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NOTES


1* The order of implying differs from en, but this does not mean that the en is structured or patterned. We who are building a model employ patterns, and see environmental occurrences in patterns, but patterns are a later development. We derive them in VII. So we have to think of the environmental sort of order as happenings, like walking or feeding, which are not patterns although they might be seen as patterned in various ways. Never are they only patterns with mere concreteness or existence added to them. In logical inference we use patterns, but the process of generating them and inferring from them) involves much more than the patterns. Thinking with patterns always involves a process that is more than they would be if they could exist alone.

Of course the concepts we are making here involve patterns, but not only patterns. Thinking is also a bodily process (as we will see in VIIB). Concepts carry the body forward. Each brings its many situational applications along with it; we can tap into those at any point. The implicit experiential intricacy still comes with each term, even when one uses a theory as if it were closed, without attending to the implicit intricacy (and without attending to the implicit effort involved in putting it aside). The logical power -- the logical inferences -- require this. But we can reopen a theory at any point and in any application. We can use any theory both as closed and as reopened. (See ECM VI)

Our term "implying" employs the old conceptual pattern, but the sentences in which it occurs here enable it to imply more, which also changes the conceptual pattern. Occurring occurs into implying and changes it. The terms "occurring" and "implying" have to be thought together.     back


2* See Focusing, New York: Bantam, 1981 and "On Emotion in Therapy".    back


3* In VIII we will discuss the kind of thinking that goes beyond the usual categories. (Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning shows a number of such "characteristics" of how experiencing functions in cognition. One I already mentioned is: The more determinants, the more novelty. Determinants delimit but they also enable. See also Crossing and Dipping, and Thinking Beyond Patterns.)   back


4* The new thing happens and keeps the old thing from occurring. In building a model we seem to build from the bottom up, but as I will keep pointing out, we can in fact begin only from our human process. I am really beginning with VIII - with explication and focusing and fashioning concepts with and from those processes, terms which will eventually be able to carry those forward.

As Wittgenstein showed, language is capable of new uses that make immediate sense -- they are not first a breakdown of the old meanings. I have tried to show that when we lack words, it is because our more intricate situation is already reworking the language implicit in our bodies and implicit in the "....." which only seems "pre-verbal." The "....." is not preverbal, but it is "pre-" the new phrasing which may come.

The implying of a pet's body has language implicit in it (because its experience has), but a wild animal's body does not. But the implying in any life process is capable of developing as we have developed. In ourselves we can trace back through civilized history, our own culture, but also primitive culture, and the animal and the vegetative in us. The implying of life precedes all those levels and must be put first, at the very bottom, even at inanimate levels as the wider model. What was there before was of such a nature that what has developed from it was possible.

We must not model nature on mathematics and logic -- as was done for so long. Math and logic are exclusively human processes. If we model nature on mathematics or anything that is only human, we exclude all forms of life but ours. In the case of mathematics we drop ourselves out too. Implying and occurring are human but not exclusively human. Implying and occurring lead to a wider model, within which we can derive the logical patterns too. But the former cannot be derived within the latter.

The order of implying is neither determined nor indeterminate, but more intricately ordered. This order is not understood in most philosophies, although it is just what makes philosophies possible. A philosophy changes how the basic terms are positioned, and thereby shows that the order we live in is more orderly and capable of more than can fit one system. It is why many models can be fruitful. Ours has special characteristics but there will soon be other models with those.   back


5* I call it "functional accruing" when the environment-implying of the other processes, (their en#2) is also implied by this given process. I say that the implying of en#2 of each of the processes "accrues" to the other processes. For example not only certain digestive process events imply food. Circulatory and many other processes also imply food. Some seemingly tiny sub-sub-process in some remote tissue implies much of the many environments of many processes in the body.    back


6*

Zeno's paradox showed that a thing cannot move if it must traverse an infinite number of actual distances. If an interval were infinitely divisible, and if each of these divisions were an actual span, then an infinite number of them would have to be traversed before the moving object could get to the other side.

The solution was to realize that infinite divisibility of an interval does not imply an infinite number of actual spans.

Since a line is divisible at an infinite number of points (since points have no dimensions) the solution of the paradox also says that even an infinite number of slicings still would not imply an infinite number of fixed intervals between the slicings.

We could reformulate the solution by saying: The multiplicity achieved by any one way of dividing need not stay fixed, while the motion is occurring. The motion defines its own interval (it is a motion from here to there) in starting and stopping, and aside from that, interval units need not stay fixed, and do not define the motion.

If we formulate the solution of Zeno's paradox in this way, we retain the idea that an infinite variety of slicings does not provide an actually existing infinity of intervals that take time to traverse, and we can let the actual motion determine the slicings.

Our formulation can extend to events, not only to space and time intervals. The multiplicity that crosses need not be thought of units that actually happen separately, in their own right.

We could apply the paradox, so formulated, to the old unit model: If all the interaffectings have to be separate actual occurrences, then interaffecting would take an infinite amount of time to get from one constellation to another.

But the multiplicity of space points, and also the multiplicity of aspects of a given whole event are not separate occurrences. (Even as simultaneous they are not separate occurrences, but different aspects.) The further occurring is not defined by them as a fixed and literal multiplicity of separate existents. Only the next event occurs. We can retroactively relate the further event to a previous one in any number of respects of comparison. Thus we can retroactively construct an earlier multiplicity which supposedly lasted through to the later event, and ascribe just this multiplicity to the earlier one as well. In this way we can derive the old model's way of conceptualizing a transition. However, such a formulation will be much poorer than ours, because it will involve separate strings of comparison. For us the retroactively determined multiplicity will have been one in which all aspects affected all others and were in turn affected in how they affect others. But all these interaffectings did not happen as separate events. Analogous to the infinite number of points on a line, they are constructable, but not independent events with their own time-spans.

The traversing, or the occurring, is not fixed by static units. If the units are not lasting, then there can be any number of them, even as an infinite number.

For why space and time intervals, and independent units, are not actual events, see footnote 8 and "The Responsive Order", Man and World, 1997. Gendlin and Lemke, "A Critique of Relativity and Localization," Mathematical Modeling 1981, hereafter RO and CRL.    back


7* I am indebted to Hannah Frish for this example. She used the term "aura" for the way all that is felt at once. See also Goldfarb, M., "Making the Unknown Known: Art as the Speech of the Body," in M. Sheets-Johnstone Giving the Body its Due (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993) partnership. 180191. Einstein said that he was guided by "a feeling" on the relativity problem. "Direction" in space is derivative from living as I tried to show in TBP and my reply to Mark Johnson.   back


8* In R.O. I showed that the consistency of Newton's and Einstein's space is less basic than interactions. The assumption of individuated referents is not necessary. This assumption has seemed even more basic than consistent localization, but both are systems of mere comparison. Comparison does not need to supervene quantum mechanical interactions. Individuated referents alter depending on the respects in which one compares them, which in turn depends upon the grouping of other things with which one compares them. I do not deny individuated referents. We need (and in an odd way are .....) those. My point is that the individuation of referents changes without interaction, simply by deciding on a different comparison group.   back


9* Hierarchy Theory. Howard H. Pattee, Braziller, New York 1973, partnership. 77-78.    back


10* To let our scheme of "sbs" itself be sbsed, instances how all concepts apply (see VIII). What a scheme reveals when applied is not necessarily only what fits within or under it. Rather, facets which emerge from applying the scheme, can change that very scheme. The scheme is further schematized by its own role in schematizing.

A simple way to say this: One need not apply a scheme blindly to something so as to notice only what can be said in terms of the scheme. It is more powerful to notice that what arises from applying the scheme can turn out to have further aspects that do not fit the scheme. The scheme itself is can be further specified if one pursues those.

This is a way of thinking both about the use and the formation of conceptual schemes. A scheme first forms when something is used to schematize something else. I discuss more of this in VIII and in Theory Construction. Of course we can use this model in that way.    back


11* Brandom, R. B., Making It Explicit, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 661, n54.   back


12* We will derive "making" in VII-A. See also my derivation of the machine in RO. Our science renders everything as if it were something made out of antecedent pieces. Chairs are not made by the wood or the metal, nor do they develop from a straight chair into a sofa. Patterns and positional time arise together (as we will see in VII). The chair pattern is separate, and externally imposed. The wood can splinter and the nails rust, but this is not always positional time. Physics needs a more intricate time. See CRL.

Inanimate things are not just in positional time either. (See Steven M. Rosen, Science, Paradox, and the Moebus Principle. State U. of N.Y. Press, Albany, 1994 for a reflexive treatment of time and space.)

For a model that is less different from the usual than ours but does have some of its major advantages, see Bickhard, M.

For physiological evidence that organismic process is not primarily something that happens to a body, and that perception is not prior, see Ellis, R. D., Questioning Consciousness, John Benjamins, Amsterdam / Philadelphia: 1995, pp. 51-55     back


13* In this sense we can say that the implying always "wants" life to work out, to go on, to succeed. Much that we find in focusing will become clearly sayable with this concept of the dual "was." The pathology may be implied next, but a healing way is also and more truly implied next, since what is implied is not this or that content, but a carrying forward. The more intricacy, complications, problems, in a sense the greater the pathology, the more novelty is implicit in the healing or carrying forward which is always also what is implied. And carrying forward is always still more than the implying. A sequence of actual further steps is even more, as one can see from focusing steps. (See "A Theory of Personality Change" and VIIAo on how carrying forward is not only more, but also brings more implying.)

The case of simply not carrying forward is quite distinct (e.g., doing a lot of other things does not carry hunger forward), but there are many kinds of carrying forward, as we will see later on. This is also why carrying forward an organism's own inwardly arising process connects it to its original implying, and is therefore so much more valuable than even the best imposed way.

   back


14* On not dividing between "was implicit" and explication see "Reply to Mohanty" and the Section VIIAo here.

For example, in walking, when the foot presses on the ground, the ground has to "already" have returned the foot's pressure so as to cause it to "have been" foot pressure. Kant solved this problem in the old model by making "simultaneity" a kind of time-"order" that could be consistent with the succession of cause and effect.

Similarly, the moving body's momentum seems describable as being-about-to-be-there, in a further location, but the momentum is an attribute of it here now. The implying is a real aspect of an occurring.

Kant saw that a pure positional time-order cannot exist alone. As Kant put it, time is not written on the events so that one could perceive time as such. Whether something must come before or after was determined for Kant by explanatory relationships between events --you must put up the walls of a house before the roof, but you can look at either one first, if they are already up. Kant took this to mean that time is a scheme of relations between events. He used the Newtonian model and was content to impose both positional and explanatory relations on time-positions.

Instead, we would say: time is in the events, not between them. That the roof comes after the walls is inherent in what a roof is, and what building a house is. Therefore time is not an empty ordering system that is independent of events.

In terms of quantomechanics, what the actual interactions are (re)generates the systems of space-time localization. (See CRL and RO). Experiencing is time-inclusive and multischematic, as I say in ECM (p155). This means that many models of time can be devised from actual experiencing.

We need to retrieve and revise the way our American Pragmatists employed three terms. Currently in Europe it seems there can only be two terms, signifier and signified. It is assumed that a "third term" would be the Hegelian synthesis. So it seems that other than logical continuity there is only rupture.

This model also builds on Dilthey, Whitehead, McKeon, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, as well as Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, and others. Elsewhere I have discussed my debt to them, and my way of going on from them.   back


15* My use of "derived" is intended to mark that we are not simply asserting a commonplace, (that much of nature has rhythms). We have built concepts or internal structure in terms of which to think this. These concepts and this structure is precise all the way back into our earlier concepts, and will be continuous with our later ones. Yet the new concepts are not reducible to the earlier ones; it is not an axiomatic system. If it were we would forever be stuck in whatever concepts we first developed or began with, some arbitrary choice. If one can begin, ever, there is nothing against beginning often; I mean developing new and further conceptual patterns that are not logically derivative from the earlier concepts alone. But neither is it necessary to have sheer gaps which don't enable one to think, except with either these or those concepts. The continuity between concepts is such, rather, that the new developments further inform and precision the earlier ones. Terms are definable and derivable in terms of each other. Our process concept can now derive rhythm, something both ongoing and stable. (Of course, "stable" means what it says here.)

Of course, we did not get leafing only from our earlier concepts; we knew about leaves and heart beats and intention movements in animals. In the latter we saw an example of how a new process and a new move can develop from a stoppage. Using that as a model instance we were able to precision it here in relation to our already developed concepts. We are also interested in other instances where something new and very different occurs when an earlier process does not go through. See (b-2) which comes next.

In using such model instances, we do more than just assert them. We are not merely saying one thing after another. If someone says only that organisms have rhythms, that living things come in pulses; etc. etc.,) it would be fair to object that this tells no more than we already knew.

But how is the method used here different, if it too adds new instances and makes new concepts at each step? How can I claim to have "derived" rhythm from our concepts when I am visibly developing the concepts right here, to do so?

I do not just add that there are, for example, intention movements in nature. I take them as model instances to let them form new concepts for us, but more than that: I let them form new concepts from the concepts we have up to now. Or, to put it in the right order: When we roll the concepts we have up to a new instance, we do more than just slice up the new instance along the lines of the old concepts. To do only that is quite foolish and locks one into a given set. But it is just as foolish to fail to make use of one's concepts up to the given point. A third way exists: we let the concepts schematize the new instance, but we also notice how the new instance resists, does not fit, crosses, gives something new, in response! Taking what is thus found and permitting the concepts themselves to be elaborated by it, lets the concepts be further schematized by how they schematize.

Such a new "response" from a new instance is not just any modification. Rather, it is just the modification which these concepts need in order to schematize this instance. There is therefore a continuity in this explicatory development of the concepts.

The concepts develop until they can derive the instance they are sbsed by. When it can be derived, the newly elaborated concepts are successful that far. (Sometimes this does not happen at once -- a whole new context may have to be built over many such steps, before something used earlier becomes derivable. (I usually point this out when it happens.)    back


16* The ordinary English word "relevant" could fit here, but we already used it in IV-Ad) for how the past functions in the present. Relevance is inherently the case; the past wouldn't be functioning in this present if it were not relevant; that it "functions in" the present means that it is able to participate in shaping the present, and to be regenerated now by functioning in this present. (See IV-Ad) and VII.) I want to let the word "pertinent" say a less inherent relation. Anything in the en during stoppage is pertinent, just as when one is trying to solve a problem all the information about it is pertinent. But only some of this information actually leads to a solution.   back


17* This is not to deny that we can trace visual perception in the animal body and brain separately from other perception. But we must not read what we differentiate back into our understanding of a process that has not yet made that differentiation. (See Part B of TBP) If we do we cannot come to understand how we form it in a later development. We will not have a grasp of the process in and from which we form it.   back


18* Here we are giving the word "context" an internal conceptual structure. For humans, the behavior context is called the "situation."

There are many occasions when one wants to say that something "occurs in a context." The phrase is as vague as it is important. Better concepts can be devised for (from) it, but ours give at least some more conceptual structure so that we can think further from saying that something "occurs only in context." See whether it doesn't show you something important, or enable you to conceptualize what you are trying to get at, if you think that the thing in context is falling out from a string of changed contexts. Rather than assuming empty space, so that the phrase "in context" means that the thing is spatially surrounded by everything else, but separated from it by its position, think of the "in" so that the thing is not separable. It is the string of contexts.

For example, the relation between action and situation is like that. It is in fact my model instance for this schema. An action goes on in a situation, but that isn't well grasped, if the "in" is considered in empty space like an object in a room. The action changes the situation it goes on in. The situation is thus "the same" one before, during, and after the action--if it were not, the action wouldn't meet the situation.  back


19* Implying is always for some carrying forward, not for a fixed form. When the environment occurs into an implying so as to form something new, we can say that the new sequence "was" implied. Therefore "implied" can mean either

"implied" a) has never occurred before, or

"implied" b) seems the same to an observer as a previous occurrence.     back


20* This is an example of the kind of model Pattee is looking for (see IV where we discussed him). He needs a way to make sense of seemingly the same unit having very different characteristics in different contexts.

Pattee makes two errors at least: he assumes a limit to order (see VIII) and thinks of a given molecule as "fully determined," no degrees of freedom, nothing indeterminate, which to him means the same thing as no openness for novelty. For us anything implicitly functioning is never determined to an explicit form. Secondly the kind of determination he looks at is only explicit. He has no way to think about what functions implicitly--and that can make greater differences despite looking no different. Really this is two points again: the molecule can do more than he knows about, because it has an implicitly functioning side, and also, what he considers an exactly similar molecule in another context, isn't. The context is not only positional around something in the observer's space. The context may be implicit.   back


21* For example, every word comes with a "family" of uses. These are not side by side, but crossed, so that they form one sense of "knowing how to use the word." But in actual use this crossed family also crosses with the situation, so that the word comes to say just precisely what it says here, in this situation. (See my "Crossing and Dipping.")

In the situation the words come to us already crossed -- the body produces them as part of implying the change we need in the situation. What makes just these words come to us is how their use-family crosses with our situation. Language will be discussed in VII, but we build our model here so that we will be able to use it there.    back


22* As has often bee noted in philosophy, even human perceptions (taken up in VII) are not experienced as bits of sound and vision. We hear voices or trucks and we see people. But we need a theory of perception to think about this, as well as how bits of just color and sound arise (as we will see in VII).   back


23* If an insect attacks the leaves on one side of a tree, those on the other side quickly mobilize certain antidotes. How plants imply their body-process is much more intricate than has been recognized till very recently. But I don't think they have the doubling we are deriving here.   back


24* Traditionally an object was thought of as a unity of "traits." The object is the underlying substrate (sometimes said to be supplied by the observer as subject) which supposedly holds the traits together. Sugar is white, sweet, and crystalline, dissolves in water, etc. , but each such "trait" is shared by other things. What makes it sugar is supposed to be a unity of these traits.

From our viewpoint such thinking comes too late. Traits are abstracted entities.

Above we see the unity of an object in terms of mutually implying behavior sequences.

Objects implicitly involve the other sequences and their fall-out objects. They are internally related. An object implicitly involves how it (for we can now call it "it") falls out from other implicit sequences and their objects.

We derive how there are objects across many sequences. We don't just assume a world cut into objects, bundles of traits abstracted from behavior.

What objects are depends upon the organism's living, its behavior. A tree is an object for humans; we cut it down or sit under it or climb it or eat its fruit, and we move around it when it is in our way to something else. For some animals, the tree may be an object like that. For others certain leaves and branches might be home, and fallen out from many sequences, while the trunk may be an entirely different object together with the remaining branches. Nor need the different division be spatial, as in the above example. The moist trees after rain might be an object, and the rest might blend into everything else.   back


25* The above rendering of space, and objects in space, makes it possible to differentiate between what moves, and what does not.

In Newtonian space, absolute empty space, only cat and bird are moving at all, the scene is unchanged. We have just derived some of the experience of steadiness and sameness which Newtonian space requires observers to have. But only in VII can we really talk about that.

From our schema we can see how simple the old model is, of mere comparisons of already assumed clunk-objects in empty space. We will derive this empty space, in VII, but behavior space will remain its underpinning.    back


26* The short syllables of language (and their intricate syntax) may have arisen from compressions of longer sequences in a proto language. We will discuss this in VII. Another example: A new train of thought must be sequenced through. Once we have often done that, just its becoming implied may be enough to move us on. A short phrase may do it, for example "Oh, yes, that." We no longer need to sequence it fully as we did at first. The brief phrase changes the evev enough so that something further becomes implied. (I call this kind of compression "boxing.")   back


27* Merleau-Ponty should be cited and credited in this discussion. He did not provide a model, nor did he study our own explicative process which he used. But he was a pioneer in regard to the role of the body in perception, behavior, and language.   back


28* Philosophy has recently overcome its long fascination with "sense data" and the error of beginning with them. But there hasn't yet been a derivation of them. Husserl said that we don't begin by hearing sounds, we hear birds and voices and doors slamming. Sounds as pure sensa are products of a theory, he thought. But this isn't quite right. Humans can and do hear sounds. We can hear a sound. We can hear a moan-sound and know it to be the wind, or someone's imitation. We can hear a shot and wonder if it was something else that made a sound like that. Pure sensa are derivatives not from theory but from expression, from symbolic sequences of the looks of, and sounds of . . . . Only thereby are there separated senses. Then there can be just a sound. Only thereby can we theoretically think of ourselves hearing sounds and seeing visual stimuli the nature of which we don't know. The animal hears something and perhaps doesn't know what it is. We can hear a sound, and we may not know what it is the sound of, but we can always hear what it sounds like (even if it is strange and "sounds like nothing we know"). We can have, feel, attend to, the sound as sound. (Only then can the theory Husserl rightly criticizes begin.)   back


29* The two laws of explication are placed here because we can derive them here. But here we only speak of a sequence that first functions implicitly, and then actually occurs in its own right. The parts are different in the two cases, and what is implicit is different. Later on these two laws have more meaning, when we can talk about language and (in the usual sense) about explicating.   back


30* For example, a frequent argument is that one can use only what is publically observable as a basis for thinking. This usually misses the fact that our inner experience occurs in publically observable contexts (in action contexts) exactly like language does. We have our inner experiences in contexts (situations) with others, and they have their public significance just as much as words do. Internal events are neither private (in the sense of not public) nor inconvenient for theory. To remain unable to think about them means being unable to think about most of human life. But how could such an absurd error be committed, as to try to drop inner experience from consideration in theory and even philosophy? It was because an outer/inner distinction was uncritically accepted. Thereby "inner" was taken as if it were spatially located out of sight, as if it thereby left no gap in the public world, if it were not considered. And this was thought to be convenient.

One must grasp, however, that all human events (VII sequences) are inherently external/internal, that is to say inherently symbolic, inherently one thing concretely while being of another thing. There might be other ways of conceptualizing this but no omitting it can then hope to grasp anything human, including how we grasp nature.

To remain unable to think about the inherent character of external/internal means leaving the human observer unexamined, and thus also the very basis of the current model used in natural science. Thus natural science cannot be deeply examined, human science becomes utterly impossible, and certainly the relation between them has to remain a gap.    back


31* Was there something like this FLIP also in VI? It could not be exactly like the FLIP here from one space to another, because there was no space before VI. But there was a new consideration at the point when the open cycle became behavior-space.   back


32* That is why the space is empty. Of course, as to the movements of gestures themselves, again one cannot raise one's arm and at the same time reach for something with it. But this is now only a concern for movements, for locations in space, and not for the meaning of behaviors (which these gesture movements only version). When the gestures form the new system of space, the situations are interactionally related, and the empty space comes to subtend everything. Objects can then be positioned in that empty space, anywhere, just as if they could appear anywhere there is room for them, just as gestures can. This is then irrespective of what the object is, and in what context it could actually arise or be found, as in behavior space. They are then loose and arrangeable as to location. That is the "space" we usually mean by that word.   back


33* Even we today cannot bring up just any old thing, something must make us think of it, must "bring it up," for us, must relevant it (see VI).   back


34* It makes no difference if this second stage originally developed with a lone individual, or if others were present and looking on. Either way an individual is turned to an object, not to the others. The others are carried-forward also by what that individual does in relation to the object.

From the start it is implicit that the others are carried-forward also by the same formation. The dance which functions implicitly in seen-formation is an interaction with the others. They are implicit from the start. Since these gestures and object-seens form for this individual with the dance interactions implicit, they form also for the others. It doesn't matter if they first form for them alone, or if they are carried forward by first watching this individual.

The "also carrying-forward" of others is implicit (at first it is type a preformed implicitly, then after it occurs it further changes the context).   back


35*

We have had three cases where it seemed a sequence forms in the wrong context. Each time we found that it isn't the same sequence. It forms a new context, comprising both earlier contexts in a new way. The three cases were the wind moaning like a person, the garden-versioning at home at night, and the "third" which reconstitutes its own collected context(s) thereby making the present context an instance. These three cases are different, of course.

Before the wind can carry forward a sound like a person, the wind's own wind-sound must acquire carrying-forward power. In that formation the person-sound functions only implicitly. When the wind sounds like a person, this likeness itself is sequenced, had, felt, carries forward. The people don't run out to comfort the wind, or to comfort some lost person out there, they know it is the wind. What is sequenced is the moaning-likeness-in-the-wind-context. At home, versioning the garden, one does not spade up the floor. Like the moaning-likeness-in-wind-context, the garden-at-home-context is a new one.

The likeness doesn't give the wind a personal identity, it does not elaborate the wind context in a basic way. The garden versionings do turn the garden context into an interaction context. What makes the difference?

The carrying-forward by likenesses as such or patterns as such occurs in all three cases. But the garden-at-home develops into language, while the moaning wind doesn't. Why not?

To be able to carry forward likenesses as such is also the capacity to see pictures as pictures, as well as the capacity to show someone how one spaded the garden by standing up and making motions (but without cutting into the floor literally). Thus the capacity to form new likenesses is very basic and occurs widely. It is not language, there is no crossing, no formation of many similar but different symbols from crossing.

We can say that there is a likeness between whatever sound forms, and the human sound that functions implicitly, but we had not explained how we can do that. We can say that the animals recognize a likeness if they respond to one thing as if it were another like it, but the animal responds to this present object. If the animal hears the wind sounding like another animal it will go out and search for that animal, not sequence the likeness.

We have often used our developed human capacities to describe what develops, long before the capacity to describe it so, develops. There are therefore three: What develops, what the developed itself can have or sequence about itself, and what we can say or observe or have about it. Else we cannot understand that observer who must then remain outside the system. Then we cannot understand our own scientific system either.

It is something very different, to live or do something, than to be able to say it (have, sequence, pause, feel, symbolize, version, take time to sense without changing), describe it, understand it. Much development and living goes between. Roughly, the living is like a first sequence, the between development like seconds, and saying thirds.    back


36* Another way to put this is in terms of the schematic principle that a reflexive turn upon some context turns, not on the context as before, but on the context newly regenerated. It turns on a turned-upon context, not on a not-turned context. The carrying forward patterns-as-such regenerate the context so that it is the interaction context, i.e., has patterns-as-such in it (not the behavior context with patterns about a behavior context added on). The patterns are about a patterned context, a "situation."   back


37* The implicit must not be thought of as nothing but the explicit not yet. Rather, there is a lot of difference between an a-type cluster and the later actual occurring. (See Polemarchus learns and my discussion of Meno in VIII). As one altered seen sequence actually occurs, it also changes all the ways the others are implicit. Actual working out or occurring is by no means nothing but what was implicit. We saw that the implicit isn't to be viewed as the same kind of structured something, that occurring is. Later, after occurring, "was implicit" will be attributed to the structured, but this isn't the literal was. We cannot split between what occurs and what doesn't but functions only implicitly as we saw in VII-A.   back


38* Why did language develop in sound? (Once patterns themselves developed, they were just sound, or just visual, or just motions. As shown in VII-A, the different senses became differentiated. But why was it sound that developed language?)

Many reasons can be thought of. A main one has to be that sound carries in all directions so that one need not have been looking at someone to be addressed by that person. The infant's crying will carry to the mother even if she is just then looking somewhere else.

That sound patterns affect us bodily by their quality is of course plain in music. The Ohm sound is still used for its specific bodily effect.

Both reasons are involved in why "conventional" symbols developed in sound.    back


39* Each new dance forms as a new whole bodylook-carrying-forward. As we said in VII-A, the whole development of patterns in the action contexts enriches the capacity for whole bodylook-carrying-forward, so that the next new dance versions such an elaborated action context (in which the other action contexts are implicit). The pattern space is "expressionized" and "actionized" reciprocally.

The object has always its looks and sounds, but this becomes more elaborate as more pattern-aspects come to carry forward. What it looks like and sounds like becomes more and more developed, although that is always its character (seen and heard in pattern space).

Similarly, the patterns of action and making grow, as do the patterns of objects, those used in action and making. They are all not arbitrary, even though the pattern dimensions are derivatives of expressive versioning of just certain human contexts.    back


40* The different behaviors or actions were physically interrelated, but not only for the external observer. There were many other physical interrelations than just that one cannot climb a chopped-down tree or that while running, an animal cannot drink from a stationary brook. The observer would see that. But the body is more complex, and much that the observer would think possible, cannot happen together, either. Also, quite a lot can be one body event, that the observer would think of as different events.   back


41* As we saw (in V), this need not literally have been part of the dance. It can look quite new to an observer. It will be what can form, when the dance sequence itself is implicit and cannot. As we saw (with thrashing) what forms can be more, it need not be less.   back


42* Edward as a baby said "bye bye" with a wave, whenever someone left the house and got into a car. Then we going out ourselves came to be called "going byebye." Then cars came to be called "byebyes," and our car was called "gooliga byebye" (the first part of that was his version of his name). Other people's cars were named by their name + "byebye." This is called "semantic drift."   back


43* It is not yet clear if we should think about this as use, or if it is still only the development of the units that are used only later. (It seems probable that we will later see clearly: yes, this short unit formation is also an original use.) Once short units have formed, there is use. Until short units, even though patterns themselves do collect, it is only past experience functioning.   back


44* Just exactly why, and at what point does language cease to take in new sounds? We now have several questions like this, about the exact point a development comes: We want to know that about the cessation of new sounds in language, about the beginning of use, and about the FLIP when interaction-context space (inside/outside space) takes over.

Against these questions we can place the schematic developments we have clearly seen: the change from whole body-look carrying-forward to only just certain visual or sound patterns themselves; the formation of interactive contexts and gesture sequences together; the collective reconstituting of patterns; the development of short units.    back


45* Appendix to f) at the end of VII-B is a discussion of how details do not drop out, and universals are not commonalities with the differences dropped out. It has been moved to the rear to permit the present discussion to arrive at its conclusions more directly.   back


46* The above offers a way of understanding Chomsky's view.   back


47* The more development there is, the more novelty further happens. It speeds up geometrically. Humans are par excellence processes that can give themselves trouble, and lead to stoppage. All the way through it need not have been en-change, that made for stoppage, it could have been from the side of the body. See also the section on increased sensitivity. Any sequence is a string of contexts of many implicit sequences. Thus what seems the same action can recur, each time with different, more elaborated implicit sequences. A point is reached where the given sequence, too, can no longer occur, the given carrying forward can no longer carry forward. In modern culture this is easy to observe. We become "too sensitive" as it is called, to be able to eat, profit, defend ourselves, have sexual intercourse, and much else, under conditions that served perfectly well to carry our ancestors forward. We can still do a behavior, but are no longer carried forward bodily and fully, so then we cannot do what our bodies would need next to imply. Instead, there is a stoppage, a new situation with a new implying.

We cannot expect always to find ways to carry such new situations forward, although we must try. No simple return to less implicit complexity is possible. Call it neurosis or creativity, call the old times brutish or spontaneous, it doesn't matter. It is an error to think that we can want to return to the eternal return as Nietzsche saw it. Certainly he is right to the extent that we must find ways to carry forward our bodies, our work and procreation. No amount of behavior can substitute for body-process, one cannot be nourished from behavior alone. Similarly, the most complex human space must still enable us to eat, sleep, and have sexual intercourse. But these must not be viewed as empty commonalities, as though the detail didn't matter.

We are in the midst of a whole new stage of the development of the individual. Some huge proportion of people in the world are developing an inwardly sensed self that transcends cultural role-identity. The rest will soon find it too, since it is a cultural development. We need not be surprised therefore, nor is it to be deplored, when many of the traditional patterns are no longer possible for us. New patterns slowly develop, but we cannot expect to create a whole regenerated culture on our own as individuals. We cannot expect ourselves to discover all the new patterns we need to carry life forward in every situation. Certainly, some degree of this culture-creating is now the norm for an individual. Just as, at some stage culture became various from place to place, so now also the individual variations are growing into a major factor. But humans are inherently interactional, and even with the greatest creativity an individual could be imagined to have, there is no guarantee that a way will always be found to carry forward an interaction.

I will consider this much more closely in VIII, as it cannot be resolved in VII which is really devoted to traditional culture, as it was before this current began.

Novelty has always been in human living. Someone who could only interact in well known routines would not be human. Here I was concerned to remind us that body-process events are never made up of extant units. Implying is always for some carrying-forward, not for an already formed next. Stoppage is something that a developing process can make of itself, and not only due to a change that comes from outside.    back


48* Of course a particular situation is inexhaustible in regard to the universals that can be formed in it (see Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, V) and in that sense Aristotle and Kant were right--practical situations are like our Details. But they misunderstood the system of universals in several ways: First, it's not right to ask: "which universal applies today?" They all do, and they all know to form today. But of course, secondly, this cannot be done from external observation of one's own situation, only from direct reference, which VII doesn't have. The VII person is cut off from this. Hence universals are brought to rather than forming from the richness of a particular. Bring-to and form-from are two different procedures. The world cannot be considered one system such that the two correspond to two systems of units, things, or considerations, aspects. Even of those that form from it, one might in a practical situation want to pick the one that focally carries forward. In developed VII but before VIII full-bodied carrying forward is difficult. Too many form, not because they're empty fencings, but because it's hard to carry forward the whole focaled situation, none of them can, usually. THE INDIVIDUAL SITUATION IS IN PRINCIPLE BEYOND THE KINDS AND INCLUSIVE OF THEM.   back


49* See VI & VII. If each bit were literally the same, there would be no body change and nothing would be felt.     back


50* This "rightness" is the yes...yes which comes in direct referent formation which I will discuss later. back


51* See Focusing.    back


52* Also note: The third step is clearly not simply some specific way of being insulted. The details are not "under" a general class definition. See later.   back


53* Direct Referent-formation is analogous to the first VI-sequence. Recall that a bird only forms later, in a more developed context (behavior-space). The space of the first sequences is the empty space (which also remains as the symbolic counterpart of the simple movements). (Later, after FLIP, all behavior seems to be going on in symbolic empty space.)

Therefore the Direct Referent is not an object like the bird in a mesh of mutually implicit sequences of the new type, that is not a stage we have yet.

Rather, the Direct Referent is a doubled carrying forward object like the monkey's gesture that is versioned. Rather than one big-shift emotion, the body-feeling here goes through a versioning on a new level.

The line that can't quite be drawn between the formation of the Direct Referent and the shift in it, is analogous to a change coming for the monkeys as a result of the whole dance (their conflict behavior-context is changed so something new can happen). But we experience this as a shift in the Direct Referent, or of the Direct Referent. It is itself the perfect feedback-object (always, each bit of each new sequence is). It is the solution to the requirement context in each bit but its fallen-out datum is already all that change. To go another step of change that is clearly different from this one (this formation one) would require another Direct Referent-formation, not the role of a Direct Referent as an object carrying forward an implying of it. All carrying forward carries forward an implying of it in a way, but it isn't a carrying forward object on a new level, since that hasn't formed yet.   back


54* As we saw in VIII-A, Socrates' respondents do not quite form direct referents. When I say that in dialectic one is thrown back to what one intended and meant (since the statement has contradicted what one meant) this "what one meant" is not instantly a direct referent. The respondents usually complain about being confused, paralyzed, they don't know what to say. Or they give another quick answer. But even when the next answer is exactly a definition that follows dialectically from the contradiction, and incorporates what has been learned, even then it may be only a direct context-crossing: from the knowledge of before plus what has been seen, the new definition follows so as to take care of what made the contradiction. If justice is paying back what is owed, and a weapon deposited with you for safe-keeping is returned when the depositor is crazy, you will hurt someone who did you no harm. So in this case returning what is owed is precisely unjust. Then the next definition of justice is to return a favor for a favor, and a bad deed for a bad one. One has learned that what one owes is a favor, something good, not the weapon or the money, or the thing borrowed.

Dialectic is therefore formal, both in driving statements to contradict exactly (unfairness or injustice follows logically from the definition of justice), but also in how the next definition is attained, exactly from what was learned in the contradiction. We don't need the formality of driving each statement separately into it.

Direct Referent-formation, on the other hand, changes the whole scene, the way all the sequences are now implied and what they are.

But each new definition in dialectic too changes all the boxes, the way the concepts cut before, and makes new cuts. It does this as a direct context-crossing does it, from a changed bodily implying but without first carrying forward that as such, as a new datum.

But the effect of sequencing implications out, and thereby altering the whole complexity as it is in the bodily implying--this is as true after Direct Referent-formation, as without it. Therefore I came to name the principle this way.

Also, in its slower way on the VII level, the dialectic features the problem we are answering: How is it that one--in a way--knows already, so that one can recognize that this consequence is not what one intended, and nevertheless one has also learned something? Is it that what one now learns explicitly is what one already knows implicitly? Not quite! One's implicit sense of the question has developed too.  back


55* The different monads will all be valid.   back


56* More exactly: we might be talking of development, recurrence, or pathology. Once developed, all extants imply it--but when they happen in their changed way, again it is new eveving.

Once happened, are they not with all their new eveving implicit in all extant sequences? Yes, but not along the lines of only one logical explicit system. New entitizing and universalizing (new particulars or aspects, and new universals) can be made from any point, which were not literally implicit.

But all this is still development. Why is this the same point as "held?" Or, more exactly, there will be some relation between type a implicit and held, since they both instance the Direct Referent here (of Direct Referent-formation). What is their relation if they aren't the same point?

Isn't the point that an actual happening is something, is a change really, and not just a filling in of extant "possibilities." It changes the implying when there is an occurring, so how can it necessarily be one ossified system as if the implyings were occurrings-not-yet?

But is this same point quite the same in development and in recurrence? As recurrence, yes, it is again a formation (with exceptions [VI, VII] that don't matter here, about thinning and boxing). But that's not the question. Rather, it is whether what the occurred "first" functions in (the formation of) should be said to be implicit in a way that leaves further functioning-in (the formation of) open in the same sense as some implicits-in-implicits are held. But "held" is that each functions only insofar as it shapes.

Since not all sequences are literally functioning implicitly (many are held) in any given VII-sequence, therefore what was held has not been crossed, as it would have been if it did function implicitly. We are therefore accounting with the "held" principle, for why each new second sequence also changes the world, why this didn't already happen--indeed would have had to happen, in Direct Referent-formation and if not there, again in any one second sequence from a Direct Referent.

But "held" seems a small, quantitative way to say it unless we enrich "held" from here! It isn't that some sequences are left out, to be crossed with later, but that how anything functions implicitly IS how it functions in this shaping, in this sequence, in this eveving. All these points instance how there is not a fixed set of clunks that move around, how there is a different eveving in each sequence. How there are many wholes is instanced and clarified too.   back


57* This is not to say we won't keep the statement until later, for other reasons. It might be the only statement we can make now, of some finding or some observation or some notion that we wish to reformulate. But we will keep it at arm's length until we can formulate it differently. We might also specify exactly certain aspects of how it doesn't fit. This can only be done with the use of direct reference, and by keeping the Direct Referent, so that the statements of what's wrong are statements that do instance the Direct Referent.   back


58* Later we will examine the relation between a Direct Referent monading out, and the contexts, language systems, and other organized fields, into which it is monaded. We can see that since these can differ, the VII sequences from a Direct Referent can be various. But all that has been said, not only this, shows that Direct Referent-formation is not yet actually the creation of the VII-sequences themselves. A further creation happens when these occur. They would be logically deductively determined in advance only if we wrongly thought of the bodily implied complexity of VII as equivalent to a system of statements, thirds, only. But within the creation of VII sequences (from a Direct Referent) the same relations hold as in VII, between the interaction contexts and how language elaborates and alters them and reconstitutes them.

The cluster is type-a implicit in advance, and thus very finely determined, but as usual, the implying (of this cluster) could be carried forward in various ways--though getting even one is difficult, since it must carry forward so many fine newly implicit differentiations.    back


59* To work out a contradiction will always show something, specify aspects   back


60* Keith Hoeller, "Phenomenology, Psychology, and Science," in Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry vol. XVI, nos. 1, 2, & 3 (1978-79), pp. 147-75.   back


 

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