A Process Model
(*) Appendix to VIIIA was called VIIIB in recent printings, but this was an error. An VIIIB is not yet possible in the world. If you look at VIB in relation to VIA, and VIIB in relation to VIIA, you will see that there has not yet developed a whole context of VIII concepts, statements, and doings, such as will become a “B.”
We have left the system of "universals" and thing-like particulars far behind. Already in VII-B we saw that words reconstitute the context(s) and don't drop out detail, are not "abstractions."
We also saw how past experience functions (in general, in IV, but that already instance VIII, as did VII-B).
A Direct Referent doesn't classify or organize extant particulars--rather it creates a whole new range of universals (universals are such, they apply in many instances). Although they can function as VII-universals and carry a "particular" context forward by means of their own carrying forward, they are all a different kind of system, a cluster.
Each VII sequence from a Direct Referent (we said) instances that Direct Referent, implicitly carries forward it. All VII-sequences from a Direct Referent instance each other (instance the Direct Referent each implicitly carries forward).
I call the system of such VII-universals from a Direct Referent a "monad."
The monad is the system of VII-sequences--but there are any number of such sequences. One might have one, or three, or a great many. They will each be instances of each other via the Direct Referent they each instance. The statements in this work are like that! (When I come to the section on Theory Construction I will show how to use all this exactly.) There is not exhaustive system like Kant's twelve categories.
The Direct Referent contains all these many VII sequences implicitly, type a implicit. We can now better see what exactly "type a implicit" means, although we already saw this (in VII-A, B) about "first," "second," and "third" sequences. In regard to the Direct Referent the VII sequences are "seconds." When they actually occur they make much more change than actually happened in the great change of the Direct Referent. This is important. We do not literally assert these occurring sequences into the Direct Referent, they have not then occurred yet. When they occur, this is an eveving (see IV-A), a crossing (tantamount to a New Expression in VII-A).
Consider a dialectical example: Polemarchus in the Republic, having had his first definition of justice defeated (led into contradiction, it implies injustice) now has only feeling of what he meant. The question is, does Polemarchus, seeing this result, return to his original feel of what he intended to define, or does he have more now? Has he learned something, more than that the literal statement he made leads to contradiction? I want to elevate to a principle the fact that Polemarchus learns.54 I see that this fact instances how second sequences do not merely state something already in a felt meaning. In so stating they structure further, they are a further occurring.
As always in this model, the change a new sequence brings becomes implicit in the ones already extant. They have more meaning ( they carry forward more implicitly) when they recur. Thus each statement adds to the others that it instances.
When a statement from a Direct Referent is "applied" to any topic, experience, context, this is not a mere logical applying, not a mere imposition of certain patternings or conclusions upon the topic. In VIII "apply" is in quotation marks, because the statement applies not just literally, but through the Direct Referent it instances. This Direct Referent crosses with that topic.
Of course the Direct Referent already crossed everything with everything, the whole of the VII-context or problem on which it turned--and thereby also the whole VII world as it was implicit in that context.
But just as each VII sequence, in VII, implicitly carries forward the whole interaction context in its own way, another sequence in another way, so that there are many ways the whole is implicit, so also the Direct Referent has not literally already done what happens when it is crossed with another topic.
There are many new wholes in VIII. Each Direct Referent carries forward the whole world already, then can monad (cross and "apply") into the whole world of different topics and contexts. The monad is the cluster of new statements which results. But a different Direct Referent will monad differently. Again there are many wholes. In contrast, dialectic assumes the same formal whole is reached by any avenue. This has a new meaning in VIII. All these wholes are not just different, nor the same. The "one whole" in VIII is in quotation marks.55
A Direct Referent in a type-a implicit monad. The above defines "type a implicit," though its meaning will grow as we proceed.
A Direct Referent stays "the same" in all this monading, and this is a new sense of "same." Already, as it fell out from the string of versions of Direct Referent-formation, it was (as usual) a sense, a datum, an object, as "the same" across the versions. (By their change the carrying forward versions enable one to feel, sense, be conscious of...an it, a datum, and object. See VI.) But now there is another way the Direct Referent stays "the same" through monading. It changes (as a "first" always does through "second" sequences. See VII). It is the "same" instanced, implicitly carried forward whole, but all the sequences each get elaborated as they come to imply the new sequences from the actually monading. The Direct Referent remains "the same" whole (as behavior space is always "the same" space, each new sequence elaborating the mesh that every sequence implicitly alters if it occurs).
Shall we ask why all this is possible? How again was it that the unique peculiarities of a given person's having of the VII complexity during Direct Referent formation came to be universally valid, so that VII-universals can be new, and yet valid for anyone?
Of course, in ordinary science already, any unique instance has to exemplify a general law. Let us be old-fashioned for a moment, then look back to see within what assumptions this is asserted. If something happens at all, however odd, it instances some laws that account for it (so scientists would say). One instance is quite sufficient to pose the question of its lawfulness. One exception is enough to disprove a law.
So it is careless to accept the idea of human "uniqueness" just like that. If a certain human experience of some individual can happen at all (and if it did, it could), then the universe is such that it was possible. By "such" a universal patterning is meant.
But now let us turn and examine the assumption that the universe or nature consists of laws or generalizations or universals. Let us not uncritically accept that as if it were a fact that we can't get behind. Laws, generalizations, VII-universals are patterns; we saw in VII how they work. If something comes into a pattern-implying space, then it has its own patterning
Direct Referent-formation (we saw in VIII-A) takes all facets (no separated number) and crosses them (with a new environmental rendering of them) so that every aspect comes into pattern-space (pattern-space as implied by the body).
And this is true again as the instanced Direct Referent crosses with each new topic to which it (or any VII-statement from it) is "applied."
We saw in VII-A how a "first" sequence, there, is a "first universal." It is only an incipient universal and becomes actually so only as it functions implicitly in the formation of second sequences.
We saw in VII-A.o) that what would function implicitly in a sequence if it occurred, does not necessarily function implicitly when the sequence itself only functions implicitly. (If it doesn't, we called that "held.") We need this point here, we are instancing it and clarifying it: If this odd principle were not so, all the VII sequences of the monad would actually be in the Direct Referent, and all the change each second sequence makes would already be made by the very first second sequence. Or else we would have to say, no, these sequences are simply not implicit in the Direct Referent, and in any second sequence. Instead we have the term "type a implicit" which lets more change happen when a type a implicit sequence itself actually occurs. As they develop, so also do they continue to imply each other.56
As we saw in VI, there is another reason why crossing with a new environmental plane brings novelty. In VI, I called it "the open cycle can surprise the evev." Even though it is the body evev that projects, implies, makes the environmental version, it is done with the actual body-environment. Here the same point is instanced as the body-sense, though made by the evev's implying and being carried forward, nevertheless comes in its own (again bodily) way.
This is even more obvious when we speak of second sequences--they can "surprise the evev" in each bit, because they occur in the VII-environment (in the interaction context) and of course in the actional and bodily (b-en) environments which interaction contexts involve.
Looking back from this, the body-sense involves all these in a way--the body goes on in all these environments and body-sense is an aspect of physical life process, of course. These environments are not separate, of course, we have seen how each is doubled with a new way of carrying forward the previous.
All these environments are implicit in the body's evev, and differently occurring as the body-sense. The body-sense might physically encounter something differently than evev implies it. In its concrete bodily way, it can "surprise," therefore. And then, of course, the VII-sequences can do that again, in their environment.
In all these ways what is later specified (in VII sequences) "was" already implicit (type a). Thus one can specify how some experience "arose from," or "is an aspect of" some other, via both instancing a Direct Referent and the further creativity of aspects which sequencing from the Direct Referent entails. In Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning I only showed that this is so, here we can think about it. Of course ours here is only one model of VII-concepts from the Direct Referent-formation, there may be other ways to think about it. This poses a problem:
In "Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning" by merely pointing to all this (for instance, how something can be retroactively specified as having come from what it literally didn't come from), I was perfectly certain of what I was saying. Here, by rendering it in VII-concepts, I cannot, it seems, have that certainty. But I can, if I use my terms here in a Direct Referent-instancing way! The pointing in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning was after all also done with VII concepts, in words and a scheme. The scheme was rudimentary so it was more obvious that not the scheme but the pointing was intended. We don't need to lose that here! We can have the advantages it gives us, to be able to think sharply and clearly about Direct Referent-formation, and still also let what we say instance the Direct Referent. (Of course instancing a Direct Referent involves "pointing," i.e. "direct reference," that is what a Direct Referent is.)
In this way we retain the inherent validity of the concepts made from the Direct Referent without overplaying this validity and falling into a VII view of conceptual schemes! From VIII we see the power of concepts not as a literal representational truth, but as a monading from a much bigger truth. The bigger truth can give rise to many clusters of VII-sequences, any Direct Referent is still only one of endlessly many possible ones that are equally universally valid in the old VII way, and hint at "one whole" in some way we cannot think about clearly yet. Equal validity here is nothing like a relativism which takes away from the degree of truth each relative version has. On the contrary, the monaded cluster of concepts from any Direct Referent is fully true in the VII sense, and certain to apply in true and significant ways for any person and in any context. The old VII notion that there is one truth only of a VII type is false in being too poor, nothing of it is lost. Experience, nature, or reality is much richer than that old view wanted.
What then can we do right now, if we wish not only the clarity our concepts give about Direct Referent-formation, but also Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning's certainty? If we ask again why speaking from a Direct Referent is valid, and we answer again: A Direct Referent isn't just any fuzzy feeling, it must jell, and doesn't always form at all. When it forms, the whole VII context of some problem or situation (with all its implicitly functioning other contexts) has actually been carried forward, i.e. all these implied requirements have in some way been fulfilled. But now we say that all this is couched in some model--are we certain about all this business with sequences and contexts and requirements and versioning? Let us now engage in a creative regress to the felt sense of what all this instances: (I will now use different words, to point to it, but again these different words are intended to instance, not as literal. As literal they are simply in another model, one less well worked out.) We recall that, yes, experiences are in each other in some way. Yes, one can specify a texture that is always there. Something profound happens in the formation of a Direct Referent or whatever we might call it. We could just stick with describing what we can always do, letting our description be so poor that none would take it literally as a scheme.
Now, in having this regress we seem to have less than our model. Not at all, we still remember our model! We could just as well say we are bringing home to ourselves what our sharp conceptual statements are really about. We add to our model-sharp sentences the wider direct referent grasp which they instance. And, our directly referred to implicit sense of what we are talking about now has the sharp statements implicit in it! Polemarchus has learned! We don't return, after conceptualizing, to the literally same Direct Referent, but to the "same" one. (Later I will say more about this IOFI space, as I call it, which instancing builds, and which is being built here.)
But if every conceptualization will alter the direct reference and always be implicit forever, what about a wrong chain of thought? Suppose we don't find out its consequences and learn from them. Suppose we think it right when it is not? Does it then remain implicit from then on in our supposedly valid Direct Referent?
So we can now think much more clearly about our own model--it's not merely that there can be many models but it's good to have at least one good one. It's not merely that our model is on a new and as yet unused level, but soon there will be more and better ones of this kind. That is so, but in our model we can now say why this is. We can bite into, think into, form sharp concepts into the underpinnings of why this is so. We can think about a new kind of truth that is much bigger.
Of course our concepts, and any concepts, are instancing the Direct Referent which as a whole can be had only by the direct reference in this instancing. But the concepts and statements can be used in a literal way too, that is not lost.
This is far beyond the usual vague statements (which remain true, of course) that we have from Plato, for example, or from Heidegger. "Any truth always also hides the truth," Heidegger says (in Wesen der Wahrheit). Plato showed in every dialogue how any statement can be driven into contradicting itself if its implications are drawn out by logical procession until something results that is the opposite of what was intended. This was long ago recognized to lie in the very nature of conceptual structures. But now we can think about the nature of conceptual structures more sharply and we can directly use, rather than be baffled by, its limitations. These limitations are not negative, they only need to be understood. Then there is at least the knowledge of these limitations, and when we wish also Direct Referent-formation and the instancing use of statements, which is beginning to become clear here. (More is written on this elsewhere.)
Just the opposite: By having regress to this Direct Referent after a given attempt at a statement, just those aspects of what the statement does will be implicit, which are valid. What magic! But of course...the statement insofar as it instances the Direct Referent and carries it forward indirectly does so only as valid. Much in the effects of the statement will fail to carry the Direct Referent forward, i.e., will fail to let it function to shape the statement. And insofar as that is so, the Direct Referent will not have functioned implicitly, will not have shaped what we said, and will not have been changed.
Therefore it is very powerful and corrective to refer directly to the Direct Referent between sentences as often as possible. If what forms doesn't implicitly take our formulation-attempt in, if nothing like that forms, if there is only a fuzzy confusion and no Direct Referent (with the yes ... yes ... yes effect of self-understanding), then it is important swiftly to return to the Direct Referent as it had formed before our latest formulation-attempt, and to discard that formulation-attempt.57
Has this not always been done in good thinking? In a way yes, in another not. Dialectic, for example, and other methods, indirectly of course employed the implicit functioning of everything one knows, as one thinks. Without that there was never thinking. Thinking is the carrying forward of the complexity that is being versioned. But very often there was only the logical guidance, arriving at systems and formulations that are only logically "spun." Empirical testing corrects that. In dialectic a return to what one intended is added, and the powerful insight is also added, that new concepts can be fashioned, new differently cut boxes altogether, when a contradiction is run into. But both the merely logical + empirical testing, and the dialectic return and reformulating proceed slowly, in that way I called "direct context-crossing." The steps are implicitly informed by all one knows, of course. But one must play out at length all that one can spin with logic, and then test it, then reformulate. There was no way also to constitute all one knows, that is relevant, as itself a datum, a new kind of object, which can be consulted between every two steps of thought, in a new kind of "empirical testing," if you will. (And we already saw what powerful and vast change the formation of such an object makes in the content itself. It is like a vast number of theories and testings, a vast number of dialectical reformulations, all at once.)
But what did it mean, how can we bring it home to ourselves, to say that monading from all Direct Referents is "true," or "valid?" I mean that it can be lived in the world, that the world really can be changed and lived in this way; I mean at least that. We have a way of thinking why Direct Referent formation enables such new statements and doings which can actually be lived in a world, a situation, a problem which they thereby change, but let us not substitute the good explanation for the direct reality. The validity is not our explanation of the validity.
Said the fellow in Catholic Religion class after the teacher-priest had presented St. Thomas's proofs for the existence of God, "Father, all my life I heard about God, and you mean that's what it is based on?"
When new VII sequences are type-a implicit, this means they can be lived, done, sequenced, had, felt in a sequence that makes time. As we saw, an occurring sequence like that is a new and further eveving; it isn't literally "in" the Direct Referent as it will be lived. In what way, then, has Direct Referent-formation insured that it can be lived? Only as far as the whole-whole carrying forward in the Direct Referent-formation has changed how the body implies all these contexts. Is that necessarily enough change to enable the further change the actual sequence will make? No, we said that there. There might have to be many steps of speech and doing, and again Direct Referent-formation. A guarantee would be an assumption we cannot make, and in fact, often we need many steps, and we do not solve all problems. But Direct Referent-formation moves powerfully in that "direction."
But again, why not? Can we think clearly why Direct Referent-formation does not necessarily enable livable VII sequences in just one step? We already saw how the VII-sequences can "surprise." They engage the actual en in a spread out way, which was only functioning implicitly in the Direct Referent (in the body-sense and in the evev). We also saw already in VI that versioning is not guaranteed to change a context so a stoppage can be resumed. It is only pertinent.58
A monad as I defined it is one kind of VIII-object, now I want to consider another kind: I call it "diafil."
A monad is like comprehension in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, and a diafil is like metaphor in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. I mean: As the Direct Referent monads out, it stays "the same." The whole cluster of statements from it, instancing it, and all the "applications" of those statements, is like one large comprehension of the Direct Referent. All comprehensions of the Direct Referent in all fields.
Instead, we might let each topic and context cross with the Direct Referent not only in that way in which the Direct Referent "applies" and monads out, but also in the reverse direction, letting the other topic be a Direct Referent monading into our first one. If we do that we lose the relevance of our Direct Referent, and it is no longer "the same" as monading (IV-A.h)).
For example, when early on I crossed explication with action I let each of them alter in crossing with the other. (See Introduction.) (As Theory Construction will show, I did this because both were already facets of the Direct Referent I was working from. Therefore they already instanced that Direct Referent and the example is only technically one of diafilling. If we get clarity about this, then it is helpful and right to consider what I did there, and this kind of theory construction move, as diafilling.)
If we were to cross each new topic in both directions, we would eventually arrive at wisdom--though no single relevance would stay.
We have seen (IV-A.h)) that the kind of crossing we called "sbs" (schematized by schematizing) is not the same in the two directions: between any two experiences different results occur depending on which one is used to obtain new aspects of the other.
Another way to put this is that there is not one fixed relation (or set of relations) between any two experiences. If there were, obviously it wouldn't matter which one you began by relating to the other, you would get the same thing both times. What we said about "sbs" (schematizing and being schematized) was thus an instance of the fact that new aspects are created, they are not all already given. Or, the same point is instanced when we say that implying is not identical with any explicit structure; if it were, again the relations would be already fully fixed, and a finite implicit set, with a "not yet" added.
Therefore the distinction between monad and diafil is not really possible, we cannot split between them. To do so would mean that we could split between keeping a relevance (a whole evev) "the same" in monading, as against letting it change in diafilling. But when two cross, each relevance is carried forward in some way, that is to say "kept the same" in some way.
There are many ways, not just one or even two, that two experiences can be crossed. In Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning I attributed this to the many "other" experiences which always function as the context. Depending on what we want, what the juncture of the discussion or line of thought just now is, what else is required to make a solution acceptable, the crossing of any two will be different. (Of course we might be crossing as our "two," the whole sense of a problem at this juncture, with the "whole sense of " another. Then the "other" experiences that function are already part of the Direct Referent. Throughout, I have not discussed the relationship between the set of functional relations in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, and our discussion here. Of course both are schemes, and what follows here about schemes applies to them.) Another instancing of the fact that many rather than one way of unitizing and schematizing are possible, is the following:
We cannot say that a given new aspect formed from a crossing between two experiences, was or was not already implicit (type a) in the Direct Referent. This is because we can retroactively specify the Direct Referent as it "was," so that the aspect will be seen to "have been" implicit in it.
All this is another instance of the fact that we cannot split between what functions implicitly and what is held. Held/functioning implicitly is not a split between parts. (See VII-A.o).) It is a new distinction in how anything can function to shape something else. To function implicitly is to help shape something else. A likeness is created when something functions in shaping something else. (We are instancing the Reversal of the Order.) The given sequence or content now functions not fully as itself, and not with some pre-existing part, but in a way that was not in any way part of it before. As we saw in thrashing (VI), its function may be much more and more noticeable, than it itself was. (Our metaphor for this was that when walking isn't possible because one is in the water, the movements of walking do not "partly" occur, much more movement occurs without the ground being there. Thrashing was not "part" of walking, before one fell in the water.)
Nor can we split between those sequences which do in some way function implicitly, and those which can't. The sequences are all implicit in each other (or, if we don't assume perfect unity, many are). Therefore we found that we cannot assume that all the sequences implicit in any one, when it occurs, also function implicitly when it functions implicitly. This is because of what we just said. A sequence does not function implicitly as all of itself, does not function implicitly always in the same way, nor in always an old way.
To version is to keep same and also change (carry forward), Versioning is always doubled. We have seen that monading is like that, one keeps the Direct Referent "the same" by carrying it forward in some other topic. I also call that other topic a field. That term is defined by this function in relation to a Direct Referent. To monad is therefore an instance of "comprehension" (defined in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning).
Contexts are all implicit in each other, so that one is always at some spot in all the contexts. If it were all one logical system, then this would add up to one set of relations between each. Since it is more than that, everything isn't settled (and more than one can VII-sequence is implied) by how the contexts are implicit in each other. Rather than simply stating what was already, the contexts are further enriched, though we then can say that (and specify how) they "were" already so.
We have understood Direct Referent-formation itself in the terms we are using here, especially the crossing of many contexts. But it is Direct Referent-formation which is instanced by these terms, so that we must not put the order backwards. It was always reversed and we set it right. (Instance of Reversal of the Order.) So we do not expect to reduce Direct Referent-formation to these terms, nor do we intend to reduce monading of a Direct Referent to what we say here about monading. We are saying that monading is "at least" what we say here. Direct Referent-formation can be thought of as "at least" the crossing of all the contexts.
If Direct Referent-formation is in this way diafilling ("at least"), we must keep in mind that there are very many ways any two can be crossed. This then lets us think how still more happens when the Direct Referent is monaded, and how there can be many Direct Referents of all contexts (and many "all contexts").
Direct Referent-formation we called "jelling," to describe the way it feels. But again, there are many ways and also there might be many jellings, many "steps," and "shifts." Again, we cannot split between no shift, one shift, and two. If we wish to know about such differences, monading out into VII will show us, whether the problem is solved, can be lived or thought from.
If it does not jell, however, then there was not Direct Referent-formation, and then one cannot do what we have been describing. That distinction stands between Direct Referent-formation and direct context-crossing.
Later (in Theory Construction) we will discuss building a new field of terms. It will be neither an "application" we can insure being only the monading of our model, nor something totally different. The model (our Direct Referent), will function implicitly in forming that new field of terms. Just as monading generally, our Direct Referent has functioning in it implicitly all the sequences we have made until now. How they will function in relation to a new field is not going to be exactly as we conceptualized monading, nor diafilling. Let us call it "monading-diafilling" and let it stand for what will be a whole continuum of different ways: for example, one may require further "applications" to be within one model, always going back over everything to make it one theoretical system. Or, one may require the kind of consistency we have had in our model, permitting new terms to be more complex and not univocally resolvable in relation to earlier simpler terms, but without any contradictions. Or, one may tolerate some contradictions, while working out others (wherever that is needed to be able to deal with what one needs to deal with.)59 And this array is only one way of bringing home that there is not a simple split between staying in one monad, as against allowing development. All these cited above are still a use of one model. Later we will see that many models can be used (see Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning - VI and the concluding section below.)
Another type of differences along which we might have such a continuum is: If above I bring in everything we ever talked about in this work, crossing each with each, I would be making the terms more and more consistent with each other. One might say: all these topics already were instancings of the Direct Referent we have been monading, of course they easily lead to one system of monading sentences and terms.
But I could also consider a narrower sub-set of my model, and "apply" to all the other topics, rather than letting my model be rebuilt by them all. Or, I could widen my scope further, bringing in new topics and considering my model still being built.
There is a difference also, whether we let a new topic raise its own facets first, so that there is a set of aspects we require ourselves to deal with. If so, we let these import the structure of their relations. Or we might let our model or Direct Referent specify the aspects of the next topic and deal only with these.
We see, usually with a startle, how vastly differentiated anything is that we care about, and if we care to deal with it we must allow that. It lets us see how vastly different anything is from the simplistic schemes that we usually use to think about anything. With our model and method we can differentiate one or many steps into the actual complexity, rather than merely deploring the supposed poverty of thinking in relation to anything. That we can do this is very powerful, and that we can do it in many ways rather than only one is more powerful. There is not just one system of differentiation levels implicit.
I call this different "densities" of consistency.
We see that there are always many considerations along which one can make a scheme of such a point as this. Similarly I spoke of comprehension and metaphor in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, showing that any other consideration brought in can specify a scheme about their relation. And this is so at any point, if one wishes to consider that point as instancing the most basic relation between experiencing and symbols (as the schemes relate to experiencing).
This way of using "monad" and "diafil" is like the use of "metaphor" and "comprehension" in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. The terms retain their VII-sharpness and help us think and instance rather than to reduce the Direct Referent relation to themselves.
One way this manifests, is that a given aspect can be formulated in both ways. We can use "monading" to explain diafilling and Direct Referent-formation and much else, but we can also, with different results, use "diafilling," and also could formulate some still different terms.
Here I want to make clear only that we are not allowing VII terms to get fuzzy or lose their power. We are retaining their usual power and adding immeasurably to it. We will not just shrug, if there are different results from two formulations of "the same" thing. We know in what sense (we can think clearly about in what sense) it is "the same" and in what sense not. We will look at the different aspects, themselves able to be Direct Referents, which are specified by the different formulations. We will see at any juncture whether the different aspects affect that juncture. That effect itself can be pursued, Direct Referent-formed, and specified further. Or, if at the given juncture it makes no difference, we can know that later on it might. For now we can leave the difference, knowing that it cannot be ultimately removed, since that would be to impoverish experience down to one system. Why want that? We see that more than one have powerful effects. Why not allow ourselves to think sharply about something that is richer, I repeat, not poorer, not less determined, not less structured, not less meaningful, not up for grabs or arbitrary statements or actions.
There has been no way to think clearly about something more ordered than clear thinking sequences. Therefore people have misunderstood all this.
When terms instance a Direct Referent, they mean more, that is to say they carry forward more. Their effect on the juncture at which they are used is more. They make more difference in the context they carry forward. If this "more," or some of it, is to be specified, that too can be done, not exhaustively reducing it to VII terms, but in such a way that we know better what that effect was, than the words say, and still also know in VII-sharpness what the words say.
So far as the model itself is concerned, I stop here. I say this in spite of a whole development of terms that is to "come," which will immensely clarify certain important points left open in our model. (It is inherent in our kind of concept-formation that there are points left open. To fill them in would develop a new tier with its own new points left open.)
Our model, as I say, will continue to function implicitly as it has for each new stage up to now, but with more openness which we will define later.
From now on each new topic will be permitted to raise its own facets, not just those our model would lead to in "applying" to it, and we will also be in IOFI space, not in our model.
I would want to use many models although there are not, as yet, many on this new level .
We will still develop clusters of mutually implying concepts and statements, but for each area. The power of the model will best be seen in this way, since often enough we will remain "within" it. But we want also to gain the other advantages.
Could I have stopped sooner? I set out from VIII (in the form of Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning) and wished to arrive again at VIII after forming concepts by crossing with the other relevances (body, behavior, symbolization, etc.). Once arrived in VIII I know I could continue on and on. I want to be able to think into how VIII "functioned" from the start. If I find that I need more concept-formation to do so, I will let that happen in doing so.
It is vitally important that this little discussion we just had, be clear. So many people today believe they must choose between thinking sharply systematically or having and honoring the much richer living Whole. I hope I have shown that both can continually enrich clear thinking by using the implicit functioning of the directly referred to Whole. It is by no means only for the power of the systematic statements themselves as such, that we want to think clearly, but also for how it enriches what we then directly refer to again.
As I will show more exactly elsewhere (with due carefulness for certain other concerns I have with them), Plato and Aristotle together instance what we have just discussed. Plato devised a method for concept-formation (dialectic) in which each step checked itself against the whole, and also informed the whole. Plato cared much more about this method, than about any specific concepts, however powerful and superior they certainly were to what had gone before. Aristotle modified this method to fix concepts. He developed one consistent cluster. He knew very well that in each new context new concepts must be allowed to form. Whenever he "applied" his model he did it so as to allow that model itself to become newly differentiated in each new context. ("It must be something like..." he would say and cite an earlier instance. Then he would let the new context develop new terms, not within, but not contradicting, what he already had.)
In spite of Aristotle's conscious fresh concept-formation with each new topic and in spite of his delineation of how to do this (Posterior Analytics), the result was the loss of the method of concept-formation Plato had originated and Aristotle had developed. People found it much easier to learn Aristotle's concepts, than his method of concept-formation. Indeed, often enough they didn't even see the method at all. The "sciences" Aristotle carved out have largely remained, while the intricate overlapping way he did it is largely misunderstood. The basic concepts in many sciences, if not still those he fashioned, are often simplifications of his. (Current discussions of time and space, and motion, life-process, self and other, individual and society, history and art, are examples.)
Should we blame Aristotle (if that makes any sense) for developing such a beautiful model? Ought he not to have done so? Do we wish he had followed more closely Plato's way of beginning anew and arriving at a different scheme in each dialogue? That cannot be the right answer. There is a way, at least today if not then, to have the power of one or more good models, and still also have the power of concept-formation.
I wish to be my own Plato and Aristotle. I wish to offer not only a method as Plato did (and Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning does), but also a body of consistent concepts that do better in science than what we have had, and are better philosophy than what we have had. But I want more still! I don't want our model to have the kind of negative side that Aristotle's turned out to have in history. I do not wish the power of the new concepts to prevent people from knowing how they were formed, from using concept-formation. The method of concept-formation is much more important than the concepts. Also, what the method shows about the relation of concepts and experience is much more important than the ways in which I have formulated that relation.
How can one be Plato, and Aristotle and more? But they have already written and we stand on their shoulder, and Kant's too, Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's, and many more. If you really understand, you always move beyond, as I tried to show a little while ago.
But if this is so, are we doing away with consistent arrays of findings and theory in each science? One can't shift models all the time, or if one does then no consistent bodies of knowledge will develop. We do need those. One or more new models might be of great value, say in medicine, or aerodynamics, but we would want them used in interaction with the existing science, not to disorganize it. Are we not glad that consistently formed data and propositions in these sciences have remained intact long enough to be thoroughly tested and expanded? Would we like to board an airplane built along the lines of some new model of thought? And did I not promise (and perhaps even illustrate in a few cases) that our new model can help science in the sense of resolving anomalies and enabling further development of consistent bodies of data and propositions in these very sciences, not only in newly begun approaches?
How are consistent bodies of knowledge to be reconciled with concept-formation?
It has always been philosophy's task to examine the kind of concepts used in science (and the kind of method, assumptions, strategies). When scientists examine the basic kinds of concepts and methods, they are doing philosophy (although they may, as persons, be quite unprepared, and unfamiliar with how to conduct such an examination). Scientists may do this because of controversies involving different assumptions, or because of anomalies arising in the current model, or because they wish to develop as much thinking power as possible.
The distinction between science and philosophy need not be embodied in separate groups of people. It does require different sections of the library, different bodies of connected statements and findings. But the same persons at different times need to do both. I am against continuing the split between scientists and philosophers. It seems wrong to prevent the first group systematically by education from ever becoming familiar with philosophy. Then they cannot examine their own tools and assumptions. And I agree with Merleau-Ponty and Hoeller60 that philosophers would do well to engage in science continuously, to examine directly the differences the philosophical assertions make. (Too often the official view was that philosophy does the science-examining task once. Let the scientist read it. The philosopher must know science, that has never been seriously questioned. But it has seemed needless to continue in constant interaction with science, on each page or in each paragraph. I find, as must have been noticed, that I must often discuss the philosophical point about kinds of concepts and methods together with a scientific issue that leads to, and is affected by what I say philosophically.) Even so, the difference in task, function --an essential difference, between philosophy and science stands, of course.
Does this mean, now, that "science" is always one connected consistent body of knowledge, but philosophy can change models and examine kinds of concepts, itself using many kinds? This has not been the case in history so far. Philosophers, even more than scientists, have usually developed just one model, one consistent system. (Plato is the exception.) True, philosophy, much against its will, has always contained many models. But most philosophers deplored this fact, as though philosophy done rightly would be in only one cast. The basic system created, the philosopher applied it from then on, and looked to scientists to read it and apply it for themselves. Once in a while this also happened to some extent.
Heidegger, having completed his consistent model (Being and Time) refused to use it, and proceeded instead to the generation of new concepts, vague but vital insights. Rather than inviting everyone to apply his new basic model, he very nearly asked them not to. In moving on as he did, he knew something of what I am saying here. But it was a grave error not to work toward developing his "model" so that it could acquire the specifics it would need to replace the usual model. He ought to have done or invited the job I have done here. But he wanted to proclaim the "end of metaphysics," that is to say systems, consistent schematic philosophy. In wanting an end to systematics, he had a sense for going beyond systematics, but he did not know how. So he went backwards to vaguer, more naturalistic, more homey ways of speaking, and he went sideways to poetry. He did not solve the problem of how to have, if you like this way of saying it, continuous philosophy, that is to say a continuous undercutting and re-examining, a continuous concept-formation, fresh emergence of form --and also still have consistent connected bodies of knowledge.
Just as the same person can at different times engage both in philosophy and science even though they are different activities, so also can the same person deal both with consistent model(s) and also with concept-formation, and this is so both in philosophy and in science. Nor need the different times be very far apart; it might be moments apart.
Having pursued some line of thought along the lines of a consistent and powerful model, having noted what this power just now gives one, why would one be unable to employ, moments later, a different model to see what that would lead to? To do this doesn't contradict the consistency of models, on the contrary it is possible only because consistent models do have powerful results and different models have different results. Having been led to something relevant by use of the second model, there is no reason (if one wishes) why one can then not formulate "that" in one's preferred and consistent model (including an examination of what difference it makes to do so). And if this is so for different extant models, it is also the case with innovative thinking.
The problem how to have both is as old as Plato, and rightly so since he sought to emphasize concept-formation rather than concepts. He chides the mathematicians for never asking why, without changing "one" in one hand, and "one" in the other, they become "two" merely by moving one's hands together. This (among many other examples) meant one should inquire into one's assumed concepts, not just deduce with them. The "divided line" metaphor in the Republic distinguishes in its upper half between deductive science and dialectic (really, philosophy). But in chiding the mathematicians Plato did not at all wish to eliminate mathematics!
But Plato did not solve the problem, how to have both, and did not think merely to examine or reflect upon basic scientific concepts--he meant to change them, and did change them in every dialogue. But if that is what happens, how then have both? Of course, some innocent "philosophy of mathematics" which would only reflect upon, but leave unchanged the concepts and axioms mathematicians use, would pose no problem. Plato did not mean it that way. If the navigator asks not only how to get to Egypt, but also, as Plato wanted, why go there, and what purposes are worthwhile, naturally that would seem to disorganize the science of navigation. (Or would it get us out of the bind of technological splits between how and why, facts and values, physical and human, and so on? Would it lead to new concepts that could apply across?)
I am discussing two distinctions: philosophy/science, and systematics/continual formation. About both I have so far said that the same person can do both at different times, perhaps moments or sentences apart, that they remain distant, and that there is much more power in both than in discarding one.
Let me now say more about philosophy and science, from the viewpoint of VIII.
Just as the many universals that emerge newly from Direct Referent-formation are not under other more general ones in one logical system (see VIII-A.7g)) so also is there no simple division among more or less general topics. Not only is this so in terms of scope of generality. It is also so in regard to context. Something in sociology, something very specific let us say in just one subspeciality, noticed by only a few observers, may instance (through Direct Referent-formation) very many sequences of great import to many other sciences. There are philosophical aspects in any statement or action. Conversely, no topic is strange to philosophy. It might sound like sociology and talk about society, might sound like psychology and talk about the psyche, might sound like physics and talk about matter and change, but is never discussing just these things, always also how it is possible to discuss those, so that whatever is said exemplifies philosophical issues.
With Direct Referent formation this becomes true in a whole new way, as a Direct Referent is a cluster in which everything is changed, and all these changes are instanced by any one statement which might otherwise appear to be in just one field.
None of this means that the divisions between fields must be lost. We still need public bodies of knowledge collected and organized topically. It is in addition to these, that one can also know how to instance more than just what belongs in one topic.
Similarly the difference between philosophy and any science stands. Philosophy will always undercut, examine, reposition basic terms, concern the kind of concept one uses, rather than only the topic directly. But all levels of discourse are involved in a Direct Referent-formation.
So we see that, indeed, it is not breakdown or limit, that our terms (all VIII terms qua instancing in IOFI space) do not resolve schematically. Instead we go forward into what is continuous philosophy.
Modified 10/2001 (c) 1998 by Eugene T. Gendlin. All Rights Reserved. webmaster