation of this "feel", just as in VI we could not begin with objects. We wanted to grasp how they form. We said here that the "feel" falls out from the changing versions of the whole. (This is analogous to how I presented the new sequence in VI. The sentience in-behavior was there seen to fall out from a string of body-changes.) The new environment is (a new kind of) bodily sentience - at least new in being interacted with, in this new way. What before was there only in-action is now interacted with, and now carries forward. We have yet to understand how it carries forward.

It is important to emphasize that the new sequence does not begin with the direct referent. It does not wait there, to be noticed or interacted with. Rather, the direct referent is a datum, a new kind of object, which forms, falls out from the sequence.

The sequence begins with looking for, letting come, waiting for... what is not yet "there." And where does one look and let? That space too is new, and is generated. As one looks, so to speak, in the usual body-sentience, this looking finds itself carried forward by a change in a somewhat different space. How this space is generated will become clear shortly. But it is not quite the usual way one feels, for example a pain, or hunger or tiredness in the body, and yet it is not totally different from these, either. Let me make the difference clearer.

While the changes in our new sequence may seem slight, they are actually each an enormous change. Duncan calls it a discovery of "the crater of motor power, the unity from which all diversity of movements are born." It is a new kind of source. There is no dance or speech or act of the VII type, which could make that much change. After each bit of such change, everything is different. Each bit is a new whole, a changed whole. The whole dance and all speech or action which would arise would be different than would arise from the last bit.

I have already distinguished this new kind of "feel" from emotions or slotted feelings. These familiar feelings also make change, of course. What one would say or do after such a feeling comes is different than before. But they are within the whole context. Our new sequence consists of changes of the whole.

I must now distinguish this new kind of bodily "feel" from the more usual body sensing. Let me first let Duncan make the distinction, then I will do it. Duncan writes: "The (old) ballet school taught the pupil that this spring (of all movement) was found in the center of the back at the base of the spine. From this axis, says the ballet master, arms, legs and trunk must move freely, giving the result of an animated puppet. This method produces an artificial mechanical movement not worthy of the soul." (ibid, p.75)

Similarly today there is a lot of work done with the body and bodily sensing. For example, one can move one's attention slowly up from the feet to the head, sensing for tension anywhere, and relaxing it. In doing this one is working with bodily sensings as just bodily, and not as a sensing of a whole situation.

Other methods involve the discovery (or re-discovery) that old childhood events and emotional sequences are, as it were, stored in the body. There is currently a lot of excited puzzling over how this can be. In certain kinds of stressing of muscles and other work, these old sequences come out, and are spontaneously acted or expressed. If the body is understood in the usual physiological way, this must be very puzzling. Our model can let us think clearly about it, as the body always focally implies a next step, and also implicitly includes all sequences that ever were, in a mesh so they are implicit in each other (and also pyramided over each other, see VI.) But in these current methods, the old memories and actings, and emotions are, of course, not the person's current life implying. The old sequences and the mere emotions are also only partial, as all VII-type sequences are. It is something quite different to have (feel, sequence) a bodily sentience of any of one's whole situations.

Much follows from this difference, which I will discuss later. (The old patterns are not as such the constituents of our living. The "Eternal Return of the Same" and the "archetypes" will be understood very differently once we grasp the new kind of sequence developing here.)

In the new kind of sequence the bodily "feel" is the body's implying of the next focal move, now (which is a focaling of many, many implicit sequences), and the new sequence is a string of versions of this, a string of changes in it.

Duncan was one of the pioneers of this new level, Stanislavski was another. Even today he is misunderstood to have said that actors should feel the emotions they portray. He did not like emotional acting. What he favored was sensing the whole scene, the whole play, the whole situation, living oneself into that whole.

"...because of the lack of better means, the stage director will squeeze emotion out of the actor, urging him ahead as if he were a horse that cannot move a great load from its place. `More, more,' the stage director will cry. `Live more strongly, give me more of it! Live the thing over! Feel it!'..."(475)

"...It would seem that there was nothing simpler than naked passion and nothing else. But the simpler a thing is, the harder a thing is to do. The simple must have a great deal of content. Bare of content it is as useless as a nutshell without meat. The simple, in order to become the most important and move itself forward, must contain in itself the entire gamut of complex life phenomena." (474-475)

"Besides talent, an inner spiritual technique is necessary." (475)

(From My Life in Art, Theatre Arts Books, N.Y.: 1948 (from the 1921 book.))

Here we see that new concepts are needed, otherwise we will not be able to capture the difference, let alone understand it, between emotions (and feelings in the usual sense) on the one hand, and this new kind of "feel" which, as he puts it, contains "in itself the entire gamut of complex life phenomena."

"I only had to think of the thoughts and cares of Stockman and the signs of short sight would come of themselves, together with the forward stoop of the body, the quick step, the eyes...And these habits came of themselves, unconsciously, and quite apart from myself. From where did they come? From where? The creative ways of nature are beyond human ken." (405)

Concepts fail him here, for the formation of that new kind of inward datum which contains "in itself the entire gamut of complex life phenomena." We are now making the concepts for how this forms.

Stanislavski, (like Duncan - and they did talk with each other) asks his pupils first to be still and let a "feel" form, that has its own rightness. Only then should they stand up and act-so that the acting might be from this newly formed inward datum. The right postures and movements will come. He too thus insists on a pause in VII-sequencing, a time when one doesn't act, or speak, or engage in any of the type-VII sequences.

We can also see again that there is a change, when this new datum forms. How one then acts from this datum is different than if one had acted earlier - - and the difference is more and other than the kind of difference type-VII sequences can make. Everything one then does is different, as lived from out of this changed bodily sense. The whole gamut of implicit sequences is involved in this changed formation. Therefore ways of standing, speaking and looking come, as if of their own accord, and are appropriate.

Stanislavski calls it being "able to create something new of an inner nature." (401) I am concerned with Duncan and Stanislavski not at all because what I care about is art or drama. What, in himself, Stanislavski uses here is his whole body's implicit richness of situations and interactions, all changed at once in this particular focal implying now. We need something like this in any life situation, and also in any new theoretical thinking. He livingly processes such a bodily implicit whole, and from it spring changed and more right50 actions and thoughts. What new kind of sequence and what new kind of "feel" is this?

How might I have had and felt the whole of my situation that made me (what we roughly call) angry? And what new kind of sensing, is this, which pauses the usual VII sequencing?

Einstein wrote that, throughout his fifteen years of work toward the general theory of relativity, not only that he had a "feeling" of what the answer had to be, but that this feeling guided him. What is he saying? Not that he had a personal feeling. Rather, that his knowledge of physics and mathematics was insufficient to enable him actually to solve the problems, to formulate equations that would predict correctly- but that his body, totaling and focaling all that, formed for him a direct referent which he could feel as such. He couldn't speak from it in terms of physics, but for fifteen years it was living physics forward in a bodily way. He could not live it forward in equations and measurements but as "felt."

Original thinkers probably engage in direct reference quite often, although by direct context crossing too one can sometimes "come up with" an answer or a step on a problem without having had the felt sense of the whole problem as such. Making this method systematic is not only useful in thinking, but reveals a whole new field of rules, a new kind of logic, a new way of understanding what the powers of thinking always were, and strong additions to these powers.

 

b) Direct Referent and Felt Shift

In the next section we will see why, we will be able to think clearly about why; here I want to describe.

A direct referent does not always form. Certainly it does not form necessarily just when we wish. And, when it forms, it is then whatever it is that formed, and perhaps not at all what we wished or expected. Another way to put this forming is to say that a direct referent comes. It can come only if we let it, and I will describe this "letting" more exactly.

When a direct referent forms and comes, something has jelled, something has happened, something - a great deal - has fallen into place. Direct referent formation is (a new kind of) carrying forward. We will understand this later.

At first, there is a period of unstable coming and losing hold of. One senses "the whole situation" or "the whole problem," and then that sense is gone again.

There are ways of helping people know how to let a direct referent form, which are much more exact than I describe here. (See Focusing, Bantam 1982.) Even so this will seem very specific, perhaps more specific than the reader is accustomed to enter into the details of experience.

It helps, at this unstable stage of direct referent formation, to find an initial descriptive term for the quality of this unstable sense of the whole problem. We call it a "handle." The whole problem feels ....unresolved....a little icky...yes, "icky" names it just right. (This could be a personal problem or it could be how we have just formulated some theoretical problem, quite well so it seems, and yet....)

Let us say it is a theoretical problem.

Once the handle fits, one can keep using it, over and over, and the felt sense of the whole problem, that uneasy sense now called "icky", will come again each time. "It" comes, of its own (and one must wait for it, by attending in a bodily way.) Ah..there it is again, yes, that's right, icky.

(Or it might need a more fitting word, phrase, image, or sometimes even a body-posture, - - any kind of VII symbol.)

If the handle functions as it should, the direct referent will form more stably. There will be an internal "Yes...yes..." quality, a bodily sense that this is just exactly right, even though one doesn't know what "icky" refers to. (One has all sorts of rapid ideas what it might refer to, but these are old information and must be put aside.)

If the direct referent comes, now, each time the word or words are repeated, each time the direct referent is waited for, there is each time a sense of relief, something shifting, releasing, stirring, in the body. This might be a very slight stirring or a big release. Yes, that's it all right, icky.

This release or relief or stirring will then occur much more strongly when, after some time, the felt sense opens and shifts in a major way. One then also finds out what is so icky about the seemingly good formulation of the problem- and usually it's rather different than one would have thought.

There may be many small "fallings into place," or one big shift. Now it is all open, and one can say, though it might still take time to find words or actions. One can say what the trouble "was" and is.

For example, "Oh....yes....yes.....this formulation I just made covers over just that funny spot where I think something interesting might come, it's too simple the way it is even though it looks good. Somehow I've forgotten the problem I had so much trouble with yesterday, today here it looks all solved but that's because the interesting difficulty has disappeared.

Or, it might be, "Oh....yes....yes....I never like it when it all comes down to that kind of explanation..." Then there will be another step, the person will tend to articulate further what it is that "I never like it" contains implicitly about "that" kind of explanation.

What at first seems a fuzzy unease, a seemingly merely personal reaction to a theoretical argument, implicitly contains complex and often new ways of seeing and understanding the theoretical issue.

As we already saw (in VII), thought is not at all only the moving around of fixed entities, concepts that are defined, "pieces" of knowledge. Thought is always very largely implicit and, as I tried to show (in ECM and in "Thinking Beyond Patterns," 1992) the implicit is not some fringe or periphery around what we centrally think. Rather, the sense we are making, the central point we are making, is had only as a carrying forward of an implicit complexity. What is implicitly functioning is the point itself, of what we are saying or thinking, just then.

Therefore, what is new here is the direct reference. In all thought the implicit functions, and in all novel thought there is some new aspect specifying, but it might occur in what I termed direct context-crossing, spontaneously in reaction to what is presented. (See VII-B.) I will later explain why the formation of a direct referent makes such a great difference.

Such a sense, like "icky" could be taken as a personal feeling as if it were only about personal matters. Not at all, it is an apprehension of the whole theoretical problem, an apprehending of more than can yet be formulated.

Similarly, with personal problems, the sense of the whole problem is very different from the more usual feelings and emotions. (Even the latter are, of course, ways of living and sequencing some situations.) A sense of the whole is always a way of carrying forward complex contexts of sequences possible in the world, often in a single focal way that is not yet possible in the world.

Both our theoretical thinking and our living are no longer as routine as they were in other times. In our time, the culturally patterned routines don't quite handle our situations. As we saw, each development brings with it many more implicit developments, (implicit type a) that have not yet actually occurred. Thus our complexity grows greater with each novelty, than is apparent from what happens. Situations develop which cannot be fully carried forward by any extant way of acting, nor is there always easily a direct novel creation which does. Our sensitivity, we might say, is greater than what we can devise to carry forward. The circumstances under which our full bodily carrying forward comes, are more complex and less frequent, less easy to bring about. In more and more situations where a simpler more traditional person would get angry, fuck, work, go forward, we may be blocked with no good way, no full-bodied way. How to be a father, or a wife, or a student, or whatever, in our situations, is not so obvious, not routined in a ways that works for us. We have to devise it anew each time.

Because emotions come in certain "slots" in interactions, and because our situations include new demands which one cannot carry forward, the emotion may not come, and because emotions are full-bodied, people think the whole problem lay in having one's emotions. But, as we saw (VII-B) emotions "break back," they carry forward less than the whole situation. The whole would be something else.

Even aside from the fact that our routines don't work anymore, the complexity of urban educated literate living consists so largely of symbolic actions rather than bodily doings, that they are "thinned". (VII-B) Of course, when signing something or pushing a button, such that a vast change is made, we normally do feel that quite distinctly in the body. The stomach sinks, the heart pounds, the hand shakes, or, if the action is fully carrying forward, there is a flood of relief and a new dawn in life. But how often are our actions that change-making? Usually the whole remains, only slightly altered.

To carry forward the whole of a situation, and to be in a full-bodied process, is rarely possible within the patterns of situations.

Just how would it be to live full-bodiedly, to carry forward the whole of routine situations? It would be a new stage.

Some new kind of "environment" could render the whole of our situation, and let us live it forward as a whole. Let me be clearer:

Suppose someone has insulted you. Now you are hurt, angry, chagrined, let us say, as you are supposed to be in our cultural routine. The routine defines both what "insulted" is, and what and when these emotions come. To a large extent we do, of course, still live and feel within these patterns, and so, let us say, you are angry, hurt and chagrined. If you are asked why, you would point to the obvious. You have been publicly called such and such a name, and that certainly is the reason. Can't anyone understand that? Wouldn't anyone feel this way?

Let us say, roundly, that, yes, anyone would feel this way, at least in our culture.

And yet - if you had several people here each of whom had been insulted today in a similar way, each of whom felt angry, hurt and chagrined, still there is another level on which one might ask each of them, further, why they feel this way. To answer this, each would have to attend to the fuzzy edges, the unclear part of the whole situation. Many people don't know how to do that, or even that it is possible. Some people do know that there always is this fuzzy edge, if one looks for it, waits for it to come in, lets it come.51

Then very different specifics would emerge for the different people.

Like anyone else this specific person would be having feelings of chagrin, anger, and hurt. One has a tendency to go over and over these emotions and the situational context that goes with it. To let a direct referent form, the person has to stop going through these VII sequences, but the stopping isn't just a blank. It is a different activity, which makes a "pause" in the usual activity.

The different activity is sensing the whole thing, as a whole. Later I will say more how this is done. Doing it, the person would find a holistic bodily quality of the whole thing, which is at first murky.

Finding a "handle" for it, the person might say, it all feels crummy. I feel crummy.

If the person now talked a lot, the sentences would be old. "All those people watching, what will they think, I'm mad, I'll get him back you wait, I don't like being made a fool of, etc. etc."

Reverting to these usually old VII sequences, the sense of the whole would be quite lost again.

Instead, let us say the person uses the handle ("crummy") to let the sense of the whole thing come again. "I remember 'crummy'....is that still there?....(waits)....ah, yes, there it is again..."

Letting it come, and perhaps again come after it is lost again, there is an unstable period. When "it" is "there," it can so to speak be touched, tapped, asked, wondered at...

Then there is a felt shift Whew...yes, that's what it is...wait,...I can say now

The person might now say, or not. The direct referent has formed, or we can say if we like it has re-formed (direct referent formation includes all these steps.) It feels open, now, to speech and action, one knows it, it is self-understood, even without words.

"Oh, I don't care what they think, but I was at fault and I hate to see that, that's what the crummy feeling is. Funny, I knew that before and still I didn't, in a way. .....Yup, that's what it is."

After a little while it is either all cleared up and the person is ready to go ahead, live, think, move, or (more often) the problem is not solved in one step. There's still a bad feeling, now the person circles around and around this being at "fault," hating to see that, excusing it, not excusing it, ethics, etc. All this is very different than before the shift, but it is again old thoughts that don't resolve anything.

Again, now, this changed whole needs to form as a direct referent. Again there will be a handle, say "unfree" is how it feels. That gets it all right! With that word, the new direct referent can keep coming back. When it shifts, there is a big relief. "Oh...it's not the fault part so much, it's like I have to be in this crummy way I was, and I have to go and be inside the ugly way I've been made to look. I keep climbing back into it," then there might be a lot of relief and then another round, perhaps ending in "Oh...yes, whew....I stop my good energy that way, when I climb back in there, sure, ..yes. I can stand that cruddy place all right, I'll even fix it I think, but I've been stopping myself ever since this happened, backing myself in like it isn't OK to surge forward anymore. Whew. what a relief. Now I can."

But it is very unlikely that these same specifics would emerge for one of the other people who had been insulted that day. They too would be similarly fuzzy at first, similarly poetic in their details, but different.52

A second person might find: "Well...ah...I'm angry. Hmm..." and after direct referent formation at this point, "....Yes, I see....uhm.. (sigh, breath,) I feel like killing the bastard. It's not too safe for me to feel the way I do. Yea, yup, (breath.) I'll do something stupid, not kill him really, but stupid. I don't like this part of me woken up. It's hard to control." And after another step of the same kind, "yea, it's not controlling it that's the problem. It's the way I don't like being that way. That anger isn't so dangerous if I'm willing to have it for a minute, but it hasn't seemed like I could have it and hold it, even that long. Whew...If I can hold it I can think what I want to do."

Now the reader might say, well, what does all that prove, of course we are each different. But what has become of the cultural routine - didn't we say anyone would react this same way? Just how we are all the same and all different is no simple question.

The usual routined cultural pattern has none of the above statements, nor the actions which these people may now do. Only allowing the whole situation to be carried forward in a new kind of way, not by a sequence within the pattern already given, did these emerge. What is said here, and the possible specific actions have never happened as such before. They are new in the history of the world.

This is why the language is often odd, newly formed. ("I have to go and be inside the ugly way I've been made to look.")

But haven't we all felt that way at some time? Isn't this merely a poetic way of saying, perhaps for the first time, what is a recognizable facet of anyone's experience, or at least of many people? Even if we haven't experienced it, we do grasp it immediately. Someone paints an ugly picture of you, and if you feel it's partly right, you make yourself go and be inside of it, and that feels bad. Is that new in the history of the world? It's merely a poetic person who can differentiate and express that.

Later I will discuss why what one says and does from a direct referent is again understandable.

Direct referent formation enables such poetic novelty - but the novel phrasing is only a result. The prior important sequence is the formation of the direct referent, the having and feeling of the whole situation as a directly felt unclear whole. This having, this sequence, is a carrying forward - only so can we have and feel - overtime, a way of pausing and sequencing the whole - a changing of it that isn't the kind of changing which taking an action would be, or speaking in a usual way without direct referent formation, using only what was clear. No one can find, think or say such aspects.

We all have, and even in the most traditional culture everyone has--such complexity. It is and remains implicit, and unchanged, unresolved, bodily cramped whatever way it is. There are not direct referents there, in some "unconscious." The unconscious is the body. But direct referent formation is a new kind of sequence, not known in other times except to a few odd people. Direct referents are not there, implicitly, but the whole complexity is there, and is implicit in every sequence of action, feeling and thought. When a person does engage in direct referent formation and then speaks, we can understand and "recognize" - not literally what was there before, but more exactly, what now forms from what was there. What was there was implicit complexity, implicit sequences, some never yet sequenced, but also all that ever were, situations mutually implicit in each other, the interactive life context (not totally unified, to be sure). From this complexity of ours the speaker to whom we listen, forms, in us, what we call "recognizing" that we always "were" like that, too. And yet when that "same " meaning forms, it is made of some different implicitly functioning experience. Ours.

I will say more in VIII-B about these quite new relations between novelty, uniqueness, universal understandability, generality and particularity. This section has revealed, but not resolved, how these notions must now be re-thought.

 

c) The New Kind of Sequence

We understand our sequence, so far, only in that certain interactive moves toward a not-yet-here "feel" generate this "feel," and generate a new space in which it forms.

We have also seen that each bit of such a sequence is changed whole, a changed version of "the same" whole situation, the same whole relevance. We saw that such a change in the whole cannot be made by a type-VII symboling sequence (although in another way each such sequence has the whole implicit in it in its own way). Each bit of our new sequence changes "everything," and from this string of changed versions, the new "feel," the direct referent falls out and is had, felt. This having (or feeling as such) of the whole was not possible in VII. It is a new kind of bodily sense of the whole complexity itself. To have it one must pause the VII type of symboling.

Many people today still cannot be for even a little time without some VII-kind of symboling sequence. They must always have thoughts or images or be doing something. Then the new sequence cannot develop. Of course, such people have feelings, but these are always had only by means of thinking or imagining doing something in some imagined situation.

Body sensations are of course also familiar to everyone, including those that come as emotions. The heart pounds, the stomach sinks. These are located in the body. Emotions make a large shift also, once come everything is different in a way with them too. What one would say or do, once the emotion has come, differs from before. But the emotion does not sequence (does not let one have a feel of) the whole situation.

The location of the heart pounding, for example, is experienced in the usual situational space, that is to say between the table and the back of the chair I am sitting in.

On the other hand, the change in the situation (which the emotion that comes, has made) is experienced in the situation around me.

The relation between these two changes is also experienced, but not clearly. The situational space is not located "in" the body in the same way as the heart's pounding is. In VII we said that the body implies all our situations and focally implies our next move in each (even if we cannot find a double sequence.) But this is not usually felt in the body as such, as a sense for the whole situation, as a datum located in the body.

If the bodily sense of a situation is to be experienced as such, most people have only very vague, general VII-sequences available. One feels "tense" or "at ease," "expansive" or "constricted," "good" or "bad." (These descriptive quality words are only physical and general, yet they are the best entry to focusing.)

In direct referent formation one both keeps the situation the same, and one also lets it change. One keeps it the same by holding the relevance, the point, the sense of the whole thing, the same. It is this situation (and all that is involved in it), which I wish to sense as a whole. I hold on to this relevance. But also, I await the coming of a new kind of feel, the felt sense of the whole business. I can only let it come, I can't make it. In letting it come, I allow my body-feel to stir, to move, to do whatever it does independently of my deliberate control, while I do employ by deliberate control to keep the situation, the relevance.

Holding and letting is something like holding a frame, but allowing whatever comes to come within that frame. The image of a frame is an analogy. (One can actually visualize a frame and let an image pop into it, but this is the formation of an image, not of a felt sense. An image forms in image space, not in this new space we must still describe.)

Holding and letting sound contradictory, but are one and the same act, like a holding and waiting. As one does so, there are murky bodily changes, and only after some seconds of these is there then a distinct datum, a "this," the felt sense, the direct referent. It comes, something like the way an emotion comes, in the body, of its own accord, but in a somewhat different space than the literal space in the body. Indeed it is literally in the body, between the table and the back of the chair (if we are sitting there), but it also is in its own new space. I sense the felt sense "there" and I am next to it, pointing at it, in this new space. The space is not distinct until the direct referent comes.

Whether a direct referent actually forms, whether it comes or not, cannot be controlled. One can deliberately hold and wait, point and sense, but one cannot get a direct referent to form and come at will.

For example, if I am dissatisfied with my formulation of some theoretical problem, I can certainly say the words: "Oh...now I have a sense of what's wrong." But I cannot thereby make myself have such a sense of what's wrong. I can begin with what I do have, some diffuse, unfocused dissatisfaction, but this is not yet that "feel" which is a version of the whole. There is as yet no "it" that has come. And there may not be that day, whatever I do inwardly or outwardly.

I can call my diffuse dissatisfaction by some name, using some noun, but there is not yet a direct referent there for me. (That is why Duncan didn't yet want to dance for such a long time.)

We see from this that a direct referent formation really is a kind of carrying forward. Carrying forward is always something that might not happen. Much else can happen, one can (if one wishes) talk, image, act, make tea, but none of that gives one that coming of the sense of the whole.

When one is practiced at it, however, there is quite often little difficulty in letting such a referent come. Even so, there is a further distinction: I have called it a "felt shift," and described it earlier. (Iberg calls the pre-shift stage "parturient" and the post-shift stage "nascent.") Once it has shifted, one can speak or act not just in the countless unsatisfying ways always available, but in a focaled way that will carry forward what is implied. (Even that is inaccurate, one may have to do more, it might be only a step, one might have to arrange the action situation still in many ways.) But one can say or do something that is a just right next step. Then one might have to engage in further direct referent formation for further steps.

It isn't quite right to separate the coming, and the shifting, of the direct referent, as if they were always two distinct events. Sometimes they are. But the direct referent, the "feel" of the whole problem, itself is closed and still in formation until suddenly it opens, and "what it is" falls out. "It" has jelled. Now one "knows," though it may then still take some time to find words or actions.

What I have to say about the direct referent as an object from now on refers to it after it has formed as an it, and that means that some shift will have been experienced, though it may not yet be that shift which lets one go out and do or say all of what one needs.

So there is a distinction between the direct referent still during formation, (as when Duncan waits, the whole thing doesn't feel quite right), and once it is formed. Of course what I can then do may only be to state what the trouble was. Even so the trouble has just changed very greatly, even as I now say what it was and still is. I can now say.

 

d) Relevance and Perfect Feedback Object

In the new VIII sequence one feels the relevance as such. Feeling is a sequence of changes, a string of versions. In being felt as such, the whole (or the relevance) goes through versions. In sensing or feeling it as such, it changes. (As we saw, it changes very greatly.)

When a direct referent falls out (it jells), we can then also say (or dance, or act from) what the whole problem "was," what the relevance "was." But of course this saying is from a changed relevance. In a VII sense it is still the same, the same situation or problem or concern we have been holding. While the same in that respect, it has now fallen out as a new "feel" from the new sequence, and from this "feel" we can speak in a new way, to say what it "was" all along.

We have often said that an explication is not the same as what was implicit. Implying is never to be equated with some structure. Loosely, if we have often seen cfing by the same thing, we can say it is what the previous moment implies. So hunger implies food. But something else too might carry forward in a new way. (For example, intravenous feeding.) Even if new, carrying forward will be recognizably different. What was implied will then no longer be. In contrast, there is always a vast variety of events which would not carry forward and thus leave the implying unchanged. You are hungry and you go out in the rain. Now you are still hungry. If you are on the way to a restaurant, this going out might be a version of your continuing same hunger which you are carrying forward in a special way- but which must still be carried forward by feeding somewhere some time.

Our new sequence is also again a versioning on a new level. Sometime the direct referent formation will succeed and Duncan will dance again. (Perhaps not that day.) What now, exactly, is the new carrying forward of the VIII sequence, this new versioning? When it comes (jells, falls out, becomes "nascent",) then I have (feel, sequence) what the problem "was." That is to say an object, a datum, has formed, and is now no longer changing and forming. There is an it. This it is my sense of what the problem is or "was." I have or feel it now.

I am now going to explain that this object is itself a further living, a carrying forward, a kind of solving, of the problem. It is what is needed, but on this new plane, in this new environment (so that I will still have to do things in the old environments). It is a kind of solution, an object that carries forward, and yet it also is a sense of the problem.

Therefore, one's first description of a direct referent usually is "Oh, that's what the whole problem is." But really much more change has happened in this formation than one first notices. This ascription to the past is not quite right. This (the direct referent) is not literally how the trouble has been all along. Something new and different has formed.

Each slightly changed version of the relevance carries forward. This means it is in some way what was implied. The body lives on, lives forward, lives on by the erstwhile stoppage of the problem or not-right situation. "Not right" simply means that something was implied focally, and couldn't happen

In this new space, it seems, something can happen which was implied, whereas in the old VII space of our actual situation it couldn't. The direct referent forms from a sequence of (in a way) fulfilling what was required.

There is therefore a great physical relief when a direct referent forms. Many processes in the body return to their more usual way, no longer carry (see IV-A) the stoppage. The interaction in the situation is still implied, still awaiting being done, perhaps still quite unclear or impossible, but the body has lived on and the stoppage has been resumed by a new object, the referent.

When the direct referent comes, (forms, falls out, jells) it is from a sequence of "perfect feedback," each bit being what the previous bit focally implied, required. It is therefore not only a sense of the difficulty, but a new object made by a solving of the difficulty (in a new sort of environment.)

One has lived past the stoppage which the problem literally was. Now, from this changed relevance, in this changed whole context, one formulates what the problem was in a new way. One formulates the problem in a world in which the problem is solved, in a context changed by that solving.

(Therefore, if any further steps in the VII situation are needed before a way there can be found, it is important to hold on to the direct referent of the problem, until enough sequences from it can form, so that the interaction context is changed accordingly. Often that is the case, one cannot always instantly speak and act so as to resolve the situation. But any speech or action now instances the solution, and feels right. They will change the situation so as to instance the solution. Then an action becomes possible, which may not be there at first.)

The direct referent is a perfect feedback object.

How contradictory all this would be if we had only VII concepts in which to say it. Just what we feel as the problem is the solution. (People do often say this! "If you can state the problem, you've got it half solved," and other paradoxical statements. A paradox is a new concept not yet formed.) Also, just as we can sense how it has been all along it has really changed fundamentally. It was not, before, really as we now say it "was."

We must quickly distinguish: Without an VIII sequence too one can say what a problem is, and one can have many feelings emotions, and do many actions. These are then usually what I call negative instancing.

Instead of being an instance of the solution (of how the whole context is, such that the problem is solved), they are instances of the problem (how the whole context is, such that one cannot proceed. There is a problem). One's statement of the problem is then itself an example of the problem, and lacks just what the problem is the lack of. One's effort to fix something is once again just another instance of what one was trying to fix.

From the direct referent, the statement of the problem and other actions are instances of the changed constellation, the carried forward whole, the solution.

The body has given itself an object that carries it forward in just that way in which the bodily whole focally implies.

Of course, something is still missing in the VII interaction context, the situation, but this can now be fashioned.

The carried forward body (the stoppage no longer carried) now crosses directly with the situation, and the sayings and doings that form are instances of the new whole.

When a direct referent forms and comes (jells), and opens (becomes "nascent") then the carrying forward has happened. It comes as it can and only that way. Its features are not what we might predict, usually, certainly not what we can control. Sometimes it is not an it, but two things, or three facets. Sometimes it is an odd juncture, two things neither of which is "it," but how they cross. A direct referent has its own character.

There is a great change in a direct referent formation, a carrying forward of the whole in accord with a focal implying that could not previously be carried forward. This lets us understand why direct referent formation takes time (how the direct referent isn't just there, waiting, but must form) and also why it has its own character. One cannot solve a problem any old way. There cannot be a feedback object, a carrying forward of a complexity any old way.

The change in the formation is not the same as the change inherent in feeling the direct referent once it is there. The formation is murky--then suddenly the further formation is what the direct referent falls out from as a stable object or datum. For some seconds or minutes sometimes months, the falling out does not occur. It is nothing like turning and reflecting on what is there waiting. It is a very special formation. When it falls out, every bit of that sequence is exactly what the previous bit required, and the object made by that sequence is a perfect feedback object.

 

e) Schematic of the New Carrying Forward and the New Space

As with the other new kinds of carrying forward we formulated in earlier chapters, this new kind involves a kind of doubling, a way in which the body finds itself carried forward in a new way, and we must also again say exactly what in this new cfing can be understood in terms of the old, and what cannot. We also want to understand the self-understanding internal to a direct referent, the "Yes..yes...," the sense that "if all fits." Each bit of the sequence locates into what the previous bit focally implied. What kind of re-recognition is here?

A new kind of sequence, for us, is doubled. In one sense (of course a special sense) it is the old kind of sequence, but in another sense a second, doubled carrying forward is also occurring. For example, behavior is a new kind of body-process, and makes a (new kind of) bodily change. But also, the body's new environment (see VI) also carries each bit of body-change forward in a second, new way. Similarly, in VII, the gestures are a (special kind) of behaving, but they also involve a new doubled kind of carrying forward by the bodylook. While dancing, one would still avoid falling off a cliff, in that sense the movements are behavior and go on the ground as other behavior, and in behavior space and its objects. But the "simple movements" of gesturing are also a carrying forward of one body by the other's body-look.

Here the special case of the old sequence is the interacting, the pointing, waiting, pursuing, etc. These are of course special, but they are of the old kind, a special case of them. (One has to interact with the incipient direct referent in the "friendly" way, for example. One has to "welcome" it, and so on.) But, in this new kind of old sequence a second carrying forward happens: the whole body-sense finds itself carried forward. Changes in body-sense are a new environment, a new sort of registry. The interactional move one made, and the resulting datum's coming, are a new kind of old interaction. But the carrying forward of the whole body-sense of the problem is a new, second carrying forward. Let me explain:

If there were only this new internal kind of interaction, it might be like relating to some datum, say a pain in some new way. The pain might then also become different, perhaps better. Or, say I have a worry, and I shelve it. When I can, I take it out and worry some more. Then I put it away. If this succeeds or not, there is here something like the interaction I am talking about, but there is not the new VIII carrying forward.

Just as a gesture is not only a simple motion, but also a string of versions of the whole behavior context (see VII-A), so also the interaction with a direct referent is not only some inward dance, but each bit of sensing is a version of the whole life situation, or the whole theoretical problem. Again a new kind of en enables something seemingly simple in the new en to be versions of the whole complexity of the previous sort of en. What seems like simple change on the new plane is also enormous change on the old plane. All the VII sequences (all the speeches, actions, and interactions implicitly in the situation) are versioned, altered, carried forward as a whole.

A direct referent is thus as different from the usual feeling, as a body-look-cfed gesture is from an ordinary behavior.

A direct referent is like a symbol with regard to the whole of the symbolic human interaction world, insofar as relevant in this situation or concern.

There is only one body, so that it isn't puzzling why a change in stance toward the "feel" that is awaited also changes that "feel." Similarly, the change in the "feel" is also a change in the body, and thus in the body's focal forming of the next stance. So also on the new level: the direct referent falls out when a bit of "feel"-change carrying the whole complexity forward is such, that its bodily effect makes for another bit of feel-change which again carries forward. Until then there is a bit of change, but not yet the sequence.

To define the sequence, our old notion of "re-recognizing" will fit again. "Re-recognizing" was our way of thinking about what is usually called "expression." Something that is done is an expression, when the body responds to it by finding itself carried forward further, and in so finding, the environmental effect is recognized by the body as (a rendition of) what it just did. Expression is never just one unit. There is a response to it, once it occurs. The response to it, by the body that emitted it, is a recognition of what is outwardly perceived as being an environmental version of what the body just was. Expression is made, we don't want to assume it. The way a new environment can function to carry forward is first found.

The direct referent is a kind (a new kind) of expression. Each bit is a new kind of bodily sense of what one just was, and one finds oneself carried forward. Retroactively the changed body-feel is what the body just "was," and this relationship is the new carrying forward.

If this finding-itself-expressed is a body-change which again makes a "feel"-change that is re-recognized, if again it is (an explication of) what was just implied focally by the body, then there is a sequence.

These new body-feel changes are a new environment, a new registry made in a new kind of sequence.

As we usually do, let us ask how body-sense already had some carrying forward in power. In VII we found that certain behaviors called "animal gestures" already made very large shifts (as when the fighting monkey turns and the fight is over, or never even begins, ceases to be implied). All through VII a body-sense implies the whole complexity of one's situation, only this is never felt (had, sequenced, cfed as such). When an emotion comes, it makes a big shift (but doesn't carry the whole situation forward). Slotted feeling sequences similarly make big shifts, they are also body changes, and hence changes in how the body implies the whole situation. That is all not new. Only the doubled way a new kind of environment carries the whole forward, that is new. Body-sense has not, before VIII, functioned as a kind of environment in its own right. (Analogously, in the higher animals there are many whole-body expressions that a human can perceive as expressive of the animal's whole situation but the animals do not respond to this in each other. The whole body-look and sound is not an environment of a separate kind for them, and only certain looks and sounds are reacted to - and even then only as behavior.)

Doubling can also be understood as two kinds of implying. Each bit of body-feel would focally imply some VII - actions, speeches, dances, etc., and implicitly involves a vast number of these. But each bit of body-feel also implies the next bit of body-feel which will carry that whole complexity forward, carry that whole relevance forward. (This is similar to how each bit of gesturing implies a changed behavior-context, but also the next bit of gesturing.)

Therefore one has the sense that one could say, and does know, what is happening, and yet the change is more than thousands of words could ever say. It is a change in what would be said (and done), and could be symboled in some vast number of VII-sequences from the new bit, but how then the next bit carries this one forward is more than could ever be said. We must better understand this sense of knowing. It is not really that one "could say," or think it at all. Yet there is an internal understanding, I call it "self-understanding," but must later say much more about this. All these many VII-sequences that are now changed (type a implicit; they have never yet been sequenced in their changed way) need of course not, and cannot ever be sequenced. Some of them are enough to change the VII-situation so that one can act in it.

The internal self-understanding in a direct referent sequence is how each bit occurs into the previous implying (as our model from IV would say it). Each bit of occurring locates itself into the previous implying, is an explication of that implying. The many VII-sequences which are each a kind of understanding (actions too, in VII, always involve understanding, we know what we're doing, the way we are being carried forward), all these sequences of understanding are now carried forward at once, as a whole, and all their understanding is implicity. That is one way to think about the "Yes...yes..." quality of a direct referent.

But, until now we always were bodily, but never had the whole relevance, the whole situation. So there is also a new kind of understanding here, a sensing and having of the whole relevance, carried forward by another version of the whole relevance. All the implying is carried forward and we feel that relevance as such, from version to version.

Animals sense space, but it is full. Empty space, especially geometric space, is a late human derivative. Empty space is due (as we saw in VII) to the symbolic character of gestures - the way they version a whole complexity although in themselves simple. Gestures go on, not only in the actual physical space, but also in the complex context which they version. This context is "full," but the space in which the gesture physically moves is now different. It is no longer the behavior context itself, that the gesture occurs in. Rather, gesturing generates its own space, and that is empty space in which there are simple movements.

When an animal moves, it does so in behavior space, in the full context of all other behaviors, implicit in each other, forming a context, a space. Only the symbolically doubled space is empty, so that mere movements can occur in it independently of how all else is changed by each move. This is because the gesture (while still amidst the behavior objects, while it must still avoid hitting tree or falling off a cliff) is not really in that space, but in its own doubled space, the complexity being versioned is not here, only the empty space is.

In this respect the doubling here in VIII is again twofold: The space in which the direct referent forms is in one sense empty (just this new kind of self and this new datum) and in another sense of course all of the bodily implied complexity which is being versioned. So the new space is empty in that the VII-complexity is not literally here, and yet that complexity is more fully carried forward than in any possible VII-sequence.

The vastness of that space is therefore understandable: It isn't the kind of space that situations are. We are in them. Here is a space in which THE WHOLE SITUATION MOVES. We are not in the situation anymore, but in the new space, and we are here, the situation is now a something, a new datum, there, over against us.

Once a direct referent has formed, what one can do in the new space is also different. Now one can "put it down," or "receive," one can let it wait for later, one can ask how one would feel without it (awaiting a new feel in the body, which again, must come, cannot be invented), one can stand next to it, tap it lightly to sense what more is involved in it, or, if one places each new problem to one side and lets each further problem be a direct referent again placed, one comes upon a vast plane. The big problems lie there like huge boulders, now small in comparison to the big open space.

Like VII-space, this space is symbolic in its new way (not like VII). It is a space generated by the moving in relation to the direct referent, and seemingly one stands outside the situations.

The space is made by the sequence. The sequence is a bodily carrying forward of this new kind (Whole-Whole-Whole). The body-sensing is the new rendering, the new registry, the new environmental versioning of what the body is, implies, just was.

The space is of course not the body-sensing, the space is empty. Space, for us, is always a result, an "in" that is generated by a sequence. Any sequence goes on in its own generated space. We first had space in VI when any given behavior altered how any other behavior is now possible. Let me recall this.

An animal does not move merely, it behaves. We might say it moved from left to right, but that kind of empty space and pure motion is a result of VII, of motions that are gestures and are doubled, as I just showed, and freed from the present behavior-context (except for bumping into things). The point of a gesture is not that, having to raise my arm to vote, for example, I must not hit the man next to me as I do it. I must look out for that, but the gesture goes on in the situation we are voting about - usually far away and not in this room where people sit around a table. My vote may change much that is not in the room, of course. Thus a new kind of space is created in the room, empty space, really symbolic space. The animal, on the other hand, behaves. As it moves (what we see as) to the left, going after a mouse for example, all the other behaviors which are implicit are not done, but if they were they would have to be done differently. The behavior goes on in a full space, in the context of the other behaviors (like my raising my arm in respect of the people and objects near me, not in respect of its gesture-character which is independent of that, and goes on in empty space and versions an absent situation). A full space is one in which the other implicit sequences and this one are on the same plane, in the same context together. Considered symbolically, my VII-situation is a full space, whatever I do alters all the other sequences I might then do. Having voted I cannot now do things in the same way as before - though I may have continued sitting where I was, or I may have moved, that doesn't matter.

We have seen that it is important not to think of space as mere position, and positional relations. These always require an observer who remains a puzzle because the observer is human. To an observer positions A and B are "related," but this doesn't mean there is any actual relation between A and B as events. To understand how an observer related spatially we have had to think all of VII. Already in VI we saw that an animal in behaving changes not just positions, but how other behaviors could now be done. Of course, moving there the animal cannot approach a given spot in the same way as from here. But also, in chasing the mouse its adrenaline has flowed, its circulatory system has altered, the behaviors that are implied by the body (and are implicit each in the others) have been altered in how they would now occur. The animal behaves in a mesh of possible behavior sequences. Each behavior is a change also of the implicit others. The behavior occurs into this implicit complexity, and is always within it, and never carrying forward of it all. Only symboling does that.

Similarly now, we understand how the VIII sequence can take one out of one's situations, just as the gesture takes one out of the behavior context, by doubling and carrying forward on a new plane, and as a whole.

That is why the VIII space is empty, and yet is sensed as so full of the life meanings being carried forward as a whole complexity.

The vast space is not the space of VII only bigger, it is made by a carrying forward with a new kind of medium. The object that falls out (the Direct Referent) is a new kind of object.53 That object and its space, form together. So the space is necessarily bigger than the object.

The self corresponds to the space, not the object merely (corresponds to the space and object). The body-feeling as Direct Referent is now the object, the "perception," the specific facet of the environment. But the body implies the whole new kind of environment, the whole space.

That is why the self seems so vast, and so clearly not merely the having-of-the-object. However large the Direct Referent-formation change, the space is much larger.

But what is this space, should it not (by our scheme) be all the Direct Referent-formation sequences implicit in each other, like behavior-space was? No, it is rather like the new consciousness of the first VII sequence in VIIA.

We can think about this new kind of "empty space" along the lines of VIIA, where the symbolic simple movements had with them (from the first one) their "empty" space. They were still in full space as behaviors (not bumping into anything) but they were doubled and, as gestures were not in the same space as behaviors. Nor were they in an (as yet not formed) context of such new sequences. Empty space remains, of course, even after such an interaction-context forms, since it is the space that goes with the simple movement. Its "emptiness" is its versioning of the previous context-type. That is why it was symbolic space.

Of course these VII-concepts have to be used in a VIII way here to instance the Direct referent of Direct Referent-formation; we don't want to reduce VIII to VII-terms unless we use them in an VIII way. But the terms let us think about the character of this new "empty" space, and especially about the new self (self-locative carrying forward) which is now the body-side of this new carrying forward.

Just as the merely positional geometric space of location point must not be taken as basic, because then one forgets its derivation from symbolic movement, so also this new VIII space must not be thought merely empty in a simple--and especially not in a positional--way. Positions are always in relation to someone, and space is that someone's mesh of implicit sequences, how each alters when one occurs. All this is lost sight of, when a space of mere positions is constructed, unless we remember its derivative character. The capacity of a human observer to live a continuity between here and there, or there and over there, derives from movements that are versionings of (and thus physically independent of, and on a new plane from) behavior contexts. When (see VII-B) the new interactional symbolic space becomes encompassing of the old behavior-contexts, then people live in symbolic interaction contexts instead, and physical space comes to seem empty, but it is still doubled, always. It becomes a mesh of mere movements and position, because the life events are now in symbolic interaction space (see VII-B-1). In moving and relating moves in empty space we version our interaction contexts.

Of course, we would feel more ourselves since so much more is carried forward, which equals bodily changed, = felt, = had, = sequenced, = occurring, locating into it is now not a consciousness of self (as in VII) but a new level of "of." To think about this we must first see in what new sense the Direct Referent-formation is universal in its own new way.

 

f) Rapid Statements of Points that Instance Direct Referent Formation

f-1) How an VIII sequence makes changes in the VII-context.

Each bit of the new sequence is a changed version of the whole VII-context. Each bit carries forward (satisfies) the requirement-context that the previous bit was. A Direct Referent, a feeling of the whole, would not fall out as a datum, if this were not so.

The change made by this new kind of carrying forward is not a change possible within the context of VII-sequences, and could not be made by a VII-sequence. It is a change in all of them of the sort we called "meshed" (VII-A). They all change, but not in a way any of them could bring about in the others.

f-2) Any VII-sequence from the Direct Referent (DR) is like a new "first" sequence in relation to the VII-context.

There can be a new "first" sequence only either by a renewed versioning (as when we developed VII, each "new expression" or new dance made for a new crossing of all the VII-sequences with the new expressive pattern, see VII-B); or this can happen from the next level only (as now in VIII), once no new expression in the body-look environment can carry forward the whole (see VII-B).

With regard to VIII, all the VII sequences from the Direct Referent are "second sequences" and DR-formation is the "first" sequence. But within VII each sequence after the Direct Referent is like a "first" sequence, that is to say it changes the whole context, all the other sequences.

But let us recall the difference (clarified in VII-B) since new or changed second sequences too change all the others. The second sequences are the working out, the occurring, of what was already type-a implicit in the first sequence--that's just why it is a first sequence, because it implicitly involves a whole new cluster of crossed new second sequences. (When they actually occur, of course they make further change.)

Each statement from a Direct Referent acts like a new first sequence in VII. Each implicitly involves (type-a implicit) a whole cluster of "applications" to everything in VII, not at all only to the given situation or problem or theoretical topic.

This is why, as we will see later (in the Theory Construction section) such statements far exceed what at first is their only literal significance. Each can be a model affecting any consideration.

As a VII-statement it only applies to what is "under" its generality.

f-3) "Monad."

"Monad" is the term I use for how a Direct Referent applies to everything, that is to say, to the working out of all its second sequences (each of which, we just said, is a "first" sequence within VII). For me, "to monad" is a verb, I want to say that a Direct Referent "monads out into everything."

f-4) VII-statements from a Direct referent instance that Direct Referent.

The reason they have powerful new properties is because they aren't only changed VII-statements, they come from the Direct Referent and carry the Direct Referent forward indirectly, implicitly. Each such statement actually monads out the direct referent that it instances. Therein lies its power.

Of course we must remember that a direct referent only forms (falls out) if the sequence carries forward, meets the implying of the whole. Therefore there is an implicit correctness, a validity in any VII-statement in regard to the whole VII-context that was carried forward.

Also, we must recall that "everything" is not a lot of things next to each other, but many sequences each of which implicitly contains the others. That is why the whole cluster changes (in some carrying forward way). Every VII-sequence if changed, implicitly (type-a) involves changing its whole cluster--that's why I call it a "first" sequence within VII. But it also instances the Direct Referent which is a different sort of change of the whole. All the VII-sequences from a Direct Referent will be instances of the same Direct Referent the others instance. The whole that the Direct-Referent-formation carries forward (and that the fallen out Direct Referent is) is not only the kind of whole that any VII-sequence implicitly involves. Rather, it is the having (feeling, sequencing) of a whole never capable of being sensed within VII, and not itself capable of being said or acted in VII-sequences.

f-5) The new "universality" of the Direct Referent.

The Direct Referent falls out from a new level of versioning. It is "of" (versioning defines "of") the VII-context(s) in a new way, a new kind of having, a new way of doing what in VII was properly called symbolization. For VIII I will put this new kind of kind into quotation marks. A Direct Referent is a new kind of "symbolization" (without symbols)! It is a new kind of rendering of something (the whole VII-context), now rendered in body-sense.

f-6) The old universality of VII is implicit also.

It is important not to confound the new universality and the "symbolization" with the fact that in Direct-Referent-formation the VII context(s) as a whole, in being carried forward, constitute a change in all of the VII-universals. Of course the Direct Referent has VII-universal significance since it is a carrying forward of a VII-context consisting of mutually implicit VII-sequences. However they are changed in this new carrying forward which results in VII-universals, i.e., statements, or kinded interactions. But this is a VII-result from the new universality. Above we stated the new universality itself. It is different.

f-7) The whole VII-complexity, not just the collected kinds, is carried forward and universalized in the new way; we can now derive the IOFI principle.

We saw (in VII-B) that words collect, they cross all the contexts to which they apply, each new context crossing with those already collected. This collected crossing differs from the lateral crossing of all the contexts implicit in each other situationally.

We saw there also that VII-universals are nothing like the empty generalities with the details dropped out, that they are usually considered to be. One uses a word with the collected sense of all the contexts in which it ever applied. (Even apart from individual experience, the contexts in which a word applies are implicit in the cultural system so that one has this implicit use already in other contexts and in other words, even if one has not individually used a word in enough contexts to have a personal experience of it.) All these contexts imply each other laterally, that is to say our different interaction-contexts imply each other. In VII-B I showed all this exactly. The VII-complexity, the interaction contexts (mutually implicit) are fundamentally elaborated by the collect-crossing of language, but there is also much more complexity than language makes into kinds, and collects.

Direct-Referent formation carries forward much more than just the language-kind system. It carries forward not only the VII-universals (the "thirds," the words and possible sentences, the collected life interaction context, the collected interaction-context(s)), but also the whole complexity of all the mutually implicit contexts which, as we saw, are not dropped out when we speak. And it also carries forward aspects that are not collected in words at all. (See VIII-B.)

For this reason a Direct Referent can be the source of countless new VII-universals, not only changed extant ones. This derives the IOFI principle of Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, where we did not explain why it is, that any statement, taken qua Direct Referent, is capable of leading to countless new universals--or, as I said it there: can be an instance of itself in countless ways. (Exactly: the having, the Direct Referent, of any statement can give rise to countless new general statements of which the given one will have been an instance.) Put mildly, the given statement--rather, our having of it, i.e., the Direct Referent--can be an illustration or example of countless generalities, new categories. For example, this point I am here making can be an instance of (at least) new conclusions emerging from what we already said and thought we fully knew; how implicit complexity functions; how universals come to be; the way newly specific points are not really logically "under" what was more general; monading a Direct Referent, here about Direct-Referent-formation; how a new aspect is continuous with the previous but not logically derivable from it by deduction; and with a little intervening creativity almost anything we ever said here can also be made to have been instanced here. Such a list would not ever exhaust what could be "generalized" (as it is usually put) or "universalized" (as I call it).

Direct Referent-formation, by carrying forward the whole complexity, nor just VII-"thirds," has made a type-a implicit universal of "every" facet of that complexity.

f-8) The Direct Referent, and the new universalized complexity, was not there before Direct-Referent-formation. The Direct Referent is not a "reflecting upon" what was there before. ("From 1/2 to 2.")

The Direct Referent falls out from the string of carrying forwards. The Direct Referent is therefore not at all something that was there before, waiting for us to notice it. The "turning" which one thinks to do is there, but it is a new sequence, and creates a new datum, not what was literally there.

The complexity of VII which was always literally there is not the carried forward one. It is the not able to be carried forward complexity. You can say they are "the same," this one carried forward in VIII is the one that couldn't be carried forward in VII. True, but the datum, the Direct Referent, is new, and is from the carrying forward sequence.

This has been the case throughout. To feel something is to have it, to sequence it, to have it fall out from a sequence. What falls out (they used to call it the "commonality") is a product of the carrying forward of the sequence, not what was literally there before. (Thus I put "was" in quotations when I speak of explicating what something "was.") Even in VII the danced behavior-context is the one altered in this new versioning, not literally what it was. Even in VI the body-stoppage is the one versioned in behavior, itself a new kind of bodily change.

I call this the principle of "from 1/2 to 2." This rough way of naming it brings home that what is roughly called "reflection" is not a turning to see what was there before, unseen. It is not as if "1" was there, and reflecting, as in a mirror, we get two ones, making 2. Rather, both ones are created in the new "reflective" process. What was there before can be called "1/2." (Of course I don't mean this to apply literally as quantities.)

This is why, without Direct-Referent-formation, one cannot state the problem or be aware of the lack that one is instancing. To be aware of the trouble is to have it, to sequence it, thus to carry it forward in a new kind of sequence. That is why there is no way to have or feel what is not being carried forward. This goes a long way, as we will see, to explaining the character of the so-called "unconscious."

f-9) Direct context crossing makes novelty but still instances the lack.

Novelty in VII also alters implicitly all the mutually implicit sequences, but the novel action or speech will instance the lack negatively, not through a carrying forward of the whole in a way that satisfies its implying. We can use the above points to make this difference clear between novelty in VII, and in VIII. That is why it is quite slow in VII, why cultural contexts last so long, and why an individual cannot change by deliberate planning and decision alone--it will all instance the problem rather than instancing a solution. Direct context crossing lacks phantastic differentiation (see VIII-A.f) though on the VII level it makes some differentiations.

f-10) Many words, like "direction" are used in an IOFI way in VIII.

Any word and any sentence can be used in a Direct-Referent-instancing way. Here I want to point to one characteristic (among many) which then arises.

Words like "direction," "good," "possible," "right," and many others, when used in an VIII way, seem to be empty of content--and are not at all empty. Rather they instance Direct-Referent-formation. One knows in advance that they will be intended as used from a Direct Referent. Therefore one cannot (before Direct-Referent-formation) give their VII-content, yet they have such content. Let me explain:

If I wish to move in a certain direction, in VII this means I know and define this direction. In VIII it means that I know in advance that this direction will change in Direct-Referent-formation. From the VII point of view this means only that I don't know what the direction will be after Direct-Referent-formation. But in VIII I do know--I know more than the direction I defined, I know that plus the openness I leave for the "change" which a Direct-Referent-formation can make in carrying the whole context forward.

VIII-carrying-forward fulfills the requirements, the implying, of the whole VII-context or, more exactly, the implying by the body (which is the whole VII context as the body constitutes it. This specific way of saying it leaves open that some of my situation may escape me, since it involves other people. Most of that will be implicit in my body-sense which constitutes the situation as I live it, much more than I know, but I may not be sensitive to everything that can be relevant).

Yet VIII-carrying-forward fulfills the implying in a new way, through a new medium. Therefore much is involved in the carrying forward which cannot happen in VII and of which it would not be meaningful even to ask if it could happen in terms of the actions, interactions, and symbolizations of VII. In that sense VIII-carrying-forward transcends the requirements of VII, and arrives at a bodily solution which takes account of all the requirements of VII, but in a new way that must then still be sequenced creatively within VII. Such changes cannot of course be delineated in advance in VII.

Therefore it would be foolish for me to decide the "direction" in which a solution to a problem must lie, before I solve it. Such a decision would only instance the problem. Yet I sense a direction and could say what it is. Instead I want this direction, but not as definable in VII, rather as about-to-be "changed" in an VIII carrying forward. So far as VII can possible define it, it is this direction into which I mean to head. But in addition an VIII use of that word would intend the "direction" not yet definable. (I italicize "in addition" because the VIII-carrying forward will not lose me anything of this VII-stated direction, despite there as yet being no words in VII to say, or deeds to indicate, in what way my VII-statement is not what I intend to mean.)

An old way of saying something like this, is to want the will of God. One wants the best, and in the long run the most desirable, what one would want if one knew everything. (At least, so it is with the notion of God I am implying here.) Thus one still wants the specifics as one now sees them, but in addition one wants the best change in them. And--furthermore, if this way of thinking were not the best, then one would want whatever the best would be. Finally, if "best" is not a right way to think about or feel about this, and if perhaps "wanting" isn't either, then whatever changes that would make are also intended.

In IV-A,e) our concept there of "eveving" already employed this kind of "direction" when we formulated how an evev becomes stable. Only now can this be said clearly. The concept of "eveving" is from Direct-Referent formation, from VIII.

This discussion is also an instance of how VIII relates to VII-content generally. An VIII sequence is a carrying forward of VII-content, but it is much more than that. This still includes, however, a fulfilling of the VII-requirements, only in a way that moves as one couldn't within those requirements.

We want something "possible," and Direct-Referent-formation will enable us to get it, but "possible" needs to be defined as above, not by how it would be defined in VII-statements of VII-conditions. (We saw throughout, and discussed in IV, how the model is false, which makes any occurrence only one of antecedently defined possibilities.) Again here is that relationship between VIII and VII-content to which I wish to point. We will fulfill the condition that the later actions and statements must be possible in VII, but from a carrying forward that itself is not possible in VII. The eventuating change will be possible in VII. Retroactively we will restructure the VII-context in a possible way, and we can then say how what we say and do is possible ("was" possible all along).

For example, as we develop as persons what we consider good and bad changes. This doesn't mean that we come to be more evil. Looking back to say when we were teenagers, it would be sad if our sense of good and evil had not developed, become more subtle and complex, deeper. But it is also sad if we thereby lost something that was good. This would be contradictory if we had to stay with a VII use of terms. Here both "develop" and "good" were used in an VIII way.

Spiritual people currently often say one should not have a purpose, a direction, and shouldn't be concerned with good and bad. They mean this in a VII way of using these words. But there is a seemingly content-less way of using them, not defined only in a VII way, but rather, defined by VIII-carrying-forward. Then one still has the best VII definition and sense one can have, but more.

Of course, if I structure my efforts to "develop" by how I now sense everything, I will structure myself to stay fundamentally as I am. I will make efforts to improve capacities that how I now am lead me to value, and I will do it in the way I now do things.

What was said here is instanced by a whole discussion of axiomatic systems , and of how it becomes possible to examine and move beyond assumptions. The whole new model, in a way, instances the question how something can develop which is not capable of being reduced back to the explicit structure and its units and relations, which was.

Also instanced here is the whole relation between implying and occurring. What is implied is not some explicit structure (not even what usually happens and has many times carried forward) but something that will carry forward. Occurring, when it occurs into implying, changes that implying not as if the implying were for an explicit structure. "Explicit structure" itself, as usually conceived, is a VII term! In VIII it becomes something that can instance a Direct Referent, and thus apply in ways that could not be inferred from its VII character.

It is important here to see how nothing is lost. Implying is not less determinate than an explicit structure. Implying is always more ordered, but in a different way (I have said so often, and can now be clear)!

The "more" and different kind of order is that of VIII-carrying-forward, of Direct-Referent-formation which is at least what I have said of it. "At least," because of course what I said was in VII statements--new ones, to be sure, and odd, formed from Direct-Referent-formation, but still only VII terms! This matters greatly. Nothing I say in this work is intended to foreclose someone's better sensing and better knowing. It is all said in a use of words I have just now defined.

VIII-carrying forward is a carrying forward of VII's implying. It is not indeterminate, it demands more. It has all the determination of VII. A VII-statement doesn't lose any of its determination by instancing a Direct Referent (before or after a Direct-Referent-formation). VIII-carrying-forward (which really defines the term "carrying forward") is beyond explicit VII-type structure by carrying it forward, not by making everything indeterminate or vague. In regard to VIII-carrying-forward something can be "open" without losing its VII-order.

 

g) Additions to VIII-A (f)

1) That is why in VII people can actually make (see VII-A) things, what VII-versioning alters and creates is possible in the VI-behavior-contexts, but not within the way they are explicitly structured. If versioning were not like that, what is symbolized would not then in fact work in the behavior context.

2) A Direct Referent can monad only because of the jellednes, i.e., having fallen out from VIII-carrying-forward. Just feeling or sensing something does not have this property. Direct-Referent-formation takes time, there is amazing speed but it does take some time. Something happens. Until it does, one cannot monad, although one can make VII-statements they don't have the properties described.

3) IOFI space is not without this Direct-Referent-formation. Having gone round and round issues many times, having seen many views, does not automatically make IOFI space. Only when Direct-Referent-formation happened, and in regard to it, can one use VII-statements in a VIII way. Until then the most one can do is leave the terms open for a Direct-Referent-formation, as I said.

In order to make something clear, terms in VII will be cut so that much else equally important and true is denied or covered over. In VIII words are used as instancing the Direct Referent, and not only as the explicit structure which does this denying and covering. IOFI space use has its own rules.

4) Self is "separate" from the content being carried forward, in the space of the VIII sequence. Data are therefore constituted something like perceptual objects always are (see VI), so that they are the perception-perception-perception string, while there is also an feeling-feeling-feeling string, both as one sequence. The Direct Referent, the new datum, the new object, is there, I am here. The fallen out Direct Referent is like the perception-perception-perception, the interacting separate self is the feeling-feeling-feeling. (see VI-A.) Both make the continuity of the carrying forward, but now the doubled implying is new: how each bit of Direct Referent-formation implies the next bit is new: it is a self-understanding much wider than the VII-content even as a whole, since as we showed, the carrying forward is new, new in kind, in a new medium (the body-sense as environment). Just as in VII the carrying forward was by no means nothing but versions of the behavior-context, but a new doubling medium, so here too. The self in this sequence is not the of VII (from 1/2 to 2) reflected upon, it newly finds itself as a new wider self with a new object, the Direct Referent, not of the old VII-objects. (Of course the self is not the new "object" either, an object is always different than, constituted by, over against, though from the same sequence as that in which the self finds itself. (The carried forward fallen-out context or space is much wider, see later.)

Even in regard to VII situations, each feeling in the feeling-feeling-feeling sequence is the whole, hence in regard to these the evev-evev bits are each of the situation.

Just as VI-objects involve behavior-space, and VII-objects involve interaction contexts, so a Direct Referent involves a new space (that vast space in which the Direct Referent can be "placed" down along side oneself . . . or at some distance).

The self or consciousness, now self-understood, is parallel to the space, or the context-carrying-forward, context-self-locating, not merely the object, of course.

5) This was always the character of consciousness in our model, the self-locating (see VI) and also the making a new space. (In VI it was the first space. In VII it was internal space, or rather, internal/external space, see VII-B.1)

6) All contexts (or, since total unity is an assumption, very many) always were implicit in any one. But this could not be had or sensed as such. To have or sense is to sequence, to carry forward into a sequence. One could say in general, as Plato did, that anything, if fully known and pursued, would lead to everything else, but one could do this only in small steps and never to the end. In Direct Referent-formation it happens completely. But it happens differently in each new Direct Referent-formation. Therefore there are many wholes, not just one as Plato thought. One can say that one always forms "the same" whole in a Direct Referent-formation, but this sameness is in quotes. The order of experience, nature, or the universe is understandable only as (at least) an VIII "order" (using the word as "direction" was used earlier).

7) From any Direct Referent-formation very many new universals can form, but from any one of these in some use a new Direct Referent-formation can occur too. (Can occur, I said, but might not occur. Direct Referent-formation is a special kind of carrying forward, it isn't just to be assumed.) Thus the universals that instance a Direct Referent need not remain only in the "system" that a Direct Referent is. Direct Referent-formation from one of its uses leads further. A Direct Referent is a kind of particular, as well as being universal as we have shown. From any universal (VII statement) in use, or at any point in living, a new Direct Referent may form. In this sense of VIII, a new "particular" can always be formed leading to many new universals. New or old universals can lead to such a new particular (in Direct Referent-formation). This is a way in which particulars are not under universals in the most radical way. Neither do universals (VII terms used in an VIII way) include a fixed set of particulars.

8) Phantastic differentiation was our term for what happens when, in versioning, the whole complexity of some stage is carried forward by (some new environmental version of) the whole complexity. Carrying forward is always context-crossing: as in VI the way the body implies the environment is different than the way the environment all spread out is a version of this same implying. Versioning always vastly differentiates what is versioned. Thus VII, in relation to VI, vastly differentiates, increases complexity. This complexity remains and is the new kind of carrying forward, so that carrying forward is always cross-contextual (body implying is carried forward by an environmental version of that same implying).

In making sensible the complexity implicit as any VII-context, so that it can be had (as we saw, thus implicitly universalizing or versioning all of it), a vast number of now sayable aspects are created (type a implicit) and can be said, thought, or acted.

What was a cultural pattern or a basic human type (archetype) becomes a texture of possible differentiations. For example, what in VII thinking is either so or so (e.g., either continuous or different, either determined or indeterminate, either internal or external, either in accord with this system or that) becomes in VIII not indeterminate, but a new texture enabling many new differentiations and concepts. (And so it is also in personal living.)

Our concept evev (everything by everything, crossing) applies again on a new level. We made it characteristic of any carrying forward process. Of course the concept came from VII and instances DR-formation. A new environment enables a new crossing of bodily implying with an environmental rendition, a new carrying forward, thus a new eveving. Everything, each facet, crossed with every other (using "every" in an VIII way so that the crossing itself determines the new multiplicity) makes each facet as numerous as the whole complexity was. Of course that is only a VII-metaphor for what occurs.

9) Just as animals have much expressive body-looks that do not function in animal behavior (and become a new environment that carries humans forward), so also is there in VII a carrying forward by body-sense. As with animal body-looks, some specifics of it did function already in animal behavior, but only as behavior, and only some of it. Body-sense carries forward in certain VII-sequences but only as symbolized, and only partly, never as whole. Now the whole of it is a new environment and carries forward the whole of the body's implying.

Why is it that from such a sequence new symbolic VII sequences are actually possible in VII again?

We already asked this kind of question in VII. We were not content with just accepting the notion of symbolizing, we had to ask why versioning with patterns of body-look (or, later, derived from it) actually result in something that can then actually be done, or actually made. Why does symbolizing work?

To answer it we traced how the patterns are not arbitrary but inherently related to the behavior contexts. First this was because that body-look is how a body is in that context, later even what are termed "conventional" symbols turned out to have intricate but non-arbitrary relations to behavior contexts. It is nothing like two separate things, the symbol and what it is about. That split makes two think-like entities, basically separate, that someone must then "conventionally" tie up. We saw instead that what patterns would form was already type-a implicit before their occurrence (see VII-B), and we saw how they develop. We also saw exactly how they reconstitute the implicit behavior contexts they version, how these are bodily implicit.

Here in VIII also, we want it clear how body-sense is a non-arbitrary versioning of VII-contexts.

Symbolizing or versioning is always in a new medium, that is non-arbitrarily related to the old. Neither is there a one-to-one denotative relation of symbol and what it is about--if there were, one would have to assume that everything symbolized was there before, already cut apart and interrelated as symbols render it. Similarly here, the VIII sequence doesn't just find, it makes (but not out of nothing, not arbitrarily).

The body implies the whole VII-context in some focal way. When this goes through a new kind of change, it doesn't lose that implying. The new kind of change being made is a carrying forward of this implying. And yet it is also new in kind and not a sequence of the kind that were implied within that whole. The phantastic differentiation is a differentiation of those implied contexts and sequences, and yet it is also doubled, so that both: the VII-sequences are different (they are already universals) and also, the new doubled carrying forward is not just of them. Well, is it then a carrying forward of VII or is it something different? If we must choose among these alternatives, then it is something different. But instead, let us keep just this relationship we have found, how symbolizing is of, but by being a versioning (a string of carrying forward versions in a new kind of carrying forward in a new environment).

The VII-context is kept the "same," although (like "direction" above) it goes through change. It is not carried forward in a VII way until later when we come to say or do something.

Another feature of this relationship between VIII and VII is that the change is the solution to the VII problem "only" in a VIII way. The VII ways to solve it must still be devised. New VII sequences are instantly focally implied, but these may not instantly solve the VII-problem. They may "only" state the problem, what has been wrong. They instance the solution, but it may still require much struggle to devise it. (Similarly, the change made in a behavior context by VII-symboling is not guaranteed by itself to resolve the problem in the behavior context. It will be pertinent, not arbitrary.)

The relationship is as we have seen, and cannot be split between how VIII is of VII, and how it is not, in a simple way.

One can have the Direct Referent only as itself, it cannot be rendered in VII ways. Any VII sequence from it can instance it, that is to say we mean more by the VII sequence than it, itself, carries forward in a VII way. It reconstitutes the Direct Referent, and is a "second sequence" in relation to the Direct Referent.

In VII cultural change is slow, the complexity grows with each direct context-crossing but doesn't result in a changed constellation of the whole. We become "more sensitive" and may get to the point of not being able to carry forward in the usual ways, yet no new ways develop. Each bit of novelty changes all (or many of) the other implicit sequences, they now have the changed context implicit in them. This much change is however nothing like VIII-carrying forward of the whole. At last some new way of VII-carrying forward is found, through direct context-crossing, that is to say without a Direct Referent, without having, feeling, or saying what was wrong, and more importantly, without that change of the whole.

It is important to understand what I call "increased sensitivity" here in this sense. I also use the term "hard structure" for the usual carrying forward which continues to be the only way extant, despite increasingly failing to carry forward all of what we sense, and sometimes failing to carry forward at all. Much of our culture is currently in this condition.

Culture forms and reforms further in the crossing (laterally, and collectedly) I called "direct context-crossing" (dir-c-c). Direct Referent-formation in terms of VII is such crossing of all implicit sequences by all. It is therefore culture-formation par excellence.

Culture was defined (VII-B) as the structure of situations, the interaction contexts. Direct Referent-formation elaborates just this (phantastically, we said).

After Direct Referent-formation what is now implicit as interactions with others in the situation has become vastly differentiated, all kinds of alternatives exist which were only "unconscious" facets (not separately) of implicit complexity. These facets "exist," I just said--I mean they are as such, that is to say they can be had, sensed, spoken of, they are universals, new kinds (as anything in VII is a kind).

Not only are the extant VII-sequences changed, not only are there many more new ones, not only are these new ones universals, that is to say they can be sequenced in VII (they can be done or spoken), but all this is not just a quantitative change, vastly more alternatives. What a situation (a context) is, has changed. It retains what it was, it is "the same" context, just as "direction" retains the direction and also changes it. After Direct Referent-formation "the same" situation is different in kind, is many quite new kinds.

Direct Referent-formation is culture-formation--we must examine this further since it sounds so odd. This individual and private process is culture formation?

It is the formulation of new interaction-contexts, new implicit sequences of interaction between oneself and others.

Until very recently this was a very private and odd individual process, and even now those who have not engaged in it don't understand it. Therefore one of the problems with it was its individuality--and the question was how it relates to culture, to society, to others.

VII symboling came about as interaction. Only from interaction did the VII self come to be. A person acquired an inner life through private sequences implicit in interactional contexts. Something seemed wrong with VIII insofar as it was not like that.

But over the years that I have been working on this, the change in our culture has become so marked, and is swelling so strongly, the way people imply their situations and interactions is changing so fast, it has become quite clear how Direct Referent-formation is culture-formation.

In early parts of this work I say (what is still widely true) that our roles don't work very well anymore, the usual ways of carrying forward have broken down, one must pick one's way through each situation. Father, mother, daughter, son, wife, husband, employer, etc., the role patterns--the "hard structures" so often fail to carry a situation forward. We must (direct context-crossing) pick our way through them. To do it better we need Direct Referent-formation.

But already this is becoming incorporated into what many situations are, how they are implied by people. The whole complexity implicit before is becoming something certain situations "appropriately" involve--and those who cannot let a Direct Referent form, and then speak from it, are having to learn how to do that.

This is much more than saying out loud the sequences one once kept to oneself. People are having to learn to find that inner source of such speaking, and are rapidly learning from those who already have it. Especially intimate relationships have utterly changed in this regard while I have been living and working, and observing. And what could be a more important cultural change than a change in what these relationship-contexts are, how they are implied. If you cannot talk about finely differentiated sexual feelings and behaviors with your partner, you are "closed" and you must learn. No use saying "It's fine, let's just do it, I love you." Not too long ago (and in many circles still) it was the other person--the one with the complex feelings all differentiated, who was neurotic and too complicated, odd. And this goes even more for personal interaction between two intimate people. What a wealth of differentiations have suddenly come into common parlance, which would have been squinted at with puzzlement not long ago. All this has become not just additions to intimacy, it has become what an intimate relationship situation is.

I am not saying that all roles and all contexts will now become intimate. Intimacy is one kind of interaction context. But the others will also change, first because so much that used to be implicit and hidden is now perfectly visible, perceptible, sayable. Where not long ago (and in many places still) all one could say was "He's odd," or "That's the way she is," now there is differentiated perception of, for instance, the boss's way of acting manipulatively, deviously, playing one off against another, withdrawing responsibility for now obvious intentions and so on and so on.

Secondly, there is an increasing perception that the routines need not be just only as they have been. Less and less are people "threatened" (as one used to say) by any change proposed in a routine way of structuring all situations. More and more people demand the leeway to restructure in various differentiated ways. This line of change has not yet gone very far but it is very noticeable already.

The change is so strong, it is literally a new kind of humans, that are emerging. A person who has not yet found the inward source of these differentiations seems "closed" just to that which we are coming to think of as the person.

It goes without saying that "finding oneself" is therefore not finding something that sits there, waiting to be found. (From 1/2 to 2 again.) What waits is the not carried forward implicit complexity (not carried forward in an VIII way, a differentiating way). What is found is something very different, the carried forward, utterly hanged complexity, and the self that is fundamentally separate from all this complexity in the new sequence in the new space.

I call the VIII carrying forward on the evev-evev-evev side "self-understood" or self-understanding. This is the "yes...yes...yes" of Direct Referent-formation, the new kind of carrying forward of the whole. This understanding is fundamentally without words (though implicitly it versions and alters the words implicit in the contexts, of course, so speech sequences are implicit). Again one might ask, is the self-understanding the implicit symbolic sequences being carried forward? We have already been exact about this relationship, above. No, the carrying forward is new in kind, and doubledly what can be spoken is being versioned in a new medium. It reconstitutes (each bit is a doubled version of) the interaction contexts and their implicit verbal sequences, and understandable kinded interaction sequences. In its changed way it has all those old and vastly many new VII meanings, but also its own kind of "meaning."

Just as body-look gave VII the new pattern-dimension as a new kind of environment, so here body-sense carrying forward gives a new dimension of versioning, rendering, meaning. A new kind of meaning dimension arises here for a new kind of thinking. Again--from 1/2 to 2: thinking always involved implicit body-sense. Along with the sound-symbols (or any symbols) there always had to be the bodily carrying forward, the feeling-feeling-feeling string interwoven with the perception-perception-perception string, each perception carrying forward each feeling.

Patterns, we saw, are powerful. Anything coming into pattern-implying space has then its own pattern, not some arbitrary human figment. (See VII.) But thinking was always more than patterns, it was also the bodily carrying forward. Now this bodily sensing has itself come to carry forward the body, so that body-sense is an object, a datum. In terms of body-sense as a rendering environment, that aspect of thinking which was implicitly part of a sequence comes into its own in a very new way. It is not a matter of becoming aware of something that doesn't change as a result. "Coming aware" must not be thought about with the flashlight model. To "be aware" is a sequence. To be aware without changing something away is to "pause" it, to have a string of versions of that "same" thing, rather than carrying forward it away. Thereby whatever it is acquires a new nature which is then after all its own, rendered in the new medium. Just as symbolizing discloses nature in a new way and builds a world, so the new carrying forward environment does also. I will go into this new way later, but for now just this: From any point in a VII discussion or line of thought one can move in two different ways: first, along the implications of the symbols; secondly to Direct Referent-formation (and from it to new symbolic sequences again). Of course Direct Referent-formation doesn't always succeed. It makes a vast difference, however, when it does. One is led to thinkings impossible to get to in the usual way...but these are thinkings about the topic's own nature.

As with patterns, it is again the body which has given the new medium. What must be grasped is that, in terms of the new medium everything acquires a new way of being disclosed, but one thinks the nature of what is disclosed, not just something made up. This is of course recognizable in the new VII-type sequences which then emerge and can satisfy the requirements of VII (although they instance more).

 


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